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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines cross-national differences and similarities of the influence of 
chief executive officer (CEO) professional development and work context on organisation 
performance between the legal jurisdictions of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
 There is topical debate in the contemporary corporate governance literature arguing 
for the possibility of convergence of corporate governance practices around the world toward 
the Anglo-American model, which seeks to maximise shareholder wealth (Rasheed & 
Yoshikawa 2012). Convergence theorists, including Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), argue 
that the Anglo-American model ideally provides the required resource focus and efficiency to 
manage large corporations; consequently, other countries with other practices that reflect 
local business culture or regulatory systems will need to adopt this model. It is of note that 
leading organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) have pushed for the implementation of certain principles of guidance for sound 
practice in corporate governance that reflect the rights of shareholders and a role for key 
stakeholders. While these OECD principles provide some impetus for convergence, the 
OECD notes that specific circumstances in legal jurisdictions plus the size and complexity of 
companies can impact corporate governance practices. This provides scope for an alternative 
view argued by Branson (2001) that convergence theory proponents did not take into 
consideration the actual obstacles in attaining such convergence. The differences in culture 
and regulatory systems across various countries may prevent convergence from taking place. 
Further, the process of convergence may take a longer time (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009). 
This thesis examines this tension between the convergence and divergence arguments, 
specifically in the context of the CEO professional development and work matters and their 
influence on organisation performance within the Australian, United States and Hong Kong 
  
xxii
legal jurisdictions. These three countries have been intentionally selected to represent the 
Anglo, American and Asian practices and models of corporate governance. 
This research study is informed by a blend of positivism and critical realism 
methodologies, favouring deduction on the deductive-inductive continuum. The sample 
includes the largest 200 publicly listed companies by market capitalisation from the 
Australian Stock Exchange; the Russell 200 Index (i.e., the New York Stock Exchange, the 
NASDAQ); and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, respectively, as at 30th of September 2010. 
The total sample size is 600 companies. The data was collected from secondary publicly 
available sources such as annual reports over a three-year period from 2010 to 2012. The 
research also utilises reliable publicly available archival data (e.g. Morningstar DatAnalysis 
and BoardRoom Review) in the case where the information from the annual reports was 
insufficient. Quantitative analysis undertaken includes descriptive statistics, bivariate 
correlation statistics, analysis of variance (ANOVA), hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis and moderated regression analysis with the similarities and differences in results for 
the hypothesis tests giving benchmark insight into points of convergence and divergence in 
particular country practices. 
The findings show a few areas of difference in the cross-sectional CEO work context 
data across the three countries, notably the relatively high cases of CEO duality seen in the 
United States context and the relatively high percentage of CEO share ownership in the Hong 
Kong context. Australia exhibits a low incidence of CEO duality compared with the United 
States and Hong Kong. There is an area of similarity in the positive prediction by a CEO with 
an output-oriented functional background of the dependent variable organisation performance 
in the three countries providing support for the convergence argument. Other points of 
convergence are as follows. In Australia and Hong Kong, CEO share ownership percentage 
has a positive effect on organisation performance; however, the non-executive director ratio 
  
xxiii
is negatively related to organisation performance. These findings provide support to the 
stewardship theory and may suggest that agency-based corporate governance structures, 
which embrace the importance of composing a board with a majority of non-executive 
directors, could be limited in providing a favourable effect on organisation performance. 
Instead, in Australia and Hong Kong stewardship-based company structures, which embrace 
the importance of remunerating the CEO with company shares or including a few skilful 
inside, executive directors on the board, should be considered. Further, there is an area of 
similarity in the positive prediction by an insider CEO of the dependent variable organisation 
performance between the United States and Hong Kong. In the United States only, a CEO 
with international work experience has a positive effect on firm performance. In Australia 
only, long CEO tenure alone does not predict better firm performance; however, the findings 
of the moderation hypothesis and the moderation plot suggest that long CEO tenure is 
associated with better firm performance when the non-executive director ratio is low.  
This thesis contributes to theory development by integrating multiple theories such as 
the upper echelon theory and relevant corporate governance theories (e.g. agency theory, 
stewardship theory) in its development of research hypotheses. This research study critically 
assesses whether these theories can help to explain the relationship between the professional 
development and work context of the CEO and organisation performance in different national 
contexts. Understanding the value the right CEO selection and work choices can bring to an 
organisation is important for a range of stakeholders inside and outside the company. The 
findings will also assist practitioners in developing a CEO succession plan, training for senior 
managers and company policies. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is debate in the corporate governance community of academics, company 
directors, business executives, consultants and professional bodies—such as the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors—on the speed and extent of a trend to convergence of 
international corporate governance practices to the Anglo-American model (Clarke 2004a; 
Gordon & Roe 2004; Crossland & Hambrick 2007; Kiel, Nicholson, Tunny & Beck 2012; 
Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). The Anglo-American model is noted for its focus on 
maximisation of shareholder value and is supported by corporate law and securities 
regulation to protect shareholder interests (Nestor & Thompson 2001; Hansmann & 
Kraakman 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009; Kiel et al. 2012). Asia is a key economic 
growth region on the globe (Galvin 2014) and is experiencing an increase in the number of 
listings and turnover on important stock markets such as the Japan Exchange Group, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Asian business has in the 
past been characterised by dominant shareholdings by family groups or a small group of 
majority shareholders and the use of personal connections (Clarke 2000). Following the 
Asian economic crisis of 1997 Asian corporations were encouraged by bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank to improve their 
governance practices (Clarke 2004b). Asian corporations seeking capital on United States 
and United Kingdom stock exchanges have also had to comply with local listing rules in 
those countries. This background provides the basis for a theory that has inspired this thesis, 
that there is a convergence of international corporate governance practices taking place to the 
Anglo-American approach. This thesis investigates this theory. 
  
2
 This introductory chapter will present an explanation of the background to the 
research, describe the research context and highlight the research problems and gaps in 
existing literature to explain the motivation for conducting the study. This chapter highlights 
the use of a multi-theoretic perspective in this thesis to provide a better explanation of the 
link between the professional development and work context of the chief executive officer 
(CEO) and organisation performance. This chapter will present the research objectives and 
research questions. The key variables used in the study will be defined. This chapter will also 
provide a brief overview of the methodology and methods for conducting the research. The 
outline of the thesis will be presented and the contributions of the study will be succinctly 
described. 
1.2 Research Background  
The introductory remarks note there is a debate in contemporary corporate 
governance research arguing that there is convergence of corporate governance practices 
toward the Anglo-American model that emphasises shareholder value maximisation 
(Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009; Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argued that the Anglo-American model provides the 
necessary efficiencies for the management of large companies with various owners in 
globally integrated markets. Global convergence may eventually develop when overseas 
companies willingly acquire United States, shareholder-based corporate governance practices 
for the purpose of obtaining access to United States investors and listing on American stock 
exchanges (Coffee 1999; Fiss & Zajac 2004). The corporate law and the securities 
regulations in this model put a priority on shareholder interests offering protection to both 
majority and minority investors (Nestor & Thompson 2001). 
The Asian financial crisis that emerged in 1997 uncovered underlying weaknesses in 
Asian corporate governance systems, which are typically characterised by ownership of a 
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high concentration of shares by a dominant shareholder or family group or a small group of 
majority shareholders, and a lack of protection for minority shareholders (Clarke 2000; Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller 2006). There is also a lack of a clearly outlined role for non-executive 
directors and evidence of business leaders relying excessively on personal connections 
(Clarke 2000; Crawford 2001). The Asian crisis led to a trend toward reform of the disclosure 
requirements, governance standards and regulatory systems in the affected countries; more 
prescriptive approaches to corporate governance and the development of best practice codes 
were deemed to be essential (Clarke 2000). A wide range of external institutions including 
the IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank have been influential in encouraging and monitoring 
the reform process (Clarke 2004b).  
It is of note that the OECD has pushed for the implementation of certain principles of 
guidance for sound practice in corporate governance that reflect the rights of shareholders 
and a role for key stakeholders (OECD 2004). While these OECD principles provide some 
impetus for convergence, the OECD notes that specific circumstances in legal jurisdictions 
plus the size and complexity of companies will impact corporate governance practices. This 
provides scope for an alternative view argued by Branson (2001) that convergence theory 
proponents do not take into consideration the actual obstacles in attaining such convergence. 
First, the process of convergence takes time (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009). Second, 
convergence theory has been largely based on the study of capitalism in the United States, 
Germany and the United Kingdom (Branson 2001). Third, the differences in culture and 
regulatory systems across various countries may prevent convergence from taking place 
(Branson 2001). Clarke (2000) argued that the assumption to think that what was required in 
East Asian countries after the crisis was simply an adoption of Anglo-American influenced 
governance system undervalues the unique cultural fundamentals of corporate governance 
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systems. There is tension between convergence and divergence arguments in the corporate 
governance literature across countries. 
In the early 2000s the collapse of high profile corporations in the United States such 
as Enron Corporation and WorldCom, and in Australia HIH Insurance and One.Tel Limited 
broadly highlighted shortcomings in corporate ethics and corporate governance practices 
(Kiel, Nicholson & Barclay 2005; Dhir 2006; Kiel et al. 2012; Clarke 2014a). The scandals 
‘shed new light on the convergence debate’ as they emerged at the time when convergence 
theory proponents claimed the Anglo-American model to be ideal in offering greatest 
efficiency in corporate governance; these scandals exposed some vulnerability in the Anglo-
American model particularly in relation to director vigilance of audit practices (Gordon & 
Roe 2004, p. 5). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the United States regulatory response to 
the scandals might push forward convergence as new requirements that improve board 
responsibility such as CEO monitoring, disclosure and financial reporting were developed 
and also mostly applied to foreign firms which prefer to list on United States stock exchanges 
(Gordon & Roe 2004). The global financial crisis (GFC) that commenced in late 2007 only 
served to further highlight the importance of broadly improving corporate governance 
practices and in particular improving the prospect of the CEO in his or her performance 
having a positive effect on organisation performance (Smallman, McDonald & Mueller 
2010). 
Strategy scholars realised that a company’s competitive situation and economic 
environment alone cannot completely describe the nature of firm’s strategic decision and its 
performance results (Wiersema 1995). Strategy is created, reviewed and implemented by 
powerful individuals within an organisation and so there is an argument that researchers need 
to acknowledge the importance of the human element involved in running an organisation to 
properly understand strategy work (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009; Galvin & Arndt 
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2014). As the head of the executive team, the CEO is the key organisational human resource, 
holding responsibility for organisation performance and providing an essential nexus or link 
between the top management team (TMT) and the board of directors (Carpenter, Sanders & 
Gregersen 2001; Hunter & O’Shannassy 2007; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The 
knowledge, educational qualifications, previous work experience and current work context of 
the CEO as the key executive member, usually with a seat on the board of directors, can be a 
key differentiating element in getting strong organisation performance (Carpenter, Sanders & 
Gregersen 2001). This is why this research focuses on the professional development and 
work context of the CEO and seeks to theoretically and practically understand when, where 
and how these considerations deliver better organisation performance. 
The convergence debate has implications for corporate governance practice 
considerations in relation to CEO work context and professional development in Anglo, 
American and Asian countries. For instance in Australia there is wide practice of separation 
of the chairperson and CEO role (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; O’Shannassy 2010; Fitzroy, 
Hulbert & Ghobadian 2012). However, in the United States the practice of CEO duality is 
still commonly encountered in major publicly listed companies (for example Exxon Mobil 
Corporation and General Electric Company) (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). It is 
of note that in the United States activist shareholders have pushed for proposals to separate 
the chairperson and CEO positions at leading United States publicly listed companies (for 
example JP Morgan Chase and Company and News Corporation) (Krause, Semadeni & 
Cannella 2014). This provides some impetus for convergence of this particular CEO work 
issue in the United States toward the Anglo governance model. In Australia on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 200, duality is practiced by less than ten per cent of companies 
and this has theoretical and empirical implications for research on CEO professional 
development and work context in Australia compared with the United States. For example in 
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approximately 70 per cent of Russell 200 companies (that is, the largest 200 companies on 
the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ) in the United States a variable such as 
CEO tenure is usually measuring chairperson and CEO tenure compared with less than ten 
per cent of ASX Top 200 companies. ASX Top 200 companies will have a separate measure 
for chairperson tenure in more than 90 per cent of cases. In Hong Kong, a large percentage of 
publicly listed companies are owned by family groups; in family-controlled companies a 
family member usually holds the CEO position, and he or she will possess a high percentage 
of company shares giving some influence, control and power over the corporation and the 
board (Lam & Lee 2008). This type of variation between Anglo, American and Asian legal 
jurisdictions on key measures should influence corporate governance theory development and 
empirical findings in their respective research communities. There is need to explore 
similarities and differences in CEO professional development and work context matters 
across countries to understand whether these similarities and differences play a crucial role in 
influencing organisation performance in each respective country. Rigorous research in this 
area will ultimately contribute to the advancement of an international corporate governance 
theory (Kumar & Zattoni 2013a).  
The research reported in this thesis focuses on three legal jurisdictions to provide 
Anglo-American and Asian contrast. The Australian legal system has emerged from the 
United Kingdom legal system, is representative of the Anglo corporate governance model 
and has high quality standards of corporate governance disclosure and financial reporting 
(Clarke 2004a; Kiel et al. 2012). A distinctive point of comparison between the Anglo-
American corporate governance model and the Hong Kong model relates to the ownership 
and control structure of publicly listed companies. In the Anglo-American model, widely 
dispersed shareholders and in particular institutional investors in the United States dominate 
the ownership of the public listed companies (Farrar 2001; Keong 2002). The control of 
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many Australian and United States publicly listed companies is entrusted to the CEO and the 
board of directors of the respective companies. However, in Hong Kong families still 
dominate the ownership and control of the public listed companies (Stolt 2010). Databases 
have been prepared for Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
1.3 Research Context  
The Australian ASX Top 200 listed companies, the United States Russell Top 200 
Index listed companies and Hong Kong Stock Exchange Top 200 listed companies have been 
chosen as the research context for this thesis to provide the Anglo-American Asian contrast 
required.  
Australia represents an important country for corporate governance research 
internationally in that it is a country context in which there is prevalence of best practice in 
the business community (Higgs 2003; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a).  
The United States stock exchange setting has been selected mainly because of its 
large economy and influence on the world economy with great companies such as Apple Inc. 
and General Electric listed on the NASDAQ and NYSE respectively. During the time of 
study, the United States as a nation was ranked first globally in terms of gross domestic 
product (Euromonitor International 2012). There is a proliferation of studies investigating the 
effect of CEO selection, tenure, duality, shareholding and other CEO attributes on a 
performance variable (for example Westphal & Zajac 1995; Walters, Kroll & Wright 2007) 
conducted in the United States context. These studies provide valuable background and 
insight for the development of hypotheses, research design choices and interpretation of 
results in this study (Galvin 2014).  
Hong Kong provides an interesting context for the investigation of convergence in 
corporate governance. Prior to 30 June 1997 Hong Kong was a dependent colony of Britain 
and from then on China has resumed control of Hong Kong (Brewer 1997; Ho 2008). 
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Therefore, Hong Kong represents the ideal Asian country with a unique position that captures 
both Western and Eastern cultures. This has implications for businesses where some 
companies which are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are also listed on the Chinese 
Stock Exchange such as Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Convergent trends such as Hong Kong’s observance of ‘liberal political-economic principles’ 
and Hong Kong’s globally ‘competitive financial services sector’ have reinforced the 
country’s status as ‘a Western-style financial centre in the Far East’ (Crawford 2001, p. 50). 
Nevertheless, Hong Kong companies are distinct from Anglo-American companies because 
they are characterised by family-oriented financial management systems and guanxi, which is 
‘an informal, yet highly compelling and closely knit, system of reciprocity built upon familial 
and sub-ethnic connections’ (Crawford 2001, p. 47). Profit maximisation of companies in 
Hong Kong largely depends on connections, guanxi and trust (Crawford 2001). Hong Kong 
companies also provide an accessible level of disclosure for gathering data for this thesis 
(Cheng & Firth 2005).   
The literature indicates that the three legal jurisdictions chosen for this study would 
vary in important ways. For example, the differences between Australia and the United States 
might be more related to the regulatory frameworks (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004), such 
as being more about whether CEO and chairperson duality is common or allowed in the 
United States, or certain differences in reporting requirements (e.g. financial reporting 
requirements). In comparison, the differences between Australia and Hong Kong could be 
more in terms of context, such as a much higher proportion of the shares being held by 
individuals or families in Hong Kong (Stolt 2010). This has an important implication for the 
selection of the research context for this thesis and for the exploration of convergence in 
corporate governance. 
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In terms of market capitalisation the United States New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the United States NASDAQ, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Australian 
Stock Exchange were ranked the first, second, seventh and eleventh largest stock markets in 
the world, respectively in 2010 (World Federation of Exchanges 2011; 2012). This statistic 
signals the importance of these stock exchanges and the companies listed on them to the 
overall world economy with implications for both research and practice.  
1.4 Motivation for the Study 
We have seen that there has been an increased focus on corporate governance 
research that explores the link between the professional development and work context of the 
CEO and organisational outcomes over the last few decades in the United States (for example 
Hambrick & Mason 1984; Finkelstein 1992; Bigley & Wiersema 2002; Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004; Hambrick & Quigley 2014; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 
2014; Lin, Wang, Chiou & Huang 2014; Luo, Kanuri & Andrews 2014). However, there is 
limited research that explores this link in Australia and Hong Kong, or research that provides 
benchmark insight across Anglo-American and Asian countries. A further research 
opportunity is presented by the mixed findings of the United States research studies; there is 
an opportunity for clarification of some of the more contentious findings.  
The research background section has identified the key debate on convergence in 
corporate governance toward the Anglo-American model. However, there is a lack of 
research being conducted worldwide to understand the convergence issue and trends in terms 
of the CEO professional development and work context between Anglo, American and Asian 
countries. Further studies that explore cross-country convergence of the influence of the CEO 
are needed to provide valued theoretical and practical insights into the current state of 
convergence in corporate governance and to identify whether CEOs in a particular country 
are more important in affecting organisation performance than CEOs in other countries 
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(Crossland & Hambrick 2007). In the recommendations section of the Crossland and 
Hambrick’s (2007) study, they discussed several possible analytical approaches that would 
provide guidance for future studies that look into exploring convergence trends. One possible 
approach is to determine whether the relationships between certain CEO attributes and 
organisational outcome variables will converge (or vary) statistically between countries. They 
did not take this particular approach since their study aimed to compare the overall influence 
of the CEOs on organisation performance between the United States, Germany and Japan. 
This provides a research opportunity.  
Kumar and Zattoni (2013b) explain that results from a multi-country study will offer 
useful insight on whether the results are applicable to a specific corporate governance system 
or are applicable across various corporate governance systems. Upper echelon theory has 
been developed from the exploration of the American business context (Hambrick 2007). 
Many of the corporate governance theories including agency theory have been concentrated 
on the Anglo-American corporate context (Clarke 2014a). The generalisability of these 
theories to a wider range of corporate governance contexts such as Asia should be explored 
further. For example most of global corporate governance codes embrace agency theory by 
emphasising on the importance of independent, non-executive directors on the board (Clarke 
2014b). But the separation of control and ownership may not be an issue in a business context 
where family ownership and control is prevalent (e.g. Hong Kong) (Zheng & Ho 2012), or 
perhaps in nearly all business contexts (Clarke 2014b). This prompts the need for a study that 
explores whether the recommendation from agency theory to include a majority of non-
executive directors on the board would indeed predict better firm performance in different 
business settings. There is a research gap in the development of comparative corporate 
governance studies between countries (e.g. Australia, the United States and Hong Kong) with 
robust empirical samples (Zona, Zattoni & Minichilli 2013). There is specifically a gap in 
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studies that explore the similarities and differences in the influence of the professional 
development and work context of the CEO between Anglo, American and Asian countries. 
This provides the research opportunity for this thesis. 
Corporate governance development in the Anglo-American countries focuses on 
optimising organisation performance through the proper check and management of the CEO 
(ASX 2010). The role of the board is important for monitoring the work of the CEO (Bonn & 
Pettigrew 2009). But research exploring the work relationship between the CEO and the 
board is still inadequate because many existing studies have included board characteristic 
measures (e.g. the outside director ratio) as control variables rather than as moderating 
variables to test joint effects (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). This provides a research 
opportunity. 
1.5 Theoretical Significance 
 This research uses agency theory, stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory, 
resource dependence theory, convergence theory and upper echelon theory to inform the 
literature review and theory development with regard to the relationship between CEO 
professional development variables, CEO work context variables and organisation 
performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003b; Clarke 2004a; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). This 
gives this thesis a multi-theoretic perspective, and helps this thesis take a step forward from 
the over-dependence on agency theory seen in much of the corporate governance literature 
(Clarke 2014a). The moderating influence of CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio 
jointly on organisation performance is also explored to better understand the value of agency 
theory, stewardship theory.  
 The need to integrate different theories has been emphasised in top management 
journals such as Academy of Management Journal (Mayer & Sparrowe 2013), Journal of 
Management (Boyd, Haynes, Hitt, Bergh & Ketchen 2012), Journal of Management Studies 
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(Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011) and Academy of Management Review (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson 1997). It is often inadequate to draw upon a single theory to find the answer to an 
intended research question (Mayer & Sparrowe 2013). The integration of theories together 
with the use of different independent variables but a common dependent variable will help to 
explain the same phenomenon under investigation from different points of view and thus 
generate useful understanding that will inform future research and eventually influence 
management practice (Mayer & Sparrowe 2013). 
1.5.1 Upper Echelon Theory 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) developed upper echelon theory, which provides 
valuable insight to inform this CEO study. The focus of upper echelon theory is on top 
executive cognition, perception and value and the influence this has on the process of 
strategic choice for the TMT (Hambrick & Mason 1984). This process of strategic choice has 
organisation performance consequences (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004; Boyd, 
Haynes & Zona 2011). The CEO is the key TMT executive holding overall responsibility for 
the performance of a whole organisation (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). During 
their daily work CEOs often face unknown conditions and they interpret these conditions and 
other issues through personal lenses, which are shaped by their individualised characteristics 
including observable characteristics (e.g. demography and professional experience) and 
unobservable attributes (e.g. personalities, perceptions, cognitions and values) (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004; Hambrick 2007; Hambrick, Humphrey & Gupta 2014). Since 
the latter elements are hard to measure researchers use observable managerial attributes that 
are reasonable proxies for fundamental differences in executive values, cognitions and 
perceptions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004).  
Variables including international work experience, functional background 
heterogeneity, educational heterogeneity and tenure heterogeneity have been used to better 
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understand TMT strategic choices (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Carpenter & Fredrickson 
2001). This research stream has yielded inconsistent research findings to date (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson 2001). Moreover, the generalisability of upper echelon theory is quite limited, as 
many past upper echelon studies used United States data (Hambrick 2007). This thesis will 
complement the existing studies by exploring the influence of the CEO professional 
development variables and CEO work context variables in the United States and other legal 
jurisdictions including Australia and Hong Kong in order to assess the external validity of 
upper echelon theory. There is a relatively unexplored area of upper echelon research with 
regard to the relationship between the TMT—and (or) the CEO as the leader of the TMT—
and the board (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). This thesis will explore the relationship between 
CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio, and how this joint relationship will affect 
firm performance. 
1.5.2 Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, Managerial Hegemony Theory and 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Agency theory, stewardship theory and managerial hegemony theory focus on the 
issues of internal monitoring in corporate governance practice (Clarke 2004a). Agency theory 
explains the value of the board acting as the centre of corporate control for the organisation, 
while stewardship theory and managerial hegemony theory illustrate managerial control with 
the CEO as the most valuable employee at the centre of corporate control (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Agency theory views professional managers as individualistic 
and untrustworthy (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). On the contrary stewardship 
theory argues that CEOs should be trusted to perform their job and are good stewards of the 
corporation (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). Many 
corporate governance studies have relied heavily on agency theory but this theory may not be 
applicable to all institutional settings (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011) or to all company 
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circumstances. There is tension between agency theory and stewardship theory that leads to 
the important questions of what constitutes an ideal board, when to have a vigilant board, and 
whether the CEO and the inclusion of executive directors on the board will contribute 
positively to the overall firm performance (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996). Managerial 
hegemony theory recognises the limitations of the board in deciding the future direction of 
the organisation, arguing that board decisions are to a great extent subject to TMT control 
and especially to that of a high-powered CEO (Mace 1971; Hendry & Kiel 2004). Agency 
theory and managerial hegemony theory lead to an increasing awareness of the need of the 
board and particularly non-executive directors to be actively monitoring and controlling the 
work of the CEO.  
Resource dependence theory is concerned with the external relationships of the 
organisation and recognises the important role of non-executive directors on the board in 
providing a bridge between the firm and its external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson 1998; Clarke 2004a). Powerful actors who are external to 
the TMT working as non-executive directors may affect organisation performance and also 
affect how the CEO influences organisation performance (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 
2004). Board members and particularly non-executive directors can have a direct effect on 
organisation performance as they bring important external resources, information and 
legitimacy to the organisation (Geletkanycz & Hambrick 1997; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & 
Sanders 2004). Simultaneously, all board members—inside directors and outside directors— 
can have an indirect effect on organisation performance as they work closely with the CEO, 
offering advice to the CEO throughout the CEO’s tenure and holding the power to select, 
monitor and dismiss the CEO (Westphal & Fredrickson 2001; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & 
Sanders 2004).  
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Agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory also provide 
useful theoretical explanations of how the non-executive director ratio can influence 
organisation performance and also moderately affect the influence of CEO tenure on 
organisation performance. 
1.5.3 Convergence Theory 
 Convergence theorists hold the view that corporate governance practice is converging 
toward the Anglo-American model that maximises shareholder value (Hansmann & 
Kraakman 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009; Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). Convergence 
theorists argue that the Anglo-American corporate governance model of shareholder 
capitalism provides the required efficiency for the management of large corporations that 
have many widely distributed owners or shareholders (Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Gordon 
& Roe 2004). The development and distribution of good governance codes by leading 
international organisations such as the OECD, and the standardisation of accounting 
regulations have all been regarded as adding to the growing convergence of corporate 
governance practices across different nations (Coffee 1999; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 
2004; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009).  
1.6 Research Objectives 
 Given the preceding discussion, this research has six main objectives.  
The first research objective is to develop a review of the corporate governance 
literature in relation to CEO professional development and the CEO work context and 
organisation performance that provides a foundation on which to develop a series of 
convergence theory hypothesis for this study of large stock exchange listed companies in 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
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The second research objective is to build three corporate governance databases—one 
for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong to enable testing of the convergence 
theory hypotheses.  
The third research objective is to use statistical analysis techniques to identify and 
benchmark similarity and difference in cross-sectional CEO professional development and 
CEO work context data variables from companies in Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong. 
The fourth research objective is to use statistical analysis techniques on the Australia, 
the United States and Hong Kong data to test a series of convergence theory hypotheses using 
the cross-sectional CEO professional development and CEO work context variables on the 
dependent variable organisation performance. 
The fifth research objective is to explore using statistical analysis whether the 
influence of CEO tenure on organisation performance is moderated by the non-executive 
director ratio in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
The sixth research objective is to examine the results for areas of similarity and any 
areas of difference and discuss these similarities and differences and their implications in the 
context of the discussion in relation to convergence of corporate governance practice between 
Anglo-American and Asian corporations. 
1.7 Research Questions 
To achieve the above objectives, the following research questions (RQs) are proposed: 
RQ1: Is there a theoretical basis for the argument that there is a trend to convergence of 
Anglo-American and Asian corporate governance practices in large stock exchange 
listed companies in relation to CEO professional development and the CEO work 
context that has an influence on organisation performance? 
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RQ2: Does the empirical evidence from large stock exchange listed companies in Australia, 
the United States and Hong Kong identify and benchmark areas of similarity in cross-
sectional CEO professional development and CEO work context data? 
RQ3: Does the empirical evidence from large stock exchange listed companies in Australia, 
the United States and Hong Kong identify areas of similarity in prediction by cross-
sectional CEO professional development and CEO work context variables of the 
dependent variable organisation performance to support a convergence argument? 
RQ4: Is the influence of CEO tenure on the dependent variable organisation performance 
moderated by the non-executive director ratio in Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong respectively?  
RQ5: Is there any empirical evidence of difference indicating divergence in relation to the 
influence of CEO professional development and CEO work context on organisation 
performance between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong? 
1.8 Definition of Key Variables 
To empirically test theory in relation to the influence of CEO professional 
development and CEO work context on the dependent variable organisation performance 
particular variables have been selected for use in this study informed by research practice in 
key corporate governance and upper echelon studies (e.g. Hambrick & Mason 1984; 
Finkelstein 1992; Bigley & Wiersema 2002; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004).  
1.8.1 CEO Professional Development Variables 
After an extensive review of the upper echelon and corporate governance literature, 
CEO insider/outsider status, CEO functional background, CEO international work 
experience, CEO MBA education and CEO number of university degrees have been selected 
as the key CEO professional development variables.  
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CEO insider/outsider status explains whether the incumbent CEO was an employee 
of the firm or any of its subsidiaries prior to and at the time of appointment as CEO and 
reflects whether the knowledge, skills, values and work experience of the CEO were obtained 
from inside or outside the firm (Dalton & Kesner 1985; Kesner & Sebora 1994; Westphal & 
Zajac 1995; Bigley & Wiersema 2002; Shen & Cannella 2002a). CEO functional background 
refers to the functional areas that the CEO previously had direct experience in and can be 
considered to be an expert in those areas (Finkelstein 1992). It reflects the type of knowledge 
that the CEO possesses and the experience shapes the CEO’s beliefs, perspective and attitude 
(Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller & Huber 1999; Bell, Villado, Lukasik, Belau & Briggs 2011). 
CEO international work experience reflects the ability of the CEO in handling global 
business operations as a result of successfully completing a past international work 
assignment or previously managing an international division (Herrmann 2002). CEO with a 
Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree reflects the CEO’s formal education, 
training and professional development obtained from a graduate business school that is likely 
to enhance his or her business acumen and assist in gaining important social capital (Bertrand 
& Schoar 2003; Lindorff & Jonson 2013). CEO number of university degrees indicates the 
extent of and level of CEO education that is often linked to better receptiveness to innovation 
as it reflects the CEO’s cognitive ability, particularly open-mindedness (Kimberly & 
Evanisko 1981). 
1.8.2 CEO Work Context Variables 
After an extensive review of the upper echelon and corporate governance literature, 
CEO and chairperson duality, CEO tenure and CEO share ownership percentage have been 
selected as the key CEO work context variables.  
CEO and chairperson duality refers to the work condition of the CEO where there is a 
‘dual board leadership structure’, i.e., the CEO also holds the position of chair of the board 
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(Daily & Johnson 1997, p. 100; Peng 2004). CEO tenure refers to how long an individual has 
assumed the CEO position (Bigley & Wiersema 2002) and reflects the total number of years 
of experience in the CEO role (Luo, Kanuri & Andrews 2014). CEO share ownership 
percentage refers to the percentage of a company’s shares possessed by the CEO (Bigley & 
Wiersema 2002). CEO and chairperson duality, a long CEO tenure and a high percentage of 
CEO share ownership respectively has been linked to superior CEO power with implications 
for organisation performance (Finkelstein 1992; Daily & Johnson 1997). 
1.8.3 Non-executive Director Ratio Variable 
 The non-executive director ratio has been selected as the moderating variable for this 
study and indicates the percentage of non-executive directors on the board (Zhang & 
Rajagopalan 2010). A high non-executive director ratio is related to superior board 
independence from the CEO and management (Westphal & Zajac 1995). The relationship 
between the CEO and the board is important to corporate governance practice (OECD 2004; 
Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). As a consequence, this research will also explore the joint 
effect of CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio on organisation performance.  
1.8.4 Organisation Performance Variable 
This research uses an objective financial performance measure—specifically actual 
return on assets (ROA)—for the dependent variable. There is a tradition of measuring 
organisation performance as a dependent variable in management and corporate governance 
research (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004; Richard, Devinney, Yip & Johnson 2009). Three 
types of organisational performance measures that are used frequently in the strategic 
management literature include objective financial performance, subjective financial 
performance and subjective non-financial performance (Newbert 2008). There is particularly 
a strong preference to use objective accounting measures, as they are readily available 
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(Richard et al. 2009). ROA is ‘a very popular accounting measure’ of organisation 
performance that provides an indication of the efficiency of the TMT in using the firm assets 
to generate incomes (Richard et al. 2009, p. 729). ROA provides a more reliable organisation 
performance measure than a market performance measure (e.g. market-to-book ratio) for this 
study, which collected its data following the GFC, because the value of market-to-book ratio 
might have been overestimated after a stock market crash (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004).  
1.9 Overview of Methodology and Methods  
 This research blends positivism and critical realism, favouring deductive theory on 
the deductive-inductive continuum. There is a long tradition of studies in corporate 
governance and strategic management blending positivism and critical realism (Kwan & 
Tsang 2001).  
Taking a positivist approach, information was extracted from databases and annual 
reports in relation to CEO professional development, CEO work context and organisation 
performance to facilitate the quantitative analysis presented in this thesis to test theory and 
create objective knowledge (Neuman 2011).  
The critical study of management identifies and explores tensions between the actual 
reality of management and the validated representation of the reality using a set of objective 
techniques (Alvesson & Willmott 2012). Critical realists argue that a claim made by an 
existing theory can be tested and re-tested over time to verify that theory; also scholars 
should be cautious when generalising research findings from a particular context to another 
context (Kwan & Tsang 2001). Taking a critical realist view, this research will conduct and 
replicate the same test of convergence corporate governance theory on different populations 
of the Australian, the United States and Hong Kong companies in the databases prepared 
using similar measurements, techniques and analysis (Tsang & Kwan 1999). In doing so, this 
research will contribute to the development of theory by critically testing existing theory but 
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doing this across different business cultures. In this way this thesis will identify whether the 
existing theory plus the theory developed and tested here in this benchmark convergence 
study can be empirically generalised from one culture to another (Bhaskar 1975; Tsang & 
Kwan 1999).  
 This research uses quantitative methods to enable the objective analysis of the 
relationship between CEO professional development and CEO work context and organisation 
performance in the Australian, the United States and Hong Kong contexts respectively. There 
is much evidence of existing CEO studies in the corporate governance field that uses 
quantitative methods and statistical analysis techniques such as analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation statistics, multiple regression and 
moderated multiple regression (Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008). These techniques will be used 
in this research to identify similarities and differences in results for the hypothesis tests and 
hence areas of convergence and divergence in the CEO professional development and work 
context effect on organisation performance between Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong. 
1.10 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter one provides an introduction to the thesis, highlighting the research 
background, research context and motivation for conducting the study. Chapter two reviews 
the key literature in relation to the corporate governance models in the Australian, the United 
States and Hong Kong legal jurisdictions and the influence of the professional development 
and work context of the CEO. The use of a multi-theoretic perspective will be discussed 
further. Chapter three presents the conceptual framework and the development of hypotheses 
for the thesis. Chapter four describes the methodology and research design for the thesis. 
Chapter five presents the results of the study including the results of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation statistics, multiple regression 
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analysis and moderated multiple regression analysis. Chapter six sets out the findings, 
discussion and the theoretical implications of the research findings. Chapter seven closes the 
thesis by discussing the strengths of the study, the practical implications of the findings, 
certain limitations of the study, future research possibilities and a conclusion.  
1.11 Contributions of the Study 
 This study builds on the existing literature on the influence of the CEO on 
organisational outcomes and convergence theory in corporate governance. This study will 
contribute to a better understanding of upper echelon theory and multiple corporate 
governance theories by identifying which CEO professional backgrounds and work context 
issues matter most to organisation performance outcomes in the Australian, the United States 
and Hong Kong business contexts, respectively, in a benchmark study sampled shortly after 
the GFC. This study also contributes to the development of convergence theory by 
identifying evidence of areas of similarity and difference in the organisation performance 
consequences of key CEO professional development and work context choices and variables 
between the selected Anglo, American and Asian countries. This cross-country benchmark 
research study provides both contribution of theory (i.e. testing of the validated theories with 
the observed phenomena) and contribution to theory (i.e. improvement of the existing 
theories through the observed phenomena) (Whetten 2009). This research has developed 
three country specific corporate governance databases and developed a conceptual 
framework, which will open up an avenue of future research possibilities in relation to the 
convergence issues under investigation here. This cross-sectional study provides a benchmark 
for further study, which will allow replication and longitudinal aspects in this research area to 
be explored. 
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1.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the thesis and identified there is an important debate on 
the topic of convergence theory in corporate governance. The next chapter will review the 
key literature in relation to the development, model and practices of corporate governance in 
the legal jurisdictions of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The use of upper 
echelon theory and other relevant corporate governance theories for explaining the 
relationships between CEO professional development and the CEO work context, plus the 
moderating influence of CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio jointly, with the 
dependent variable organisation performance will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
The key literature in relation to the convergence debate and the influence of the professional 
development and work context of the CEO will be reviewed.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the literature in relation to contemporary corporate 
governance issues, the convergence debate in corporate governance research, and the 
influence of CEO professional development and the CEO work context on organisation 
performance.  
The chapter commences with a definition of corporate governance and an explanation 
of the significance of corporate governance. Next a review of the literature in relation to the 
differences and similarities in the development, models and practices of corporate 
governance between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong will be presented. Agency 
theory, stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory and resource dependence theory 
will be used in this research to explain the relationships between the professional 
development and work context of the CEO, the non-executive directors on the board and 
organisation performance. Despite the differences in corporate governance practices, 
convergence theory posits that the worldwide convergence of practices toward the Anglo-
American model will occur. The convergence debate will be discussed further. 
This chapter will discuss the roles of the CEO and the board, in particular non-
executive directors, in influencing organisation performance. A review of the key literature 
with regard to CEO influence on organisation performance will be presented. Upper echelons 
theory will be discussed to explain the link between CEO professional development and the 
CEO work context and organisation performance. The final section will provide a conclusion 
and summary of the literature review to provide a basis for the Chapter Three Conceptual 
Framework. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Definition  
 The etymology of the term corporate governance is derived from ancient Greek and 
Latin: ‘corporate’ comes from the Latin verb corporare meaning ‘to form into one body’ 
while ‘governance’ from the Latinised Greek gubernatio meaning ‘management or 
government’ or from the ancient Greek kybernao meaning ‘to steer, to drive, to guide, to act 
as a pilot’ (Clarke 2007, p. 1). The ASX Corporate Governance Council (ASX 2010, p. 3) 
defines corporate governance as ‘the framework of rules, relationships, systems and 
processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations’. Levitt 
(2002) explains that good corporate governance can be achieved when there is an open and 
honest relationship between the investors (i.e., the owners), the board of directors and the top 
management team.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that corporate governance mainly looks at solving 
the problems between the principal and the agent that can arise as a result of the separation of 
corporate ownership and control. This definition basically captures the key issues of 
corporate governance particularly in the Anglo-American countries where the main purpose 
of the company is to maximise shareholders value (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride 2004). In certain 
legal jurisdictions such as Germany and Japan, corporate governance is not only concerned 
with the interests of the shareholders but also with the interests of the broader stakeholder 
groups including employees, corporate managers, regional societies and trading partners 
(Letza, Sun & Kirkbride 2004; Suto & Hashimoto 2006). In practice, Letza, Sun and 
Kirkbride (2004) and Lau and Young (2006) argue that there is an interconnection between a 
shareholder perspective and a stakeholder perspective because after all, shareholders are also 
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stakeholders themselves. A good relationship between the shareholders and the stakeholders 
will help to promote better organisation performance (Lau & Young 2006). 
Corporate governance provides the foundation for the achievement of the objectives 
of the organisation and performance optimisation through the proper check and management 
of the CEO and the top management team (ASX 2010). The board of directors is an 
important element in corporate governance (Tricker 1994) ensuring sufficient monitoring and 
supervision of the management and behaviour of the CEO (De Wit & Meyer 2010). CEOs 
hold the key role in deciding the future direction of the company as the board entrusts them 
as agents with the task of developing strategy and making the crucial ‘day-to-day’ decisions 
for the organisation (Ocasio 1999).  
There are several fundamental dimensions of corporate governance. The two most 
important elements which are captured in every governance code are the necessity for proper 
‘checks and balances in the governance structure’ especially at the level of board of directors, 
and the demand for sufficient disclosure (Cadbury 2000, p. 9). Boards need to be able to 
apply independent and objective judgement in carrying out their duties (OECD 2004). 
Effective accountability is important to any corporate governance system (Cadbury 1992). 
The board needs to ensure both the accountability of employees to the firm and the 
accountability of board members to shareholders (Sternberg 2004; Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 
2005). In addition, Huse (2005) emphasises the importance of CEO background, experience, 
tenure and characteristics as the contextual factors that can affect corporate governance 
(Clarke 2007). The other contextual factors include the distribution and structure of 
ownership; national, territorial and cultural variations; organisation structure and size; the 
market environment of the company and the industry; and lifecycle differences such as 
recurring crisis (Huse 2005). 
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2.2.2 Corporate Governance Significance 
Corporate governance has an extensive history; however, there is a renewed interest 
in the practice of corporate governance since the mid-1980s (Clarke 2004b; Muthukumar 
2009). Globalisation and the rise of global markets have provided new challenges to the 
corporate governance agenda (Cadbury 2000; Gordon & Roe 2004). Globalisation has 
opened up opportunities for CEOs from companies typically in developing countries to 
expand internationally for the pursuit of large amounts of capital and also to build good 
relationships with the investors and regulatory bodies from developed markets (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 2000; Li & Nair 2009). International organisations such 
as the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN) and the United Nations (UN) believe that corporate governance influences the 
growth rate of developing countries (Gordon & Roe 2004). Since ‘[d]isclosure is the 
lifeblood of governance’ (Cadbury 2000, p. 9), companies that can exhibit transparent and 
good corporate governance practices are more likely to attract foreign investors and avoid 
their shares being devalued (La Porta et al. 2000; Li & Nair 2009). Share analysts have put 
more interest on companies with good disclosure since they can develop a more precise 
estimate of the company’s earnings (Useem 1998).  
Corporate governance has become a topic of importance to researchers, managers, 
regulatory agencies and investors (Dowell, Shackell & Stuart 2011). The academic scholars 
in the various disciplines of finance, strategy, economics, law and psychology believe that 
corporate governance can provide a better understanding of the basic functions of existing 
organisations with the CEO and the board of directors providing an interesting context for 
this research (Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 2008). There is a renewed concern in the practice 
of corporate governance following recent corporate collapses and scandals with the GFC. 
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Consequently, a number of influential corporate governance reports, codes and regulations 
have been developed globally over the last few decades.  
2.2.3 Corporate Governance Development and Models in Australia, the United 
States and Hong Kong 
The key development in corporate governance reform is believed to have commenced 
in the United Kingdom with the formation of the Cadbury Committee in 1991 (Keasey, 
Thompson & Wright 2005). The Committee was initiated to respond to three key issues 
concerning the exercise of ‘creative accounting’ schemes, the fast increase of executive 
remuneration that is not clearly linked to better organisation performance, and the lack of 
control systems for CEOs (Keasey, Thompson & Wright 2005, p. 5). The Cadbury Report 
was developed and published in 1992 by the London Stock Exchange in response to the 
British recession and a series of high profile corporate failures (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 
2004; Clarke 2007).  
Carter and Lorsch (2004) stated that the practice of corporate governance is different 
between countries. Corporate governance models vary because different countries carry 
different economic circumstances and institutional effects (e.g. regulatory, legal and political 
systems) (Craswell, Taylor & Saywell 1997; Hanson, Dowling, Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson 
2002; Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004). Consequently, the companies in the United States 
may face different issues to the companies listed in other countries such as Australia and 
Hong Kong (Craswell, Taylor & Saywell 1997; Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004).  
Mobius (2002a) explained the differences between doing business in the west and the 
east. In the west, there is a widely dispersed mix of people who have invested in the company 
and the board is accountable to the shareholders. In the litigious environment of the United 
States, the management and board are more vulnerable to the threat of legal action than in the 
east. In the west, share price performance is important, and shareholders demand CEOs get 
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access to capital on favourable terms in order for the company to stay competitive. While in 
the east, with the exception of Japan, a lot of companies are family owned, and most directors 
have controlling shareholdings. Corporate governance is often improved when funds need to 
be raised but the company may go back to its bad governance practices after obtaining access 
to the necessary capital (Mobius 2002a).  
Despite the differences in corporate governance practices across countries, Crossland 
and Hambrick (2007) noted the importance of a series of global business research studies 
arguing that national practices are progressively getting more similar (e.g. Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas & Ramirez 1997) or more Americanised (e.g. Ritzer 2011). The Anglo-American 
system is based on deep-rooted regulatory institutions and laws and is well-known for its 
robustness, offering competitiveness and efficiency to large corporations (Clarke 2004a). 
International organisations such as the OECD, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
United Nations and the IMF all have initiated considerable steps to encourage corporate 
governance reform processes (Clarke 2000, 2004a). In 1999 following the Asian financial 
crisis the OECD developed and published the Principles of Corporate Governance, which 
have become an important foundation for the development of good corporate governance 
codes in various countries (Clarke 2004b; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 2009; Muthukumar 
2009).  
2.2.3.1 Australia 
The corporate collapses of One.Tel, HIH Insurance, Ansett and Harris Scarfe in the 
beginning of the 21st century have restated the need for more enduring and resilient 
governance requirements in the Australian corporate context (Clarke 2004b; Farrar 2005). 
There are at least three key components to governance reform in Australia (Kiel et al. 2012). 
The first component is the establishment of the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
(ASXCGC) in August 2002 (Kiel et al. 2012). The ASXCGC is a diverse association which 
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combines together 21 investment, shareholder and business groups (ASX 2010). The Council 
released the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
in 2003 and revised its Principles in 2007 and 2010 (ASX 2010). The principles relate to the 
structure of the board, management oversight, fair remuneration, risk management, 
disclosure, integrity in financial reporting and ethical decision-making (ASX 2010). Kiel et 
al. (2012, p. 170) observed that these principles are ‘recommendations and not requirements’; 
hence, disclosing a firm’s compliance with the set Principles is an important element of 
corporate governance practice in Australia. The second component is the release of Good 
Governance Principles by Standards Australia in June 2003 (Kiel et al. 2012). These 
principles were released to provide guidance on board processes such as the work experience 
and skills exemplified on the board, the independence of the directors, and board structure 
(Kiel et al. 2012). The third component is the enactment of the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (CLERP) 9 in July 2004 (Kiel et al. 2012). The CLERP 9 comprises 
amendments to the Corporations Act in particular with regard to accounting practices, auditor 
obligations and the needs of regulator authorities such as the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2010; 
Kiel et al. 2012).  
Corporate governance in the Anglo-American system is generally characterised by the 
low level of interconnecting shareholding among companies within an organisation group, 
liquid share markets and extensively distributed ownership concentration (Keong 2002). The 
corporate law in Australia and the United States puts priority on shareholder interests; the 
securities regulation offers protection to the minority investors; and there is an immense 
demand for disclosure (Nestor & Thompson 2001; Clarke 2004a). The length of a working 
contract can be shortened in the case where the company needs to adjust to any changes 
occurring in the markets or shareholders requirements because companies in the Anglo-
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American countries have an advantage of acquiring better access to unrestricted markets for 
labour and capital (Weimer & Pape 1999). This may perhaps have an implication for the 
length of CEO tenure in Australia and the United States measured in this present study.  
The remuneration of CEOs is often connected to organisation performance and many 
Australian companies provide CEOs a high base salary with additional bonuses (Psaros 
2009). Compared to the United States, there were less local Australian institutions that owned 
equities in the Australian share market, while foreign investors held ‘31.7 per cent’ of 
Australian equities in 1998 (Farrar 2001, p. 321). Australia in recent years has had a larger 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board than the United States (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003a). The board of directors in Australian publicly listed companies has a smaller size than 
in United States companies (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). The separation of the roles of the 
chairperson and the CEO is an important element of corporate governance in Australia and so 
the companies that combine the CEO and chairperson positions are required to disclose their 
reasoning behind their decision (Investment and Financial Services Association 2009; ASX 
2010). A powerful independent chairperson will present the proper check and balance on the 
board to offset CEO power and the risk of the principal-agent problem emerging (Investment 
and Financial Services Association 2009).  
2.2.3.2 The United States 
The national developments in corporate governance principles were most apparent in 
the United States following immediately from the corporate collapses and scandals of Enron 
and WorldCom (Mallin 2013). In 2002 the United States Congress rushed through the 
Accounting Industry Reform Act, which is widely known as the ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ 
(Mallin 2013, p. 50). The Act was designed to safeguard the interest of shareholders by 
refining the trustworthiness and precision of company disclosures (Petra 2005; Muthukumar 
2009). The Act was a significant reform in United States corporate governance, led to the 
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alteration of the NYSE listing regulations and had a considerable impact on corporate 
governance practices around the globe including relevant Australian legislation (Farrar 2005; 
Mallin 2013). The Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise which was formed in 
2002 has listed some principles in relation to the board’s responsibilities, the relationship 
between the management and board, share ownership and director qualifications (Mallin 
2013). In 2003 the NYSE and the NASDAQ put forward and implemented new regulations 
on corporate governance after acquiring approval from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (Mallin 2013). The alterations on the requirements require firms to 
include on their board with mostly outside, independent directors (Petra 2005). The NYSE 
Commission which was formed in 2009 has published the principles of corporate governance 
in 2010 (Mallin 2013). 
 The roots of United States corporate governance concepts lay in British law (Farrar 
2001. The United States system is characterised by the active presence of share markets, the 
separation of control and ownership, a high number of institutional investors owning the 
corporation and the predilection for boards governed by the outside directors (Farrar 2001). 
Banks regularly lend capital but founders often use the securities market to finance their 
company growth or to provide them with an exit strategy when they desire to cash out, 
diversify or finance mergers. In around eighty per cent of the United States publicly listed 
companies, the same individual holds the two positions of CEO and chairperson (Lorsch & 
MacIver 1989; Worrell, Nemec & Davidson 1997). In a study exploring the overall CEO 
effect on organisation performance, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) found that CEOs in 
United States companies have a stronger effect on organisation performance than CEOs in 
German companies and Japanese companies. This may have implications for the prediction 
by the CEO professional development and CEO work context variables of the dependent 
variable organisation performance in the United States legal jurisdiction in this present study.  
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2.2.3.3 Hong Kong  
The Asian financial crisis erupted in Thailand in June 1997 and rapidly had a 
substantial impact on other Asian countries like Singapore, Indonesia and South Korea 
(Clarke 2000). According to the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong, China 
(2001), the crisis also affected growth of Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP). 
Although Hong Kong did not face a catastrophic financial tremor, the crisis became a 
learning experience for the country that depends excessively on its financial sectors including 
its stock market (Mobius 2002b). Corporate governance reform was needed in Hong Kong to 
cope with the pressures of tough business competition mainly from Singapore and China 
(Crawford 2001; Mobius 2002b). The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong are the principal regulators with an 
important role in improving corporate governance in Hong Kong (Mobius 2002b). The 
HKMA was established in April 1993 to regulate financial institutions, especially banks, and 
maintain Hong Kong’s status as a global financial hub (HKMA 2013). The HKMA released 
the Best Practice Guide on Financial Disclosure and imposed a requirement that the board of 
directors of banks should include at least three independent directors (Mobius 2002b). The 
SFC was established in 1989 and holds the power to oversee the laws regulating the securities 
and assisting the growth of the markets in Hong Kong (Deloitte 2013; SFC 2013). 
The Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) forms a close working 
relationship with the SFC to manage and regulate the listed companies (HKEx 2013a). The 
HKEx was established as a result of the merger of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
Limited (SEHK), the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited (HKFE) and the Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company Limited (HKSCC) (Mobius 2002b; HKEx 2011). The HKEx 
has been functional since March 2000 and emerged as a part of the reform to strengthen 
business productivity in Hong Kong and overcome the difficulties of competing on a global 
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market for capital (Mobius 2002b; HKEx 2011). The SEHK (or the HKEx after the year 
2000) published the Code on corporate governance best practice and the corporate 
governance report (CGR) in November 2004 to improve corporate governance practices in 
Hong Kong (Deloitte 2013). The Code discusses the issues relating to directors, such as 
board meetings, the separation of the chairman and CEO role, board composition, the 
selection and removal of directors, and directors responsibilities and remuneration (HKEx 
2013b). The CGR outlines the ‘mandatory disclosure requirements’ for the stock exchange 
listed companies such as the need to disclose information on directors securities, the period of 
appointment of non-executive directors, the separation of the position of chairman and CEO, 
board composition and the number of annual board meetings (HKEx 2013b, p. A14-25). The 
CGR also outlines the recommended disclosures on certain information such as the number 
of shares held by the senior management and the functions of management (HKEx 2013b). 
Corporate governance in practice in Hong Kong has some distinctive characteristics 
compared to the Anglo-American model. The most apparent characteristic is the substantial 
number of family-controlled firms that would imply some deficiency in its corporate 
governance system (Stolt 2010). For instance Chinese families often hold a crucial role in 
managing businesses but they are often criticised because of their lack of professionalism and 
their reluctance to trust and delegate tasks to the non-family employees (Kriz & Keating 
2010; Zheng & Ho 2012). Family controlled businesses are also often seen as suffering from 
exploitation of minority shareholders and harmful nepotism (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & 
Buccholtz 2001; Morck & Yeung 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller 2006). Hong Kong is an 
interesting country because it exhibits characteristics of the Anglo-American system with the 
presence of a liquid, free, transparent and open market (Brewer 1997). However, in reality 
the Hong Kong system displays a high level of interlocking shareholdings among companies 
in the same organisation group and a high level of share ownership concentration—that is, 
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the presence of one or several shareholders with a large percentage of shares (Brewer 1997; 
Keong 2002). There is also a high level of relationships between business networks in Hong 
Kong (Clarke 2004a).  
With regard to company law, 'Hong Kong retains the British model of the joint stock 
company' whose fundamental architecture assumes that a wide base of shareholders and 
owners will entrust management of the company to a smaller number of key people including 
directors and the CEO (Brewer 1997, p. 77). Unlike Japan, the fund managers and banks in 
Hong Kong have little impact on the capital market and so it would appear that Hong Kong 
system is similar to the Anglo-American system (Brewer 1997). Nevertheless, the reality is 
contrasting; according to the information from the South China Morning Post, Brewer (1997, 
p. 77) informed that only one company from a total of 526 companies had not been ‘a 
controlled or dominated’ company while the others were controlled companies. From this 
observation, it can then be expected that many CEOs in Hong Kong publicly listed 
companies would possess a high percentage of company shares. This gives the CEOs greater 
power to use their discretion, and can have implications for organisation performance where 
the CEOs can either perform for their own personal agenda or for the good of the company. 
Hong Kong provides an interesting research context for the exploration of the CEO work 
context issues that may indeed be different to Australia or the United States.  
2.2.4 A Multi-theoretic Perspective in Corporate Governance Research 
Several researchers (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; Daily, Dalton & Cannella 
2003) explain the need for corporate governance research that exhibits a multi-theoretic 
approach for identifying the right board of director and top management team designs and 
systems to improve organisation performance. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005, p. S8) 
similarly argue that ‘[t]heoretical pluralism’ instead of the replacement of one main theory by 
another is instrumental to the advancement of governance research.  
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A multi-theoretic approach to corporate governance research helps academics and 
practitioners to understand better the interactions that take place between the CEO and the 
directors on a company board (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
argue that the important matter is not whether one theory is more valid than another, for one 
theory may be effective for explaining a particular occurrence but not for other phenomena. 
Consequently, this research uses a multi-theoretic approach drawing on several corporate 
governance theories to explain the relationship between CEO professional development, the 
CEO work context, and the joint moderating influence of CEO tenure and the non-executive 
director ratio, on organisation performance in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
2.2.4.1 Agency Theory 
The main discussion in corporate governance research has been on solving the 
principal-agent problem (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). The increasing size of the corporation has 
led to the separation of ownership and control between the agent and the principal (Berle & 
Means 1932; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). The agent usually refers to the 
managers of the company while the principal is the owners or shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Although the owners would desire to manage and lead their own firms and 
obtain the maximum benefit for themselves, this is unfeasible considering the size by number 
of employees and high capital demands of contemporary corporations (Berle & Means 1932; 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). Consequently, an agency relationship develops and 
involves the transfer of decision-making power from the principal to the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Psaros 2009).  
Agency theory is grounded in economics and suggests a logically ‘opportunistic 
model of the agent’ (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011, p. 1896). The theory is concerned with the 
affairs of managers and owners within the organisation and assumes that managers are self-
serving, opportunistic and individualistic (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). The basic 
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supposition of agency theory is that managers and CEOs maximise their own wealth and 
think about their own benefits above those of shareholders (Psaros 2009). The theory implies 
that sufficient control or monitoring systems should be developed to keep shareholders 
protected from management’s self-interest (Fama & Jensen 1983; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). 
Agency theory is concerned with the reduction of agency cost which can be achieved by 
setting limitations on managerial discretion, reconciling the needs of different parties through 
the financial incentives arrangement, and monitoring and controlling management by the 
board (Fama & Jensen 1983; Burton 2000). The reasoning and assumptions of agency theory 
direct normative practice with 21st century corporate governance reforms moving toward 
more independent boards and board chairpersons in Australia and overseas (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson & Ellstrand 1999; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Psaros 2009).  
Agency theory has a long history from as early as the 18th century and has been 
debated by various eminent scholars including Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983). Smith (1776) in An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations had warned about the possible threats 
linked to the distribution of stocks resulting in the loss of motives for the managers and the 
owners to effectually manage and control their firm respectively (Kakabadse, Yang & 
Sanders 2010). Berle and Means (1932) in The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
described the increasing challenge of interest dissimilarities between owners and managers 
(Kakabadse, Yang & Sanders 2010). However, Clarke (2007) argues that agency theory does 
not clearly explain the complexity of what is in reality a double agency dilemma. Agency 
theory focuses on the main dilemma in the relationship between the principal and agent, but a 
second dilemma lies in the relationship between an agent (e.g. a director on the board) and 
another agent (e.g. CEO / management) (Clarke 2007).  
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In Australia the presence of non-executive directors on the board is deemed to provide 
the necessary control, supervision and evaluation of the CEO and the top management team 
performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). Board composition in many Australian and United 
States public companies is characterised by a high number of non-executive directors 
compared to the number of executive directors and is therefore aligned with the 
recommendations on board structure from agency theorists (Dalton et al. 1998; Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003a). Lorsch and MacIver (1989) and Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand (1996) 
nonetheless argue that this type of board composition may not entirely solve the conflict of 
interest issue because many non-executive directors are themselves CEOs in other 
companies. It can be expected that the non-executive directors who also serve as top 
executives at other companies are normally busy and spend little time investigating further 
any issues they may arise from the reports given to them as directors (Mace 1971). In Hong 
Kong the presence of family-based model introduces a different type of conflict between the 
family-controlled shareholders and the outside shareholders (i.e., minority shareholders who 
do not have ties to the founding family) (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000; Cheng & Firth 
2005; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn 2010). This conflict will result in possible agency cost 
(Morck & Yeung 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller 2006).  
Although agency theory emerges as the key principle in a majority of corporate 
governance research, the theory has some theoretical limitations (Hirsch, Michaels & 
Friedman 1987; Donaldson & Davis 1991; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). In reality, 
the disagreement of interest between principal and agent does not apply to all managers 
(Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). Stewardship theory holds that the merging of 
interest between the principal and agent is achievable by clearly understanding the 
characteristics of the managers and of the circumstances (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 
1997).  
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2.2.4.2 Stewardship Theory 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) introduced stewardship theory as a way of explaining 
relations from other behavioural perspectives. Stewardship theory has its foundation in 
psychology and sociology (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). The theory recognises a bigger 
range of human motivations in particular selflessness, the dedication to produce useful work 
and the attitude required to achieve (Clarke 2004a). Stewardship theory describes the 
situation wherein managers are not driven by individual purposes but rather are dependable 
individuals and good ‘stewards of resources’ assigned to them (Donaldson & Davis 1991; 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a, p. 190). The theory implies 
that the shareholders can rely on the managers to improve organisation performance because 
the goals of many managers are generally aligned with the goals of the owners (Donaldson 
1990; Shen 2003). Managers should be trusted with the authority to act since there is no 
inherent conflict between their interests and the interests of the owner(s) (Clarke 2004a).  
Since stewardship theory is a relatively new theory compared to agency theory, 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997, p. 21) explained the need for corporate governance 
research that ‘shows where stewardship theory fits in the theoretic landscape, in terms of a 
connection to agency theory, instead of opposed to it’. Such research could provide useful 
theoretical insights by improving understanding of the situations where stewardship theory 
would apply and other situations where agency theory applies, and reducing the over-reliance 
on one particular theory or ‘one-best-way thinking’, which is often found in earlier corporate 
governance research (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997, p. 21). In consideration of their 
advice and the importance of a multi-theoretic approach in corporate governance research, 
this thesis here will integrate different theories such as stewardship theory and agency theory 
in its development of research hypotheses.  
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Stewardship theory also has implications for board composition practice as this 
approach is not in agreement with agency theory arguments on the advantages of boards 
comprising a majority of outside, non-executive directors instead of specialist executive 
directors (Clarke 2004a). Rather, executive directors are a valuable organisation resource and 
one or more inside directors, and in certain cases a majority of inside directors (e.g. younger, 
more entrepreneurial companies), should be valued on the board and help achieve strong 
organisation performance (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996; Kroll, Walters & Le 2007).  
2.2.4.3 Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Managerial hegemony theory emerged when Mace (1971) discovered that there were 
differences between the described roles and the actual roles of the directors. In the 1960s 
after working with and spending some time on boards of directors, Mace (1971) revealed 
there was a big separation between the myth of the responsibilities and power of boards of 
directors and the reality of their poor performance. Mace (1971) argued that boards of 
directors in general did not carry out an effective job of evaluating the CEO’s performance 
because in the 1960s it was a common practice in the United States for the CEO to select the 
directors. Also, the directors assessed CEO performance mostly on reports and information 
prepared by the CEO himself or herself (Mace 1971). This has implications for the agency 
role of the board in carrying out an effective check and monitoring of the CEO (Clarke 
2004a). Mace (1971) found that directors did not create goals, did not ask sufficiently 
probing questions, and did not appoint the CEO except under certain crisis situations. 
Managerial hegemony theory asserts that the board has less dominant power than the 
management team and is perceived as a ‘legal fiction’ playing a ‘passive’ function in strategy 
and the overall organisation performance (Hendry & Kiel 2004, p. 502). Management play 
the stronger role (Hendry & Kiel 2004). 
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Lorsch and MacIver (1989) outline the progression in the power of boards of directors 
in the United States. They explain two reasons for the power disparity, firstly being the dearth 
of board power and secondly being the abundance of management power. Management 
power has been argued to increase when the CEO also acts as the chairman of the board. This 
dual leadership structure is commonly encountered in the United States public companies 
(Lorsch & MacIver 1989). From the 1980s board processes and the issues of relative power 
between the management and the board of directors have been continuously discussed 
(Clarke 2004a). In the 1990s there were growing pressures from the public, institutional 
investors and regulatory bodies for more independent and active boards following the 
increasing event of prominent and costly corporate collapses (Clarke 2004a); this trend is 
evidenced in Australia and the United States. In Hong Kong large shareholders who are not 
connected to the founder or executive directors or founding family have the capability to 
suppress and balance managerial hegemony (David, Kochhar & Levitas 1998; Cheng & Firth 
2005). Managerial hegemony theory has implications for the issues relating to CEO work 
context, the working relationship between CEO and the board, and the contemporary roles of 
the board in monitoring the CEO. 
2.2.4.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) integrate both agency theory and resource dependence 
theory to obtain a more complete understanding of how boards can affect organisation 
performance. Agency theory focuses on the agency role of the board that is to monitor the 
management team and govern the corporation. Resource dependence theory highlights the 
resource dependence role of the board that is to help to secure important resources for the 
organisation by means of the individual director’s connection with the external environment 
(Zald 1969; Pfeffer 1972; Boyd 1990; Boeker & Goodstein 1991; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 
1996; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). CEOs acting as a non-executive director in 
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various firms and also non-executive directors can bring important resources to their 
corporation and provide a significant connection between the corporation and the external 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Dalton et al. 1998). Resources may be offered in the 
forms of expertise, information, advice and access to crucial stakeholders such as suppliers, 
customers, decision makers, lobbyists and governmental groups (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; 
Gales & Kesner 1994).  
Resource dependence theory argues that corporate boards are an important medium 
for communicating information between the corporation and external organisations, 
administering external connections, and acquiring support from key external institutions 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The board can decrease uncertainty in relation to the external 
environment (Pfeffer 1972) and minimise transactional expenses related to environmental 
interdependency (Williamson 1984; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). The board assists 
in giving the organisation legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Daily & Dalton 1994; Gales 
& Kesner 1994) and improving the integrity and status of the firm (Hambrick & D’Aveni 
1992; Daily & Schwenk 1996). Resource dependence theory predicts that the level of 
environmental dependency or environmental uncertainty of an organisation is positively 
related to board composition as measured by board size and the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). The theory and research 
evidence (e.g. Pfeffer 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) suggest that a bigger board will be 
linked to better organisation performance (Dalton et al. 1999). 
2.3 Convergence Theory and the Convergence Debate 
Rasheed and Yoshikawa (2012) have indicated that an important debate in the modern 
corporate governance field is the possibility of worldwide convergence toward the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance. In corporate governance, convergence relates to 
the growing ‘isomorphism in the governance practices of public corporations from different 
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countries’ (Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012, p. 2). Convergence can be considered as ‘an ideal 
which nations and firms are moving towards or away’ (Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012, p. 3).  
The literature recognises different terminologies that are linked to convergence. 
Earlier researchers used the concept of hybridisation that refers to the detachment of cultural 
arrangements from current practices to merge with new arrangements in new practices (Rowe 
& Schelling 1991; Pieterse 1994). In the era of globalisation, overseas companies seeking to 
list on a United States stock exchange often willingly acquire shareholder based governance 
practices for the purpose of obtaining access to United States investors (Coffee 1999; Fiss & 
Zajac 2004). The companies may then apply the United States practices to their local 
conditions resulting in growing hybridisation (Pieterse 1994; Vogel 2003; Rasheed & 
Yoshikawa 2012). La Porta et al. (2000) and Gilson (2001) separated convergence into 
convergence in form and convergence in function. The former refers to the growing 
similarities in relation to the legal structures and systems; the latter implies that although 
various countries may have different regulations, they can perform the same function such as 
ensuring accountability by managers (Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). Functional convergence 
of corporate governance practices exist ‘at the firm level’ as a result of ‘market-driven 
changes’ and is considered more likely to occur than convergence in form (La Porta et al. 
2000, p. 20; Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). In the convergence debate, Khanna, Kogan and 
Palepu (2006) explained the difference between de jure convergence and de facto 
convergence. The former is when various countries adopt similar laws of corporate 
governance while the latter refers to a convergence in the actual implementation of practices 
(Khanna, Kogan & Palepu 2006). Further, Fiss and Zajac (2004) explain decoupling can 
occur when certain countries claim to espouse a new practice however in reality they execute 
the practice differently or do not implement it. This condition denotes there is de jure 
convergence but no de facto convergence (Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012).  
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) strongly established the case for convergence of 
corporate governance toward the shareholder value maximisation or the Anglo-American 
model on the normative level. The case was based on the evidence and general agreement 
demonstrating that managers should function only in the best interests of shareholders 
(Gordon & Roe 2004). The theory has been supported by some prominent organisations 
including the OECD, the Group of 7 (G7) and certain leading Western law and business 
schools (Clarke 2004a). Globalisation has opened up some important questions over whether 
certain corporate governance models present better competitive advantage (Gordon & Roe 
2004). Globalisation has intensified business rivalry and promoted market integration 
resulting in a recognised demand to satisfy particular governance conditions (Clarke 2004a). 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) pointed out that the fundamental elements of corporate law 
and corporate governance law in developed legal and market jurisdictions have reached a 
high level of uniformity and so continuing convergence in corporate governance toward a 
particular, standard model is plausible. They strongly believe that convergence to the 
shareholder model is very likely because the model provides the necessary efficiencies for the 
Anglo-American countries in relation to the management of large firms with various owners. 
In this ideal model, stakeholders of the firm can receive considerable protection through 
regulatory and contractual methods such as labour contracts rather than through corporate 
governance recommendations or company law (Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Gordon & 
Roe 2004). Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) concluded that the alternative models to the 
model of shareholder value maximisation such as the managerial-oriented, labour-oriented, 
state-oriented, and stakeholder models might undergo major changes as they failed to offer 
the same level of competitiveness in globally integrated markets (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 
2009). 
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The topic of convergence in corporate governance practices between countries has 
brought controversy among corporate governance experts and is a matter of contention in a 
range of disciplines such as accounting, finance and strategic management (Yoshikawa & 
Rasheed 2009; Rasheed & Yoshikawa 2012). The opposing arguments to the convergence 
theory (Bebchuk & Roe 1999; Guillen 2000; Branson 2001; Gilson 2001) emphasise the 
actual obstacles in attaining such convergence. Branson (2001) argues convergence 
supporters hypothesised convergence based on their study of capitalism in the United States, 
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. However, these advocates excluded the world's 
remaining six billion people and the largest nations in the world including China, India and 
Indonesia. In these countries, cultural diversity may hinder convergence from taking place 
(Branson 2001). Resentment toward the United States corporate governance model also 
exists in some cultures and economies (Branson 2001). 
The importance of exploring convergence has been raised in the leading international 
and interdisciplinary corporate governance journal such as Corporate Governance: An 
International Review (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009). Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) 
highlighted the scarcity of empirical work into convergence in corporate governance models 
although there have been an increasing number of empirical articles on the topic of 
convergence emerging in journals in various fields (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009). A 
particular study conducted by Fiss and Zajac (2004) looks into the possibility of convergence 
of corporate governance practices in the biggest publicly listed German firms towards the 
Anglo-American model of shareholder wealth orientation. They investigated the impact of 
certain CEO characteristics—CEO age and CEO educational background—on the 
implementation of corporate governance practices that move away from the German model 
towards the Anglo-American model. They found that the selection of a CEO with an 
educational background in law or economics could increase the extent and the probability of 
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the implementation of corporate governance practices which are consistent with the Anglo-
American governance approach. Notably, there is a gap in empirical research exploring the 
global convergence of the influence of CEO professional development and the CEO work 
context to the Anglo-American countries situation. 
Convergence of Hong Kong corporate governance practice toward the Anglo-
American model is likely considering British law has been used as the foundation for Hong 
Kong law (Brewer 1997). Corporate governance practice in Hong Kong has also been 
influenced by guidelines and reports from Anglo countries such as the United Kingdom 
(Cheng & Firth 2005). In the mid-1990s Canadian experts were engaged to conduct a 
thorough review of Hong Kong corporate law, looking in depth into other systems in 
countries including China, Australia, Asia and Continental Europe for insight (Brewer 1997). 
Table 2.1 summarises representative studies exploring corporate governance issues 
including the CEO or board effect on organisation performance across different countries and 
convergence of corporate governance practices. Table 2.1 evidences a gap in the existing 
literature that explores CEO professional development and the CEO work context effect 
across Australia, the United States (US) and Hong Kong.  
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Table 2.1: Representative Studies of Cross-Country Comparison and Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Crossland and 
Hambrick 
2011 CEO effect, 
managerial 
discretion, 
national level 
institution, 
firm 
performance 
10 year sample 
of 746 public 
firms in 15 
countries 
(including 
Australia and 
the US) 
Panel, fixed-
effects regression 
analysis, partial 
least squares 
analysis, 
hierarchical linear 
modelling, Sobel 
test 
There is a relationship between the level of CEOs managerial 
discretion and certain formal and informal national 
institutions. Managerial discretion was found to mediate the 
link between national institutions and CEO effects. CEOs in a 
country with a strong preference for individual accountability 
and initiative (e.g. the US) were found to possess more 
discretion than CEOs in a country with a strong preference for 
collectivism and consensus (e.g. Japan). 
Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn 
2010 Board 
independence, 
CEO duality, 
firm 
performance 
Stock exchange 
firms (66 from 
Indonesia, 75 
Malaysia, 111 
South Korea, 61 
Thailand) 
between 2001 
and 2002 
Quantile 
regression 
analysis 
The ideal design of CEO duality and board independence is 
dependent on initial organisation performance. Both variables 
have a positive impact on performance for average-
performing organisations. There is a negative moderating 
influence of board size on the positive effect of CEO duality 
on organisation performance. Regulatory bodies should 
identify conditional best corporate governance practices rather 
than design stringent ‘one size fits all’ rules (p. 624). 
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Table 2.1: Representative Studies of Cross-Country Comparison and Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices (continued) 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Crossland and 
Hambrick 
2007 CEO effect, 
compensation, 
firm performance 
15 year sample of 
100 public US 
firms, 100 German 
firms and 100 
Japanese firms 
Variance 
components analysis 
CEOs in various countries experience systematically a 
different level of restriction on their managerial 
discretion. This results in differences in how much 
influence they have on organisation performance. The 
effect of the CEOs on firm performance such as ROA, 
return on sales (ROS) and sales growth was found to 
be considerably larger in US corporations than in 
Japanese and German corporations. 
Khanna, 
Kogan and 
Palepu 
2006  Convergence of 
corporate 
governance 
practices, cross-
country analysis 
49 developing and 
developed nations 
Dyadic, panel 
regression, probit 
regression, OLS 
regression, ANOVA, 
regression analysis 
The study investigates whether globalisation is 
correlated with similarity in governance practice. 
There is similarity in governance however the 
similarity is not driven by convergence to the US 
standards. Globalisation may have led to the adoption 
of certain common corporate governance principles; 
however, the authors found little evidence that these 
principles have been put into practice. 
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Table 2.1: Representative Studies of Cross-Country Comparison and Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices (continued) 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Khanna, 
Palepu and 
Srinivasan 
2004  Disclosure 
practice, 
convergence 
794 companies from 
24 countries in 
Europe and Asia-
Pacific 
Descriptive 
statistics, univariate 
correlation, OLS, 
multivariate analysis 
The interactions between different markets are related 
to similarities in governance practices in particular 
with regard to disclosure requirements.  
Bonn, 
Yoshikawa 
and Phan 
2004 Board structure, 
firm 
performance 
Manufacturing firms 
(169 from the Nikkei 
300 Index and 104 
from the top 500 
firms in Australia) 
Bivariate analysis, 
multiple regression  
In Japan directors age and board size were negatively 
related to organisation performance. In Australia the 
female director ratio and the outsider ratio were 
positively related to organisation performance. 
Fiss and Zajac 2004 Corporate 
governance 
model, 
diffusion, 
convergence 
112 biggest publicly 
listed German firms 
from 1990 to 2000 
Pearson correlation, 
discrete time event, 
logistics regression 
model, negative 
binomial regression 
The study shows that German companies participate in 
decoupling (i.e., they adopt a shareholder value 
position but do not implement it). The probability of 
decoupling decreases with the existence of more 
dedicated and powerful key actors such as the CEO. 
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Table 2.1: Representative Studies of Cross-Country Comparison and Convergence of Corporate Governance Practices (continued) 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Aguilera and 
Jackson 
2003 Diversity in 
corporate 
governance 
dimensions 
N/A Theoretical model 
development 
Globalisation has not resulted in a rapid convergence 
on nationwide corporate governance models but often 
a hybridisation where the adaptation of the US 
practices to other countries creates a new hybrid 
structure of company organisation.  
Kaplan 1994 Top executive 
compensation, 
firm 
performance 
121 Japanese 
companies, 150 US 
companies 
Panel, regression 
analysis, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) 
In general, the relationship between top executive 
turnover, cash compensation and the firm performance 
measures is statistically similar between Japanese 
executives and the United States executives. There is a 
positive relationship between top executive cash 
compensation and the performance measures— change 
in earnings, negative earnings, stock performance and 
sales growth performance. However, there is a 
negative relationship between top executive turnover 
and these performance measures. 
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2.4 Roles of the CEO and the Non-executive Directors 
The role of the CEO and the board has long been an area of interest for corporate 
governance researchers (e.g. see Kiel & Nicholson 2003b; Kroll, Walters & Wright 2008; 
O’Shannassy 2010). Investors are increasingly holding directors responsible for organisation 
performance and failures (Kiel & Nicholson 2003b). The nature of business is '... confused, 
unsure and unpredictable' (Hendry 2005, p. 58). The business environment has become more 
complex (Hamel 2009). Business competition has increased in recent years putting demand 
on organisations to be quicker and more adaptable to customers and markets (Ireland & Hitt 
1999; Burgelman & Grove 2007; O’Shannassy 2010). O'Shannassy (2010) argues that these 
trends bring consequences for the relative roles of the CEO and corporate directors.  
2.4.1 Roles of the CEO 
 A substantial portion of the study of corporate governance has been concentrated on 
the role of the CEO (Deutsch, Keil & Laamanen 2010). The work of a CEO is recognised ‘for 
its complexity, ambiguity and information overload’ (Mintzberg 1973; Kotter 1982; 
Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991, p. 721). CEOs coordinate the creation of strategy, take 
decisions and lead the development and implementation of values in their organisations 
(Ansoff 1965; Porter 1980; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009; Rumelt 2011; Hambrick 
& Quigley 2014). Traditionally the CEO has acted as the organisation commander and 
strategy was made at the top of the corporation structure with the support of top managers 
(De Wit & Meyer 2010; O’Shannassy 2010). Henri Fayol introduced the fundamental 
functions of a manager in 1916 (Mintzberg 1973). As the top manager, the CEO’s work is ‘to 
forecast and plan, to organize, to command, to co-ordinate and to control’ (Fayol 1967, p. 6). 
Luther Gulick extended Fayol’s work description of the CEO to include ‘planning’, 
‘organizing’, ‘staffing’, ‘directing’, ‘coordinating’, ‘reporting’ and ‘budgeting’ (Mintzberg 
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1973, p. 9). As tenure increases, CEOs gain more knowledge of their company and build up a 
better work record (Simsek 2007). Mintzberg (1973) added that CEOs spend a lot of time 
gathering and processing information and also networking with a different range of internal 
and external stakeholders.  
The modern role of the CEO is now more varied than the conventional commander 
role as the CEO is perceived as the ‘chief designer of the strategy process’ (O’Shannassy 
2010, p. 284; De Wit & Meyer 2010). CEOs work together with the board to develop a vision 
and long-term strategy for the organisation, to develop and implement plans for mergers and 
acquisitions, and to implement the strategic vision and plan (Kiel et al. 2012). CEOs need to 
make sure that the strategic priorities of the TMT are communicated vigorously and openly to 
the board to avoid misunderstandings between the board and the TMT (Kiel et al. 2012). 
CEOs provide necessary guidance and mentoring to the TMT members and also contribute to 
developing an effective succession plan in coordination with the board (Kiel et al. 2012). 
CEO Duality: The Role of the CEO who is also the Chairperson of the Board 
In the instance of CEO duality, the CEO needs to perform the dual role of the CEO 
and the chairperson on the board. All the job responsibilities of the CEO have to be fulfilled 
in this duality setting. The additional role of the chairperson is equally critical, challenging 
and prominent as the job responsibilities of the CEO (Psaros 2009). Traditionally the 
chairperson’s role has been restricted to facilitating board meetings and checking on 
implementation of board meeting deliberations, plans and decisions (Kiel et al. 2012). The 
responsibilities of the chairperson have increased significantly in the contemporary business 
environment where they are required to be more proactive in making sure that the board 
functions efficiently and effectively in their roles as the ‘mind’ of the corporation (Kiel et al. 
2012, p. 233). The chairperson takes the lead of the board and is responsible for the 
management of the board (ASX 2010). The chairperson plays a key role in director selection 
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and holds the power to appraise the performance of the board and individual directors (Kiel et 
al. 2012). The chairperson should encourage the productive involvement of all directors in 
board meetings and ensure a productive interaction between the management team and the 
board (ASX 2010). The chairperson develops and drives the board agenda and is in control of 
ensuring the meetings operate according to the agenda with minimum dispute and maximum 
outcome, making sure that due process is obeyed during meetings (Psaros 2009; Kiel et al. 
2012). 
CEO Separation: The Roles of the Chairperson who is not acting as the CEO of the 
Company 
There is very limited attention given in the literature to exploring the role of the 
independent chairperson and his/her influence on organisation performance (e.g. Kakabadse 
& Kakabadse 2007). The chairperson who does not serve as the CEO should work closely 
with the CEO to encourage the productive involvement of all directors (Investment and 
Financial Services Association 2009) and make sure that the strategies and performance of 
the management team are properly explained to the board (Naciri 2010). Chairpersons should 
offer guidance to the CEO on important matters, build an efficient board, question other 
directors, and devote time to developing and counselling colleagues (Naciri 2010). 
Chairpersons supervise the process of appointing, assessing, compensating and dismissing the 
CEO (Jensen 1993). Chairpersons should possess a sharp analytical capability (Dulewicz, 
Gay & Taylor 2008) and the necessary experience and business instinct to take the crucial 
advisory role in the organisation, making them the ideal mentors and confidants for the CEOs 
(Bosch 1995; O’Shannassy 2010; Kiel et al. 2012). 
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2.4.2 Roles of the Board of Directors and Non-executive Directors  
Supporters of the managerial hegemony theory perspective (e.g. Mace 1971; Vance 
1983) explain that boards traditionally made small contributions to organisational strategy 
(Hendry & Kiel 2004). Mace (1971) sees boards as ‘the creature of the CEO’ because the 
decisions made by the board are generally controlled by the management, particularly the 
CEO (Hendry & Kiel 2004). Herman (1981), Perham (1983) and Nader (1984) argued that 
boards functioned only as rubber stamps of managerial choices. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
found the board has a more advisory role in providing counsel, rather than initiating strategy.  
Kiel and Nicholson (2003a) explain much theory development and empirical research 
in corporate governance has been aimed at better understanding and predicting a correlation 
between different board characteristics and organisation performance. For instance the 
agency relationship has resulted in an increasing emphasis on the role of non-executive 
directors on the board as they provide a moderating influence of the CEO on strategy 
development and ‘day-to-day’ management issues. The role of the board of directors has 
evolved over the last several decades especially in regard to monitoring CEO performance. 
However with recent corporate scandals researchers have recognised a more active 
role of the board in monitoring organisation performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003b). 
Corporate stakeholders have given more attention into the issues of how the board of 
directors could benefit organisation performance through its dealing with the CEO and 
corporate matters (Westphal 1999). The board of directors has legal duties to develop rational 
and informed decisions, to provide adequate supervision of the CEO and the company, and to 
act faithfully for the benefit of the firm (Clarke 2007).  
From the legal perspective the board of directors is entrusted with a fiduciary duty to 
monitor the performance of the CEO and TMT for the benefit of the organisation (Bainbridge 
1993; Cieri, Sullivan & Lennox 1994; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996). Johnson, Daily and 
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Ellstrand (1996) identify three director role and responsibilities: control, service, and resource 
dependence. Bonn and Pettigrew (2009) used a multi-theoretic approach from agency theory, 
resource dependence theory and decision-making theory to describe the three central roles of 
board. These roles include checking and overseeing the TMT, giving access to networks and 
resources, and participating in strategic decision-making (Bonn & Pettigrew 2009). The 
board is responsible for observing the performance of senior executives and implementing 
strategy (ASX 2010). The board now has more involvement in strategy formulation and 
approval and needs to work closely with the TMT to establish company goals (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003b). The board plays an important role in appointing, invigilating, appraising, 
coaching, remunerating, and when necessary, dismissing the CEO (Kiel & Nicholson 2003b). 
The roles summarised above are interconnected in a way that one role impacts and is being 
impacted by the others (Pye 2002) because ‘board activity is an integrative and multi-
functional activity’ (Hill 1995; Stiles & Taylor 2001; Bonn & Pettigrew 2009, p. 5). 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 1972) emphasises the institutional role of boards 
in helping the organisation to connect to its environment and secure access to critical 
resources (McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; O’Shannassy 2010). Non-executive directors can play 
a key role here, sharing access to their professional networks perhaps in the legal, audit or 
consulting professions or perhaps in the investment banking community to help to solve 
resource access challenges. Non-executive directors also provide a critical check and balance 
on the CEO and TMT when these non-executive directors are in a numerical and voting 
majority on the board, helping to ensure proper board process with presentation of board 
papers, proper board discussion, proper deliberation and voting. 
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2.5 CEO and Organisation Performance 
2.5.1 The Influence of the CEO on Organisation Performance 
The question of whether the CEO matters forms an important element of organisation 
studies (Crossland & Hambrick 2007; Fitza 2014). The CEOs normally receive a very high 
remuneration and so they are expected to bring an improvement in organisation performance. 
Superior CEOs like Steve Jobs, Lou Gestner and Jack Welch who are all famous in the 
business community have been praised for bringing a positive impact on organisation 
performance. On the other hand, certain CEOs of particular firms in corporate history (e.g. 
Kodak and Honeywell) have failed to perform at the level expected resulting in CEO 
dismissal by the boards (Muthukumar 2009). 
There has been discussion in the upper echelons literature into the adequacy of 
exploring the effect of the CEO alone on organisation performance. Some scholars argue that 
a group of people such as the TMT might bring more impact on organisation performance 
than the CEO. Previous research findings suggest that study of TMTs may provide a better 
estimate of firm outcomes (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). However, Dalton and 
Dalton (2005) recognised the lack of research focus on TMTs and oppositely the potential of 
CEO research. In a computer-assisted exploration of the ‘CEO’ and ‘TMT’ key words, they 
found ’15,136’ results for CEO compared with ‘174’ for TMT from various sources between 
1989 and 2004 (Dalton & Dalton 2005, p. 252). This discrepancy shows the obvious 
preference among researchers for the potential of CEO study instead of that concentrating on 
TMTs (Dalton & Dalton 2005). Dalton and Dalton (2005) suggested that if a TMT is truly the 
key entity then the CEOs who have been appointed should demand relocation their upper 
employees with them when they shift to the new company. But in reality it is rare to see a 
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company hire the CEO and the whole TMT from another company except perhaps in the 
event of mergers and acquisitions (Dalton & Dalton 2005).  
The issue of whether and how CEOs bring a great deal of influence on organisation 
performance is significant to a broad range of research agendas (Crossland & Hambrick 
2007). Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the question of whether the 
CEO influences firm performance (e.g. Lieberson & O’Connor 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer 
1977; Weiner & Mahoney 1981; Smith, Carson & Alexander 1984; Thomas 1988; Thomas, 
Litschert & Ramaswamy 1991; Finkelstein & Boyd 1998; Papadakis & Barwise 2002; 
Bertrand & Schoar 2003; Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006; Mackey 2008; Crossland & 
Hambrick 2007, 2011; Blettner, Chaddad & Bettis 2012; Hambrick & Quigley 2014). While 
the key research question 'do the executives matter?' is commonly answered with a yes, there 
is another school of thought which claims that top executives in general have little influence 
on firm performance (e.g. Lieberson & O'Connor 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer 1977; Bertrand & 
Schoar 2003).  
Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) investigated top executives in large corporations to 
examine the relative influence of leadership, organisational and environmental factors on 
corporate performance. Lieberson and O’Connor (1972, p. 124) measured performance 
variables in terms of sales, net earnings and profit margins and found that these variables 
were influenced 'by forces beyond a leader's immediate control…'. They concluded that top 
executives account for little variance in organisational performance. Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1977) studied the influence of city mayors on city budgets. Using a similar analysis to 
Lieberson and O'Connor’s (1972) study, Salancik and Pfeffer (1977, p. 492) concluded that 
leadership functioned '... within constraints deriving from internal structural and procedural 
factors and from external demands on the organisation'. A more recent study that points to a 
similar conclusion was conducted by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who collected a thirty-year 
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sample of approximately 1,500 large public United States firms. They also found that very 
little percentage of variance in return of assets might be attributable to the top managers of a 
business. 
On the other hand Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella (2009, p. 3) stated that ‘... the 
trajectories and fortunes of companies are often traceable to the actions (or inaction) of their 
top executives’. For example companies like IBM, Pearson, Nokia and General Electric 
performed well while companies like Enron, Tyco and Parmalat performed badly because of 
the choices made by their top executives (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Several 
studies have illustrated the limitations of Lieberson and O’Connor’s (1972) research design 
particularly in their selection of performance measures (Mackey 2008). Weiner (1978) 
replicated Lieberson and O’Connor’s (1972) study by randomly sampling 193 publicly listed 
manufacturing firms. Weiner (1978) discovered different outcomes when she used sequential 
analysis of variance and reversed the decomposition sequence (Mackey 2008). Weiner and 
Mahoney (1981) also replicated Lieberson and O’Connor’s (1972) study but specified causal 
variables at different levels and used simultaneous multivariate analysis to avoid the problem 
of sequentially considering each independent variable. They found that leadership accounts 
for 43.9 per cent of the variance in profitability of major firms.  
Table 2.2 summarises key studies exploring the effect of the CEO on organisation 
performance. The most recent study conducted by Hambrick and Quigley (2014) found that 
the overall CEO effect on organisation performance is significantly greater than what was 
found on previous studies. They noted that CEOs could considerably change the direction of 
their company through their selection of daily leadership actions and strategic decisions. 
Although this research here does not intend to replicate the Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) 
study, the preceding discussion in this section provides useful background. There is 
recognition from researchers that CEOs do possess the capability to influence their 
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organisations (Fitza 2014). This ability is normally accumulated from the CEOs professional 
development (e.g. functional background, work experience, educational background) and 
work situation. This professional development and work situation shapes the CEOs cognitive 
ability and values which will have implications for how they deal with daily business-related 
problems and how they affect firm performance (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Bantel & Jackson 
1989; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). For 
instance with regard to CEO educational background a past study from the United States 
(Bertrand & Schoar 2003) found that CEOs who have been exposed to an MBA education 
and successfully completed the MBA degree would be linked with higher ROA. Upper 
echelons theory provides the fundamental explanation of the link between the professional 
development and work context of the CEO and organisation performance and will be 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 2.2: Representative Studies of the CEO Effect on Organisation Performance 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Hambrick 
and Quigley 
2014 CEO effect, 
firm 
performance 
Final sample of 
315 firms in the US 
(830 CEOs, and 
4,866 firm-years) 
New CEO-in-context 
(CiC) method, 
generalised 
estimating equations 
(GEE) 
Prior techniques such as ANOVA and multilevel modelling 
(MLM) indicate that CEOs are responsible for between 10 
to 20 per cent of variation in profitability. The authors 
develop a new model namely the CiC model. This 
technique demonstrates a greater CEO effect on 
organisation performance: at 38.5 per cent (%) for ROA, 
35.5% for ROS and 46.4% for market-to-book (MTB) 
value. It was found that CEOs could have a significant 
influence on their organisations’ performance and change 
the direction of their companies.  
Mackey 2008 CEO effect, 
firm 
performance 
51 companies in 
the US, 92 CEOs 
over 10 years 
Simultaneous 
ANOVA 
The CEO effect on firm performance (both corporate-
parent performance and business-segment performance) is 
more substantial than the firm effect or the industry effect. 
Bertrand and 
Schoar 
2003  CEO effect, 
CEO 
education, firm 
performance 
600 firms in the US 
from Forbes 800 
(1969-1999) and 
Execucomp 1500 
(1992-1999) 
Fixed-effects panel 
regressions, F-tests, 
generalised least 
squares (GLS) 
There is a positive relationship between a CEO with an 
MBA degree and firm performance. CEOs who hold an 
MBA are positively correlated with ROA.  
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Table 2.2: Representative Studies of the CEO Effect on Organisation Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size Methods Relevant Findings 
Thomas 1988 CEO effect, 
firm 
performance 
Largest 200 
retailing firms in 
the United 
Kingdom (UK) in 
the Times 1000 
from 1965 to 1984 
Variance 
component 
analysis 
(VCA) 
The author pointed out some of the weaknesses of the Lieberson 
and O’Connor’s (1972) study. He conducted identical analysis on 
a different sample of retail companies in a different national 
setting—that is, the UK. He concluded that individual leader 
differences do provide an explanation for the firm performance 
variations within companies. 
Weiner and 
Mahoney 
1981 CEO effect, 
firm 
performance 
193 random 
manufacturing 
firms in the US 
from 1956 to 1974 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
The authors attempted to improve the Lieberson and O’Connor’s 
(1972) study by including some firm-specific control variables. 
They found that leadership or 'stewardship' differences account 
for 44 per cent of the variation of profitability and 47 per cent of 
the variation of share prices. Their findings are in contrast with 
the findings of Lieberson and O’Connor’s (1972) study. 
Lieberson 
and 
O'Connor 
1972 CEO effect, 
firm 
performance 
167 large public 
firms in 13 
different industries 
in the US between 
1946 and 1965 
VCA The authors found that the effect of firm and industry on two 
firm performance measures (i.e., sales and net earnings) was 
more important than the effect of leadership. However, the effect 
of leadership on a particular firm performance measure (i.e., 
profit margins) was found to be stronger than either the firm 
effect or the industry effect. 
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2.5.2 Upper Echelons Theory  
Upper echelons theory is grounded in the ‘study of behavioural decision making and 
bounded rationality’ (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & March 1963; Hambrick & Fukutomi 
1991; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011, p. 1894). The theory that upper echelons characteristics 
have an important effect on organisational outcomes was developed by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984). Research in psychology (Mischel 1977) provides the key idea that individuals in 
general often bring what they already know into their decisions, especially when they are 
facing complicated and ambiguous situations (Hambrick 2007; Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella 2009). These circumstances are often not ‘objectively knowable but, rather, are 
merely interpretable’ (Mischel 1977, cited in Hambrick 2007, p. 334). Hambrick (2007) 
explains the need to consider the dispositions and predispositions of the most powerful actors 
in the organisation in order to understand why organisations perform and behave the way 
they do. Often the most powerful actors in an organisation are the upper echelon executives.  
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991, p. 721) argue ‘bounded rationality, bias, and limited 
search’ can take place because of a particular CEO’s inability to understand each related 
stimulant (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & March 1963). Some of the difficult decisions being 
made in the organisation are the result of ‘behavioural factors’ as opposed to ‘a mechanical 
quest for economic optimization’ (March & Simon 1958; Cyert & March 1963; Hambrick & 
Mason 1984, p. 194). However, these behavioural factors including values and cognition are 
not straightforward to observe, and so upper echelon theory suggests that noticeable 
managerial characteristics and demographic proxies such as education, functional background 
and age can be used as valid measures of the ‘unobservable psychological constructs’ 
(Hambrick & Mason 1984; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004, p. 750). This growing 
awareness of the significance of the behavioural factors has directed researchers to study the 
observable work and professional development backgrounds of the top decision maker, in 
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particular the CEO who is mainly responsible for the performance of the whole organisation 
(Wiersema 1995).  
2.5.3 The Influence of the CEO Professional Development and Work Context on 
Organisation Performance 
 Bantel and Jackson (1989) discovered two distinctive approaches that are commonly 
used by researchers to observe the connection between CEO characteristics and organisation 
performance. The first approach is to evaluate ‘the psychological attributes of decision 
makers’ and explore their connection to organisation performance (Bantel & Jackson 1989, p. 
107). The second approach is to evaluate ‘demographic characteristics’ (e.g. education and 
age) assuming that these characteristics are linked to ‘cognitive abilities, attitudes and 
expertise’ (Bantel & Jackson 1989, p. 107). The three fundamental principles of the upper 
echelons perspective are summarised as follows (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004). 
First, organisational outcomes are considered as ‘reflections of the values and cognitive bases 
of powerful actors’ in the corporation (Hambrick & Mason 1984, p. 193). These values and 
cognitive biases are a function of the actors’ observable characteristics such as education or 
work experience. Therefore, key organisational outcomes will be connected to the observable 
characteristics of the actors (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 
2004).  
 The incumbent CEO represents his or her organisation in talking to and working with 
external stakeholders (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The work of the CEO is 
challenging because it is often conducted in unpredictable situations (Hambrick & Fukutomi 
1991). In these uncertain and difficult situations, CEOs often need to interpret circumstances 
by reflecting back on their professional development and work context, relying on the 
familiar and making use of solutions that have succeeded previously (Cyert & March 1963; 
Hambrick & Mason 1984; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Applying upper echelon 
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theory CEOs professional development and work reflects their personality, cognition, 
experiences and values; this all has an impact on their understanding of the circumstances 
they face, the way they make choices and decisions for the firm, and ultimately this 
influences organisation performance (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders 2004; Hambrick 
2007). 
The representative studies summarised in Table 2.3 below suggest that certain 
variables in relation to CEO professional development and CEO work context will help to 
predict if a particular CEO will exert a favourable effect on organisation performance. Table 
2.3 is a representative summary of what is a substantial literature and includes some of the 
most cited studies in the field relevant to the theory presented in this research. As mentioned 
much of this research has been conducted in the legal jurisdiction of the United States 
providing a research opportunity in other legal jurisdictions in developed economies such as 
Australia and Hong Kong. Table 2.3 evidences that in corporate governance research 
variables including CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO share ownership percentage have 
been used to explore the CEO effect on organisation performance with some interesting and 
sometimes unexpected outcomes. Table 2.3 does indicate that this stream of research has not 
explored thoroughly issues in relation to CEO professional development including CEO 
origin (i.e., an inside selection or an outside the company selection), CEO functional 
background and CEO education background for their effect on organisation performance. 
This appraisal of the literature provides useful background for the development of the 
research hypotheses in the next chapter. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Krause, 
Semadeni and 
Cannella 
2014 CEO duality Not Applicable 
(N/A) 
Theory development Review of empirical studies evidences separation 
on its own does not improve organisation 
performance. A wider, more holistic understanding 
of practice in this area is required. Institutional 
theory shows promise in explaining wider practice 
of separation.  
Krause and 
Semadeni 
2013 CEO and 
chairperson 
separation 
1,053 companies 
from the Fortune 
1000 and S&P 
1500 Indexes from 
2002 to 2006 
Fixed-effects logistic 
regression 
Separation has a positive impact on future 
organisation performance after weak performance. 
Separation has a negative influence on future 
organisation performance after strong performance. 
de Villiers, 
Naiker and van 
Staden 
2011 Board 
characteristics, 
environmental 
performance 
1,216 US publicly 
traded companies 
between 2003 and 
2004 (2,151 
observations) 
Ordered logistic 
regression 
A high non-executive director ratio has a positive 
influence on environmental performance. However, 
there was no significant relationship between CEO 
duality and environmental performance. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the 
Study 
Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Dalton and 
Dalton 
2011 CEO duality, 
board 
composition, 
financial 
performance 
N/A Editorial issue There is no evidence of a relationship between the 
choice of CEO duality and financial performance 
and also between board composition and financial 
performance. This result may be associated with the 
lack of attention to multi-level analytical protocol in 
the existing research. 
Zhang and 
Rajagopalan 
2010 CEO origin, 
CEO tenure, 
firm 
performance 
193 CEOs in 176 
US public firms 
between 1993 and 
1998 
Pooled cross section, 
time series, 
generalised least 
squares (GLS) 
regression 
There is an inverted U-shaped association between 
the level of strategic change and organisation 
performance. This relationship varies between 
companies led by insider CEOs and outsider CEOs. 
This difference between insider and outsider CEOs 
exists in the later stages of CEO tenure but not in 
the early CEO tenure. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the Study Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Simsek 2007 CEO tenure, firm 
performance 
495 companies Survey, structural 
equation modelling, 
confirmatory factor 
analysis 
CEO tenure does have an indirect influence on 
performance through its direct influence on the 
risk-taking propensity of the TMT and company 
pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. A linear 
relationship between CEO tenure and TMT risk-
taking propensity was supported. 
Walters, Kroll 
and Wright 
2007 CEO tenure, board 
of directors, 
acquisition 
performance 
313 
acquisitions of 
US publicly 
listed 
companies 
Hierarchical 
regression analysis 
Where the board is not vigilant CEO tenure is 
positively correlated to performance at low to 
middle levels of tenure; CEO tenure is negatively 
correlated to performance when tenure increases 
to high levels. Where the board is vigilant 
shareholder interests are advanced as CEO tenure 
increases. 
Combs, 
Ketchen, 
Perryman and 
Donahue 
2007 CEO power, board 
composition, 
organisation 
performance 
73 US stock 
exchange 
listed 
companies 
Event study, 
multiple regression, 
moderated multiple 
regression 
CEO tenure and the proportion of outside, non-
executive directors do not jointly correlate with a 
stock market measure of organisation 
performance. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the Study Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Kiel and 
Nicholson  
2003a Board composition, 
firm performance 
348 biggest 
ASX listed 
firms 
Bivariate 
correlations, 
ANOVA, regression 
analysis 
There is a significant, negative relationship 
between the proportion of outside, non-executive 
directors and market-based organisation 
performance (i.e., Tobin’s Q). 
Bigley and 
Wiersema 
2002 CEO power, heir 
apparent, corporate 
strategic refocusing 
61 large US 
companies  
Hierarchical 
moderated 
regression analysis  
CEO heir apparent experience will moderate the 
influence of CEO compensation, CEO functional 
expertise and CEO elite education, respectively, 
on corporate strategic refocusing in a negative 
relationship. Heir apparent experience and the 
number of external boards a CEO sits on jointly 
correlate positively with firm strategic refocusing. 
Carpenter, 
Sanders and 
Gregersen 
2001 CEO international 
experience, CEO 
pay, firm 
performance 
245 US 
multinational 
companies 
Multiple regression, 
moderated multiple 
regression, two- 
staged least squares 
Performance of multinational companies is better 
when a CEO has international work experience. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the Study Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Coles, 
McWilliams 
and Sen 
2001 Governance 
mechanisms, firm 
performance 
144 companies Multiple regression, 
moderated multiple 
regression 
Long CEO tenure and a high inside, executive 
director ratio jointly predict decreasing market 
performance. There is a negative relationship 
between the proportion of outside, non-executive 
directors and market value added. 
Daily and 
Johnson 
1997 CEO power, firm 
performance 
100 random 
firms from 
Fortune 500 
with no CEO 
succession 
from 1987 to 
1990 
Four-wave panel, 
structural equation 
model  
A low proportion of independent directors do not 
predict lower organisation performance. CEOs 
with an elite educational background led to lower 
market performance in 1990. CEO duality did not 
influence organisation performance. The findings 
demonstrate that CEOs even in very large firms do 
influence organisation performance. 
Zajac and 
Westphal 
1996a CEO-board power, 
board interlock 
491 US largest 
firms  
Poisson regression 
model, GLS model, 
negative binomial 
model  
The authors suggest that powerful top executives 
attempt to continue their control by favouring 
directors with experience on passive boards and 
avoiding directors with experience on active 
boards. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the Study Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Westphal and 
Zajac 
1995 CEO-board power, 
demographic 
similarity 
413 firms  Bivariate 
correlations, logit, 
multiple regression, 
GLS regression 
Powerful CEOs attempt to select new directors 
who have similar demography to them. CEOs may 
receive a higher level of compensation when there 
is high demographic similarity between the CEO 
and the board. 
Finkelstein 1992 TMT power, 
strategic decision 
making 
1,736 top 
managers, 102 
companies; 
172 
respondents 
from 
questionnaires 
Bivariate 
correlations, GLS 
regression 
A set of dimensions in a questionnaire was 
presented to respondents to measure top 
executives power. The power dimensions include 
structural power, ownership power, expert power 
and prestige power. The study presents 
fundamental explanations of how the TMT power 
plays an important role in strategic choice.  
Pearce and 
Zahra 
1991 CEO, board power, 
firm performance 
Interview: 87 
firms. Survey: 
139 firms  
Multivariate analysis 
of variance, 
ANOVA 
A powerful board is linked to better financial 
performance. Further, a participative board that 
embraces consensus among board members and 
TMT and displays the same, high level of power 
between the CEO and the directors is linked to the 
highest value of financial performance. 
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Table 2.3: Representative Studies of the CEO Professional Development and/or CEO Work Context Variables and Organisation 
Performance (continued) 
Author(s) Year  Focus of the Study Sample Size  Methods Relevant Findings 
Zajac  1990 CEO origin 105 companies Bivariate 
correlations, 
multiple regression 
Companies with an insider CEO are more 
profitable. Companies with CEOs who perceive a 
strong attachment between their wealth and that of 
their employer are more profitable. 
Hambrick and 
Mason 
1984 TMT 
characteristics, firm 
outcomes 
N/A Upper echelons 
theory development 
The authors expect top manager demographic 
characteristics or backgrounds can predict 
organisational outcomes (i.e., performance levels 
and strategic choices). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the literature in relation to similarities and differences in 
the development and practices of corporate governance between Australia, the United States 
and Hong Kong. The key literature exploring the influence of CEO professional development 
and CEO work context has also been reviewed.  
 We have seen that an important distinction between the Anglo-American model and 
the Hong Kong model relates to the ownership and control structure of publicly listed 
companies. In the Anglo-American model, a wide range of shareholders dominate the 
ownership of the public listed companies (Farrar 2001; Keong 2002). The control of many 
Australian and United States publicly listed companies is entrusted to the CEO and the board 
of directors of the respective companies. However in the Hong Kong model, families still 
dominate the ownership and control of the public listed companies (Stolt 2010). The majority 
of the CEOs in Hong Kong publicly listed companies may possess a high percentage of 
company shares (Brewer 1997; Stolt 2010). The practice of CEO and chairman duality is less 
common in Australian companies compared with the United States companies (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003a; Carter & Lorsch 2004; O’Shannassy 2010). Australia has a larger 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board than the United States (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003a). Despite these differences in corporate governance practices, the convergence theory 
posits that the worldwide convergence of practices toward the Anglo-American model that 
emphasises shareholder value maximisation will occur (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009). This is 
due to intensified business rivalry in global markets, companies from locations such as Hong 
Kong seeking capital on international capital markets, and the development of global best 
practice by leading international organisations such as the OECD. Corporate law and 
securities regulations in the Anglo-American model offer protection to both majority and 
minority shareholders (Nestor & Thompson 2001). Convergence theory has implications for 
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the development of conceptual framework and hypotheses in the next chapter and the 
analysis of data and results that follows later.  
 The CEO is the key focus of this study. The CEO holds crucial roles as the key TMT 
executive and organisation strategist. Research evidence shows that CEOs do influence 
organisation performance. Upper echelon theory provides the fundamental explanation of the 
link between the professional development and work context of the CEO and organisation 
performance. The literature also shows the increasing importance of the role of non-executive 
directors on the board in contemporary corporate governance in both monitoring the CEO’s 
work and providing valuable external resources to the firm. Using the fundamental arguments 
from multiple theories discussed earlier, the next chapter will present the conceptual 
framework and the development of hypotheses of this research here to describe the 
relationship between CEO professional development, CEO work context, the non-executive 
director ratio and organisation performance in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
We will see in the next chapter that the use of a multi-theoretic perspective in 
corporate governance research assists development of deeper understanding of the 
relationships between CEO professional development and CEO work context variables, the 
interaction of CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio jointly, and organisation 
performance. To achieve this outcome this thesis draws on agency theory, stewardship 
theory, managerial hegemony theory, resource dependence theory, upper echelons theory and 
also convergence theory in the development of these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The appraisal of the literature in the previous chapter provides useful background for 
the selection of certain variables in relation to CEO professional development and CEO work 
context to inform the development of the conceptual framework including the hypotheses in 
this chapter. This series of hypotheses have been developed to examine the influence of 
certain CEO professional development background matters including CEO insider/outsider 
status, CEO functional background, CEO international work experience, CEO MBA 
education and the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses respectively on 
organisation performance. A series of hypotheses have been developed to examine the 
influence of certain CEO work context issues including CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO 
share ownership percentage respectively on organisation performance. This chapter will also 
present the development of a moderation hypothesis to explore the influence of CEO tenure 
and the non-executive director ratio jointly and organisation performance.  
Taking a convergence theory perspective to theory development, most of the 
hypotheses developed in this chapter will apply to Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong. However the literature has indicated a certain moment of divergence in relation to 
CEO duality practice between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong and therefore a 
hypothesis with regard to CEO duality has been developed for the United States and Hong 
Kong only. This approach will identify areas of similarity in corporate governance practice in 
the three legal jurisdictions in this benchmark study.  
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3.2 Conceptual Framework 
The literature review has indicated that CEO professional development and the CEO 
work context can influence corporate governance practices (Huse 2005) and organisational 
outcomes (Hambrick & Mason 1984). Strategic management and corporate governance 
researchers consider that organisation performance is affected largely by the organisational 
choices and decisions developed by powerful actors from inside the company (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The CEO plays an important role in preparing and 
implementing organisational choices. It is unlikely for two CEOs to opt for the same options 
and to implement the choices in a similar way as CEOs often draw on their individual 
motivations, characteristics and experiences in making strategic decisions (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Ultimately the skills, experiences, biases and other human 
aspects of the top executives will have a significant influence on the direction of the 
organisation (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The organisation will become ‘a 
reflection of its top managers’ (Hambrick & Mason 1984, p. 193), especially of its CEO. 
The appraisal of the literature in the previous chapter has provided useful guidance on 
the selection of measures for the CEO professional development and work context for this 
study here. Based on key studies related to CEO professional development (e.g. Carpenter, 
Sanders & Gregersen 2001; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010; Buyl, Boone, Hendriks & 
Matthyssens 2011; Jalbert, Furumo & Jalbert 2011; Chung & Luo 2013; Lindorff & Jonson 
2013), the selected measures for CEO professional development are CEO insider/outsider 
status, CEO functional background, CEO international work experience, CEO MBA 
education and CEO number of university degrees. Based on key studies related to CEO work 
context (e.g. Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001; Bigley & Wiersema 2002; Walters, Kroll & 
Wright 2007; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014; Luo, Kanuri & Andrews 2014), the 
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selected measures here are CEO and chairperson duality, CEO tenure and CEO share 
ownership percentage. 
Several scholars (e.g. Westphal & Zajac 1995; Zajac & Westphal 1996a; Zajac & 
Westphal 1996b; Boyd et al. 2012) have underlined the importance of a moderating variable. 
A moderating variable modifies the strength and/or orientation of the relationship between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable (Baron & Kenny 1986). The literature review 
has illustrated the changing roles of the board in contemporary corporate governance 
practice. The board holds the key organisational role in appointing a suitable CEO for the 
firm. The literature review highlights the importance of the board of directors in particular 
non-executive directors working with the CEO in influencing organisation performance. 
However, the literature review also recognises that the board of directors was not included in 
the original upper echelon model (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). CEO work can be affected 
by organisational factors such as a demanding board (Hambrick 2007). In this scenario CEOs 
may opt for a particular action not due to ‘biased information processing’ as suggested by the 
original model, but instead because of the board’s preference for CEOs to manage the 
organisation in a certain way and to implement the board’s request for change (Hambrick 
2007; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011, p. 1917). This research here will pick up the non-
executive director ratio as the moderating variable to test a joint effect of the non-executive 
director ratio and an element of the CEO work context—CEO tenure—on organisation 
performance. In doing so, this research will extend the original upper echelon model and 
make a contribution to learning by improving our understanding of an issue here related to 
application of upper echelons theory, agency theory, stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory.  
The non-executive director ratio reflects the proportion of non-executive directors 
among all directors on the board (i.e., number of non-executive directors divided by the 
  
77
number of directors). The literature review indicates that the presence of non-executive 
directors on the board will enable the agency role (i.e., monitoring of the CEO) and resource 
dependence role (securing external resources) in the organisation (Bonn & Pettigrew 2009). 
However, the inclusion of inside, executive directors can also bring value to the organisation 
through their attainment of firm-specific knowledge and expertise (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). 
The presence of several executive directors who are good stewards will assist the CEO in 
communicating essential management and operational issues in a board meeting and then 
implementing strategic choices agreed in the board meeting. A high or low non-executive 
director ratio therefore can affect how CEOs go about their work during their tenure. There is 
then a theoretical tension between agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence 
theory and upper echelon theory embedded in this moderation relationship. This moderating 
relationship will be further explored in this study. 
Figure 3.1 exhibits the general conceptual framework of this thesis. The framework 
outlines the relationships between the independent variables (IV) related to certain CEO 
professional development and CEO work context variables, the moderating variable (MV) the 
non-executive director ratio, and the dependent variable (DV) organisation performance.   
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Figure 3.1: General Conceptual Framework—CEO Professional Development, CEO Work Context, the Non-executive Director Ratio 
and Organisation Performance 
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3.2.1 CEO Professional Development and Organisation Performance 
We have seen that in this thesis certain variables such as CEO insider/outsider status, 
CEO functional background, CEO international work experience, CEO MBA education and 
CEO number of university degrees have been selected as the variables for measuring the 
professional development of the CEO. The literature indicates much of the existing research 
has been conducted in the legal jurisdiction of the United States and has been limited in other 
legal jurisdictions in developed economies such as Australia and Hong Kong. The stream of 
existing research also has not explored comprehensively issues in relation to CEO 
professional development. The relationship between each CEO professional development 
variable and organisation performance is largely grounded in upper echelon theory although 
corporate governance theories such as agency theory, stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory are also useful in providing a better understanding of the link between the 
CEO professional development variables and organisation performance. These connections 
will now be developed in more detail prior to presentation of hypotheses in section 3.3. 
3.2.1.1 CEO Insider/Outsider Status 
The issue of how CEO origin (i.e., an inside or outside the firm selection) can 
influence organisation performance is important to corporate governance research; existing 
studies have emerged typically from the United States legal jurisdiction (Zhang & 
Rajagopalan 2010). A promotion from inside the organisation has traditionally been the main 
origin for new CEOs amongst United States companies (Vancil 1987; Ocasio 1999). The 
promotion also helps to boost general employee morale and loyalty (Howard 2001; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan 2003). CEO succession has been regarded as a crucial process for the firm to 
adjust to the changing demands of its environment with implications for organisation 
performance (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). CEO succession has particularly been 
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a critical issue in an environment where family businesses are prevalent such as in Hong 
Kong since the CEO with a family connection normally holds substantial power in making 
managerial decisions (Ting 2013). CEO succession and turnover is a recurring event in an 
organisation (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The departure of a former CEO is 
inevitable and can occur for several reasons such as illness, death, departure due to a more 
lucrative offer from another company, voluntary departure, early retirement due to private 
reasons, obligatory retirement or expulsion (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The 
literature has indicated both insider CEOs and outsider CEOs bring different types of work 
experience to the organisation (Harris & Helfat 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2003, 2004, 
2010). As part of their professional development, insider CEOs have normally gained firm-
specific skills and knowledge from their earlier experiences with the organisation while 
outsider CEOs are more valued for their fresh, different ‘outside the firm’ set of skills and 
knowledge (Harris & Helfat 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2003, 2004, 2010). This can have 
implications for organisation performance.  
3.2.1.2 CEO Functional Background 
Dearborn and Simon (1958, p. 142) argued that a top executive will recognise and 
better understand 'those aspects of a situation that relate' particularly to the goals and 
activities of his or her functional department. In Dearborn and Simon’s (1958) study, 23 
middle managers representing a particular manufacturing firm were given a general company 
case problem. The case comprised an abundance of explanatory facts about a specific steel 
company and its industry, but an inadequate evaluation for the managers to make an 
interpretation. The managers were asked to assume the position of the chief executive to 
consider the most critical problem within the company. In general, Dearborn and Simon 
(1958) found these middle managers classified the most critical problem according to their 
functional area. The findings of Dearborn and Simon's (1958) study provide support to the 
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argument that functional background and past work experience can shape a CEO's lens, and 
consequently, affect his or her way of perceiving a situation, solving daily business-related 
problems and influencing organisation performance (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 
2009). Walsh (1988) conceptually expanded and replicated Dearborn and Simon’s (1958) 
work. Walsh (1988) collected data from 121 middle managers of various companies who 
were studying an executive master’s level programme in part-time mode. The managers were 
given a three-page document representing a poorly constructed circumstance of a company 
case and a random set of 50 cards containing various components linked to the organisational 
outcomes. Walsh (1988, p. 873) found that the managers in his study did not appear as 
‘single-minded information processors’. Walsh (1988) recognised that conflicting results with 
Dearborn and Simon’s (1958) original study might occur due to differences in research 
design such as group sizes, the procedures used and the number of firms represented in every 
group. However, there were some similarities in the actual answers from each group of 
managers illustrating that ‘managers suffer from selective perception’ developed from their 
experiences in a specific functional area (Walsh 1998, p. 889). Waller, Huber and Glick 
(1995) found that functional background in general does influence the CEO’s perception of 
how effective their organisations are performing. 
3.2.1.3 CEO International Work Experience 
As globalisation escalated and global competition intensified in the past few decades, 
more attention has been given to the theme of CEO international work experience 
(Sambharya 1996). Many contemporary organisations have come to be multinational in 
nature (Chen & Stucker 1997). Executives particularly in multinational corporations face a 
more complex and challenging business environment (Prahalad 1990; Sanders & Carpenter 
1998). Maruca (1994) found retiring CEOs are more inclined to select a CEO successor who 
has previously managed and worked in a foreign environment. A CEO with international 
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work experience can be expected to be a rare and valuable firm resource (Carpenter, Sanders 
& Gregersen 2001). The CEO will possess an increased understanding of various markets and 
business practices, both locally and globally (Chen & Stucker 1997). International work 
experience is associated with organisation performance in the way that it provides the CEO 
with more rounded executive development in terms of coordination of global tasks and 
knowledge interchange between the parent company and its affiliates, and amongst affiliates 
(Black, Gregersen & Mendenhall 1992; Sambharya 1996). 
3.2.1.4 CEO Education 
Formal education has been considered as an integral part of CEO professional 
development because it is associated with development of thinking processes (Gottesman & 
Morey 2010) and the ability to deal with cognitive complexity (Hitt & Tyler 1991; Wally & 
Baum 1994). CEO education may provide understanding of how the CEOs think and perform 
in their role (Gottesman & Morey 2010). There is evidence linking formal education to 
various organisational outcomes, such as innovation (Becker 1970; Kimberly & Evansiko 
1981; Hambrick & Mason 1984), strategic portfolio changes (Norburn & Birley 1988) and 
strategic initiative (Hambrick, Cho & Chen 1996). However, there is a limited amount of 
literature exploring the direct influence of CEO education on organisation performance 
particularly in terms of return on assets. Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) studied the aviation 
industry and included education as a control variable. They found a significant positive 
correlation between educational level and organisation performance in terms of market share 
and profitability. An exploration into the number of educational degrees that a CEO possesses 
may provide valuable insights into the source of strategy-making skills and organisation 
performance outcomes (Useem & Karabel 1986; D’Aveni 1990; Finkelstein, Hambrick & 
Cannella 2009). Researchers have also paid attention to the influence of CEOs with a formal 
education in business administration on organisation performance. A Master of Business 
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Administration degree (MBA) is regarded as the most common type of professional executive 
training (Useem & Karabel 1986). In recent times, an MBA degree has become a popular 
educational background for CEOs of big corporations (Felicelli 2008; Lewis, Walls & 
Dowell 2014). Senior executives with an MBA education tend to apply more advanced 
techniques when evaluating the financial status of the organisation (Graham & Harvey 2001) 
and pursue more ‘aggressive strategies’ than executives without an MBA (Bertrand & Schoar 
2003, p. 1173). Both CEO MBA education and number of university degrees can have 
implications for organisation performance. 
3.2.2 CEO Work Context and Organisation Performance 
 In this research certain variables such as CEO and chairperson duality, CEO tenure 
and CEO share ownership percentage have been purposely selected as the variables for 
measuring the work context of the CEO. The influence of CEO duality and CEO tenure has 
been subject to debate in the existing United States literature (Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 
2014; Luo, Kanuri & Andrews 2014). There is currently a limited amount of literature 
exploring the influence of CEO share ownership percentage on organisation performance. An 
integration of upper echelon theory with corporate governance theories including agency 
theory, stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory and resource dependence theory 
will provide a better understanding of the link between CEO work context and organisation 
performance. These connections will be developed here prior to presentation of hypotheses in 
section 3.3. 
The main criticism of agency theory relates to its limited consideration of managerial 
and CEO competence (Shen 2003). Stewardship theory provides a different point of view 
arguing that a long-tenured CEO will act as a good steward of the corporation. Based on 
managerial hegemony theory the presence of CEO duality, high CEO tenure and high CEO 
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share ownership percentage is associated with high CEO power (relative to board power) in 
the work context (Finkelstein 1992; Daily & Johnson 1997).   
3.2.2.1 CEO Duality 
CEO duality has become one of the most extensively studied corporate governance 
occurrences in the United States legal jurisdiction (Dalton, Hitt, Certo & Dalton 2007; 
Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014). CEO duality is ‘dichotomous in nature, as are the two 
key theories (agency and stewardship) that are brought to bear’ (Krause, Semadeni & 
Cannella 2014, p. 2). The preference towards separating the positions of CEO and board 
chairperson is mainly based on agency theory concerns with regard to the possibility of 
management control of the board (Dalton et al. 1998). Agency theorists argue CEO duality 
reduces board independence and reduces board effectiveness in monitoring the CEO (Lorsch 
& MacIver 1989; Jensen 1993; Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994). There is empirical evidence 
from the United States showing separation predicts better financial performance (Rechner & 
Dalton 1991). The literature indicates some divergence in relation to this issue of the CEO 
duality option for companies between the selected Anglo, American and Asian countries. 
Many Anglo corporate governance reports and recommendations have pushed for the 
separation of the chair and CEO position; consequently, separation becomes prevalent 
amongst the Australian stock exchange listed firms (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). On the 
contrary, practising CEOs in the United States argue there is benefit to the firm from 
combining the CEO and board chairperson positions (Dalton et al. 1998). Taking a 
stewardship theory perspective, the CEO-chairperson dual structure offers consolidated 
organisation leadership and eliminates uncertainty with regard to who is accountable and 
responsible for organisational outcomes (Anderson & Anthony 1986; Donaldson 1990; 
Dalton et al. 1998). In the 1990s the separation of the CEO and chairperson role occurred 
mostly during difficult periods or crisis for the organisation and for a short period of time 
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(Levy 1993; Dalton et al. 1998). CEO duality is very prevalent in the United States with 
approximately 80 per cent of Standard and Poor’s 500 firms practising the dual leadership 
structure, although this trend seems to be changing after the scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom and recent GFC (Carty & Weiss 2012). In Hong Kong several existing studies 
inform that 52 per cent of Hong Kong publicly listed firms practised CEO duality from 1995 
to 1998 (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis & Wong 2005) and 41 per cent in 2003 (Lam & Lee 
2008). The exploration of the influence of CEO duality on organisation performance in 
different national contexts will improve our understanding of how agency theory, stewardship 
theory and convergence theory is applied in practice. 
3.2.2.2 CEO Tenure 
The effect of CEO tenure on organisation performance is a matter of some contention 
in the literature. There has been much research on this relationship in the stock exchange 
listed company scene in the United States where there is a high frequency of the practice of 
CEO-chairperson duality. There has been notably less research on this relationship in legal 
jurisdictions such as Australia where there is strong institutional pressure for corporate 
governance best practice and separation of the chairperson and CEO tenure role, with 
implications for the use and interpretation of the CEO tenure measure (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003a; O’Shannassy 2010). One body of research argues for an inverted U or curvilinear 
relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance in terms of average profit and 
return on sales (Miller & Shamsie 2001); profitability (Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006); 
and acquisition performance (Walters, Kroll & Wright 2007). This argument is based on the 
agency theory argument that long-tenured CEOs may become stagnant and outdated, defend 
the status quo, and lose interest in their work (Cyert & March 1963; Hambrick & Fukutomi 
1991; Simsek 2007). However taking a stewardship theory perspective, another body of 
research argues that there is a linear relationship between CEO tenure and organisation 
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performance (Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam 
(2001) found a positive correlation between CEO tenure and net profit margin. CEOs who 
hold their positions for a greater length of time ‘accumulate a track record, attain a deeper 
knowledge of the firm’s environment, and acquire firm- and job-specific skills’ (Simsek 
2007, p. 654) and should be good stewards (Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). The CEOs 
leadership and power also develop (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; Shen 2003). This can have 
implications for organisation performance. 
3.2.2.3 CEO Share Ownership Percentage 
The literature with regard to agency theory indicates that top executives serving as the 
agents of owners can pursue a series of action in conflict with the priorities of owners (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976; Dalton, Daily, Certo & Roengpitya 2003). Substantial share ownership on 
the part of the top executives can act as an incentive to reduce agency problems (Jayaraman, 
Khorana, Nelling & Covin 2000). A high percentage of share ownership provides CEOs with 
bigger incentives to efficiently manage organisation performance and serve in the best 
interests of shareholders since their own wealth is linked directly with organisation 
performance (Jayaraman et al. 2000; Dalton et al. 2003). Integrating agency theory with 
stewardship theory, it is likely that CEOs with a high percentage of share ownership will have 
greater motivation to act as good stewards of the corporation, providing a positive impact on 
organisation performance. Further, CEOs who are also family-controlling owners and have a 
substantial share ownership will have greater capacity and incentives to monitor 
management, thereby decreasing the need to depend excessively on the board of directors for 
monitoring TMT (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi & Garcia-cestona 2013). This can have 
implications for organisation performance particularly in the Hong Kong context where 
family ownership and control is dominant.   
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3.2.3 The Non-executive Director Ratio and Organisation Performance 
The theoretical literature suggests that an effective board will consist of a larger 
proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors (Lorsch & MacIver 1989; Zahra 
& Pearce 1989; Dalton et al. 1998). This argument is largely based on agency theory as we 
have seen which contends that the high percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
will result in greater board independence and hence ensure the proper monitoring and control 
of the CEO (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). The resource dependence view strengthens the needs 
for having non-executive directors on a company board to provide the necessary connection 
between the organisation and access to external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Dalton et 
al. 1998). However, the empirical evidence from the existing studies from the Anglo-
American countries is mixed, showing that a high non-executive director ratio does not 
always necessarily lead to better organisation performance (Daily & Johnson 1997; Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003a). Managerial hegemony theorists have the view that boards especially non-
executive directors lack firm knowledge and are reliant on top managers for information 
(Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). There is also evidence that the presence of non-executive 
directors on the board may not always provide the most effective means of monitoring of top 
managers (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). 
Clarke (2014b, p. 265) reviews the possibility of a limited effect of board 
independence on organisation performance and instead ‘stewardship-based corporate 
structures’ may affect positively on organisation performance in certain national contexts. 
The latter effect is even greater in the family business setting where the separation of control 
and ownership is not a major concern (Clarke 2014b). In this setting, the presence of too 
many independent, non-executive directors can be ‘perceived as a control mechanism and 
will lower the motivational levels of stewards’ (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014, p. 326). 
The knowledge and expertise presented by inside, executive directors to boards of directors is 
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essential for achieving better organisation performance in family businesses (Garcia-Ramos 
& Garcia-Olalla 2014). The resources, experience and knowledge of family directors will 
help to bring more effective performance to the advisory role of a board (Garcia-Ramos & 
Garcia-Olalla 2014). This preceding background and the sentiment of the literature may have 
implications for the relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation 
performance in a family business context such as Hong Kong, or in other market jurisdictions 
such as Australia and the United States with arguments being presented in section 3.3.9 
below.  
3.2.4 The Joint Effect of the Non-executive Director Ratio and CEO Tenure on 
Organisation Performance 
 The board of directors may have an indirect influence on organisation performance 
‘through the quality of their managerial monitoring’ (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 
2009, p. 270). Studies that explore the relationship between the CEO and board are still 
limited; board characteristics variables have usually been included as control variables but 
not as moderating variables in existing upper echelon studies (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). 
There is limited empirical research that examines the moderating effect of the non-executive 
director ratio jointly with CEO tenure on the dependent variable organisation performance. 
Given the lack of empirical evidence plus the conflicting nature of corporate governance 
research findings (Dalton et al. 1998), the integration of multiple theoretical justifications will 
be used to develop this moderating hypothesis shortly.  
 Long-tenured CEOs have acquired an in-depth knowledge of the firm and well-
developed networks (Simsek 2007), and thereby, they have the capacity to bring better 
organisation performance and maximise shareholder value. Taking a stewardship theory 
perspective, these CEOs with long tenure can be expected to serve as good stewards of their 
corporations (Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). Following this logic the agency role of the 
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non-executive directors can be minimised, as these CEOs who are good stewards can be 
trusted to perform their job competently (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson 1997). Resource dependence theory asserts that non-executive directors will bring 
valuable external resources to the company (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978); however, they also 
have limited access to internal firm resources and so they lack firm-specific knowledge and 
experience to provide the internal advisory role (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014). In the 
context where the majority of the board consists of non-executive directors such as in 
Australia, the CEO will generally be the inside, executive director and is referred to as the 
managing director (Kiel et al. 2012). The CEOs often are required to present any operational 
and managerial issues to the board as the only executive director. There is benefit to 
organisation performance of including executive directors on the board to work along with 
the long-tenured CEO. The presence of several executive directors in addition to the CEO on 
the board will strengthen the board expertise in dealing with daily tasks and solving the 
operational problems of the organisation (Mace 1971; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991) with 
implications for organisation performance (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011).   
3.2.5 Convergence and Divergence: The Conceptual Frameworks Adapted for 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong 
The literature review discusses the trend to convergence of corporate governance 
practices toward the Anglo-American model. Keeping an open mind on this convergence 
issue and taking a convergence theory perspective, all hypotheses developed in this research 
will apply to Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. There is an exception for the 
hypothesis with regard to CEO duality where the literature has pointed out that in Australia 
the prevailing practice is to separate the CEO and chairperson position (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003a). For this reason hypothesis six will not apply to Australia because of the large 
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presence of CEOs who do not hold the position of chairperson in the top ASX listed 
companies. Hypothesis six will apply to the United States and Hong Kong only.  
 Figure 3.2 shows the adapted conceptual framework for the Australian research 
context, exhibiting the relationships between the independent variables (IV) related to CEO 
professional development and CEO work context, the moderating variable (MV) the non-
executive director ratio, and the dependent variable (DV) organisation performance in 
Australia. Figure 3.3 shows the adapted conceptual framework for the United States and 
Hong Kong research contexts. 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual Framework—CEO Professional Development, CEO Work 
Context, the Non-executive Director Ratio and Organisation Performance—for 
Australia 
 
Figure 3.3: Conceptual Framework—CEO Professional Development, CEO Work 
Context, the Non-executive Director Ratio and Organisation Performance—for the 
United States and Hong Kong 
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3.3 Development of Research Hypotheses 
 The following section will develop and present a series of hypotheses to explore the 
linkage between the professional development and work context of the CEO and organisation 
performance. A hypothesis will be developed to explore the linkage between the non-
executive director ratio and organisation performance. A hypothesis will be developed to 
explore the linkage between CEO tenure x the non-executive director ratio and organisation 
performance. The literature has indicated there is convergence in corporate governance 
practices towards the Anglo-American practices. Keeping an open mind to the convergence 
theory perspective, all the developed hypotheses in this thesis will apply to Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong, with an exception of the hypothesis with regard to CEO 
duality where it will apply to the United States and Hong Kong only. 
3.3.1 CEO Insider/Outsider Status 
In general new CEOs—inside the firm choices or outside choices—face a substantial 
increase in their responsibilities, tasks and skill requirements. Harris and Helfat (1997) argue 
that the challenges for outsider CEOs are often greater compared to the insider CEO. 
Outsider CEOs are often appointed when the organisation is experiencing a period of poor 
performance requiring the outside CEO to perform a business turnaround from poor 
performance to better performance (Zajac 1990; Cannella & Lubatkin 1993). Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2010, p. 337) argue that outsider CEOs can bring ‘adaptive and…disruptive 
effects’ to a company; therefore, the outside CEOs can be an agent of change through their 
influence on strategy formulation and implementation. Although some key external and 
internal stakeholders may support these changes, outsider CEOs normally face a hostile 
attitude from senior executives, and these senior executives are typically from the 
organisation’s former regime (Boeker & Goodstein 1993; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). The 
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changes introduced by an outside CEO may also result in more pronounced cost, risk and 
organisational disturbance making the choice of an insider more appealing to the board of 
directors and management (Shen & Canella 2002a; Greiner, Cummings & Bhambri 2003). 
Outside CEOs will have less of a mastery of the organisation’s resource capabilities and gaps 
compared with an insider (Greiner, Cummings & Bhambri 2003; O’Shannassy 2011). They 
often face difficulties in selecting and creating the right strategy for improving organisation 
performance, resulting in a change program that deviates from existing organisation 
capabilities (Shen & Canella 2002a; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). Shen and Cannella (2002a, 
p. 1196) found outside CEOs increase the chance of ‘CEO dismissal followed by inside 
succession’ because ‘the high expectations the board and other stakeholders have toward 
outside CEOs make them more vulnerable when challenges from senior executives emerge’.  
In contrast, well-performed and powerful retiring CEOs often have a strong influence 
over successor selection; they tend to desire insider successors who are similar to them (Zajac 
& Westphal 1996b). Part of the legacy of a successful CEO is one or more capable inside 
executives trained and suitably experienced to succeed them in the CEO role. The 
organisation will then have the fortunate situation where there are one or more capable 
internal candidates for the CEO position. An insider successor has the opportunity to build 
company and industry specific experience, plus a network of support within the company and 
also among key external stakeholders prior to their appointment in the CEO role. Therefore, 
stewardship theory and resource dependence theory related benefits are present when 
selecting an insider CEO, especially when the retiring CEO has performed well in the role. 
Given this background, it is predicted that in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H1: Selection of an insider CEO is associated with better organisation performance. 
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3.3.2 CEO Functional Background 
Companies also have a choice between selecting a CEO with an output-oriented 
functional background (i.e., sales, marketing, product research and development) or a 
throughput functional background (i.e., accounting, process engineering, production) 
(Hambrick & Mason 1984). Finkelstein (1992, p. 514) explains output is related to ‘demand 
conditions’ while throughput is related to ‘production processes’. Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) and Datta and Rajagopalan (1998) found that CEOs with output-oriented functional 
backgrounds will be preferred in organisations pursuing an innovation strategy or 
differentiation. On the contrary CEOs with a throughput-oriented functional background will 
be favoured in organisations pursuing non-differentiation or efficiency-oriented strategies 
(Datta & Rajagopalan 1998). Other research (Chaganti & Sambharya 1987; Thomas, 
Litschert & Ramaswamy 1991) also found a positive correlation between executives ‘output-
related backgrounds and product differentiation strategies’ (Datta & Rajagopalan 1998, p. 
838). Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 199) posited that ‘in stable, commodity-like industries, 
throughput-function experience will be positively associated with profitability’; however, ‘in 
turbulent, differentiable industries, output function experience will be positively associated 
with profitability’.  
In the 1990s and 2000s with developments in transport, information technology, 
telecommunications and media the business environment has become more challenging with 
strategy cycles getting shorter and shorter (Hamel 2000). These circumstances mean that 
companies need to innovate continuously to be able to cope with high levels of environmental 
uncertainty (Tushman & O’Reilly 1997). In these circumstances companies should then give 
preference to selection of a CEO with an output-oriented functional background who is a 
good steward of firm resources to increase the probability of strong performance (Ireland & 
Hitt 1999; Burgelman & Grove 2007; Hamel 2009; O’Shannassy 2010). Bringing together 
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these insights from upper echelon theory and stewardship theory, it is expected that in 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H2: Selection of a CEO who has a functional background in an output-oriented field is 
positively associated with organisation performance. 
3.3.3 CEO International Work Experience 
Harris and Helfat (1997) explain that CEOs improve their executive ability and 
capacity by means of previous work experience making them a better steward of firm 
resources. Every CEO may have experienced substantial responsibility possibly in their early 
careers (Cox & Cooper 1989). Some work experience may involve international assignments 
to ‘manage an overseas subsidiary’ and deal with the business environment in that setting 
(Cox & Cooper 1982, p. 242). These assignments can provide the future CEO with unique 
knowledge, professional contacts outside their organisation, valuable global experience and a 
different, broader world perspective that may help them to better manage the organisation, 
especially if the organisation is a multinational corporation (Maruca 1994; Athanassiou & 
Nigh 1999; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001). This type of professional background can 
be a valuable firm resource over time whether the CEO’s employer is a national or a 
multinational business, though it should be noted that the requirement for this type of 
international experience is likely to be stronger for an organisation with international 
operations. Hence in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H3: A CEO with international work experience is positively associated with organisation 
performance. 
3.3.4 CEO MBA Education 
Studies that link directly CEO MBA education to organisation performance are still 
limited, particularly in the Australian and Hong Kong contexts. Formal education and 
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training serve as important components of organisational development and learning processes 
(Baruch 2009). The MBA degree has become the most accredited and popular learning 
programme in management education; in the United States the economist claims that more 
than fifty per cent of the CEOs of large corporations hold an MBA (Baruch 2009). When the 
CEO receives an elite degree such as an MBA degree from an elite university, the prestige of 
the university can be transferred or extended, adding to executive status (D’Aveni 1990; 
Bigley & Wiersema 2002). The MBA education helps to build the future CEO’s social and 
human capital and also influences his or her approach in selecting and making decisions 
(Bertrand & Schoar 2003). 
Hambrick, Black and Fredrickson (1992) found a positive correlation between CEOs 
with MBA degrees and profitability. They also found a positive correlation between a CEO 
with an MBA degree and organisation performance measured by return on assets. Similarly, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found a positive relationship between CEOs with an MBA 
degree and return on assets (ROA). Hansen, Ibarra and Peyer’s (2010) study of 
approximately 2,000 CEOs of large companies around the globe found CEOs with an MBA 
on average ranked 40 places better in terms of organisation performance—measured by total 
shareholder return—than CEOs without an MBA. Elite degrees such as an MBA from an 
elite academic institution will increase the chance of the executive obtaining board 
appointments and enhance their social and business status, helping the CEO to build elite 
executive and company director networks (Useem & Karabel 1986; Westphal & Stern 2006). 
The CEO’s elite social and business networks can be a very useful resource for the 
organisation. Applying stewardship theory and resource dependence theory it is expected that 
in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H4: The presence of a CEO with an MBA degree is positively associated with organisation 
performance. 
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3.3.5 CEO Number of University Degrees 
Studies that link directly CEO education to organisation performance are still scarce. 
However, there is a strong relationship between education level, the capacity to identify, 
prioritise and process useful decision-making information, and the ability to engage in 
complex thinking, making the CEO a better steward of firm resources (Wally & Baum 1994). 
The formal education of a CEO is often related to better receptiveness to innovation as it 
reflects the CEO’s cognitive ability especially open-mindedness (Kimberly & Evanisko 
1981). Past research also shows that there are strong positive relationships between executive 
education level, product differentiation and organisational innovation (Bantel & Jackson 
1989; Thomas, Litschert & Ramaswamy 1991; Wiersema & Bantel 1992; Datta & 
Rajagopalan 1998). Innovation and differentiation have been correlated positively with 
organisation performance (Cottrell & Nault 2004; Nerkar & Roberts 2004; Nadkarni & 
Narayanan 2007). There is a limited amount of literature that explores the effect of the 
number of university degrees that a CEO possesses on organisation performance. Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) predicted a positive relationship between the number of formal degrees 
that the top management team members possess and organisational innovation. Past research 
(Kimberly & Evanisko 1981; Hambrick & Mason 1984; Gottesman & Morey 2010) found no 
correlation between the type of CEO education and organisation performance. However, 
Norburn and Birley (1988) found the number of university degrees that top executives 
possess would be positively correlated to financial performance and growth. Hence, it is 
expected that in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the number of university degrees that a CEO 
possesses and organisation performance. 
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3.3.6 CEO and Chairperson Duality 
CEO and chairperson duality has been argued to offer a distinct point of advantage in 
company leadership (Anderson & Anthony 1986; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009). This argument 
has been made particularly strongly in the United States, although Australian experts identify 
agency theory concerns with this approach. Duality does create an image of company 
stability, can increase confidence in company management and can improve communication 
between TMT and the board (Anderson & Anthony 1986; Donaldson & Davis 1991; 
Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009). However, Fama and Jensen (1983) 
and Jensen (1993) state that CEO duality is likely to result in the principal-agent problem 
occurring, and also hinder the board’s ability to monitor the CEO effectively. CEOs holding 
the position of the chairperson will widen their power base and weaken the board’s role of 
monitoring and evaluating the performance of the CEO (Coles & Hesterly 2000). This 
provides a bigger opportunity for the CEO to pursue their personal interest at the expense of 
shareholder wealth (Boyd 1995).  
The empirical research exploring the impact of CEO duality on organisation 
performance evidences mixed results. Boyd (1995) found that CEO duality has a positive 
impact on subsequent firm performance. Yet Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) did not find 
evidence to support an argument that CEO duality is a leadership structure intentionally 
selected for optimising organisation performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) have 
discovered a negative relationship between CEO and chairperson duality and organisation 
performance. They conducted a longitudinal analysis of 500 Fortune companies and found 
that companies with independent leadership structures constantly outperform those with a 
duality structure. In their study, organisation performance was measured as return on 
investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE) and profit margins. In the Hong Kong legal 
jurisdiction Chen et al. (2005) found a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
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organisation performance. Many Anglo corporate governance reports (e.g. Cadbury 1992; 
Bosch 1995; Higgs 2003; ASX 2010) recommend the roles of chair and CEO to be exercised 
by a different individual to avoid the principal-agent problem emerging. This choice is also 
widely accepted in practice by business and government in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (Stapledon & Lawrence 1996; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Kakabadse & Kakabadse 
2007) and is a distinct point of difference to the prevailing United States practice of duality. 
Given the strong preference for separation in Australia (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Kakabadse 
& Kakabadse 2007), the hypothesis exploring the influence of CEO duality is not developed 
for Australia. Nevertheless, giving priority to agency theory it is expected that in the United 
States and Hong Kong: 
H6: Separation of the CEO and chairperson role is positively associated with organisation 
performance. CEO duality is negatively associated with organisation performance. 
3.3.7 CEO Tenure 
The issue of the relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance is a 
matter of some controversy in the literature. An agency theory view of the CEO tenure and 
organisation performance relationship is that early in the new CEO’s tenure organisation 
performance increases as the new CEO responds to his or her mandate from the board of 
directors or former CEO negotiated during the recruiting process (Hambrick & Fukutomi 
1991). The new CEO establishes his or her enduring strategic contribution in these early 
years of tenure until organisation performance peaks, then organisation performance declines 
as the entrepreneurial instincts, risk-taking propensity and interest level of the CEO decline 
with time (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; Shen 2003). This results in the inverted U-shape in 
the CEO tenure and organisation performance relationship discussed in the agency theory 
literature (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991; Miller & Shamsie 2001; Simsek 2007).  
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Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001) discredited this agency theory argument noting 
that there is far more evidence in support of a linear relationship between CEO tenure and 
organisation performance reflecting the influence of a CEO who is a good steward of firm 
resources. Applying stewardship theory CEOs who hold their positions for a greater length of 
time are good stewards (Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001); they survive in the role because 
they have generally gained the trust of the board and shareholders during their tenure. The 
CEO who is a good steward will have an alignment between his or her interests and those of 
the firm, internal and external stakeholders. A good steward will gain much personal, social 
and professional fulfilment from his or her executive role. This helps to sustain the CEO’s 
interest in the company for the long run. Applying resource dependence theory long tenure in 
the role will provide the CEO with opportunities to develop and nurture his or her 
professional network giving the CEO and the company access to a wider range of resources 
(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996). Given the preceding discussion and applying stewardship 
theory and resource dependence theory it is expected that in Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance. 
3.3.8 CEO Share Ownership Percentage 
 Jayaraman et al. (2000) argue that a substantial CEO percentage share of ownership or 
equity ownership can serve as an effective means for reducing the different priorities that can 
emerge between the principal and the agent. In particular since their personal fortunes are 
linked to those of their organisations, it is expected that these CEOs invest more time in 
developing their managerial skills and work more diligently ultimately improving 
organisation performance (Jayaraman et al. 2000). Therefore, a substantial CEO share 
ownership percentage will encourage the CEO to act as a good steward. Grounded in agency 
theory, Buccholtz and Ribbens (1994) argued that substantial CEO share ownership provides 
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a continuing alignment between shareholder interests and top manager interests. This is 
achieved by reducing the probability of a targeted company's management team to resist any 
takeover attempts that could ultimately maximise the shareholders wealth (Buccholtz & 
Ribbens 1994). In this situation they argued that CEO share ownership can act as an 
important means for protecting shareholders' interests. Buccholtz and Ribbens (1994) 
conclude that CEO share ownership is an important means for protecting shareholders’ 
interests. CEOs who own a high percentage of company shares are more capable of 
determining the company’s direction (Allen 1981; Daily & Johnson 1997). Hence applying 
stewardship theory it is expected that in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H8: Higher CEO share ownership percentage is positively correlated to organisation 
performance.   
3.3.9 Non-executive Director Ratio 
The appropriate balance of inside, executive directors and outside, non-executive 
directors on a company board is another matter of contention in corporate governance 
research and practice. A high non-executive director ratio is positively associated with board 
independence (Zahra & Pearce 1989; Pearce & Zahra 1991). The agency theory view on 
board composition is that there should be a majority of non-executive directors to keep the 
influence of the CEO and any other executive directors in check. There has been some 
empirical backing for this view from Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Ezzamel and Watson 
(1993) and certainly the normative corporate governance recommendations in Australia and 
the United States support this agency theory prescription (Bosch 1995; Petra 2005). These 
recommendations are based on the view that non-executive directors are best placed to ensure 
the CEO and executive directors efficiently and prudently manage firm resources.  
Resource dependence theory predicts that non-executive directors improve 
organisation performance as they often bring access to needed resources such as accounting, 
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legal and/or management consulting experts (Pfeffer 1972). However an alternative 
stewardship theory view with support in the empirical literature is that there is a need for an 
appropriate skill mix on a company board and this can require more executive directors and 
fewer non-executive directors on the board (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Kroll, Walters & Le 
2007). Executive directors who are good stewards with sound entrepreneurial instincts can 
make a favourable difference to organisation performance as they can provide internal firm 
expertise, information and advice (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). These executive directors who 
are good stewards are likely to derive professional, personal and social fulfilment from their 
role and are likely to have similar goals and objectives as shareholders and other external 
stakeholders. They have worked closely with other board members and the CEO; in the event 
of CEO turnover the board will have an immediate option to select from one of these 
executive directors for the CEO role in succession, facilitating a smooth succession process 
(Mace 1971).  
In the Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies, boards normally include the CEO 
and executive directors with considerable voting power although the SEHK has pushed to 
improve the importance and standing of non-executive directors in protecting minority 
shareholders’ interests (Cheng & Firth 2005). Boards consisting of executive directors and 
close kin or close friends of the CEO have been criticised and this situation has been 
connected to inferior organisational outcomes; however, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue 
that this criticism should be re-evaluated. Executive directors are involved deeply in the daily 
decision processes and so they have access to operational information that non-executive 
directors do not have; this information can be valuable for evaluating critical decisions that 
will decide the faith of the company (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990). In the United States 
Daily and Johnson (1997) found a lower proportion of independent, non-executive directors 
relates negatively to future organisation performance, so a lower non-executive director ratio 
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does not predict lower organisation performance. This finding creates some intrigue, as ‘it is 
not supportive of the need for greater independence in the boardroom’ (Daily & Johnson 
1997, p. 113). The most robust Australian evidence finds a negative correlation between the 
non-executive director ratio and organisation performance; this suggests inside, executive 
directors deliver better value and that stewardship theory prevails in application (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003a). Given the preceding discussion it is expected that in Australia, the United 
States and Hong Kong: 
H9: There is a negative association between the non-executive director ratio and 
organisation performance. A low non-executive director ratio correlates with better 
organisation performance. 
3.3.10 The Joint Effect of Long CEO Tenure and a Low Non-executive Director 
Ratio in a Moderation Test 
The theory in this thesis argues that stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory provide the basis for the view that high CEO tenure predicts better organisation 
performance and this theory is supported by robust research evidence (Coles, McWilliams & 
Sen 2001). Long-tenured CEOs do possess strong commitment to their chosen strategy 
paradigm, high task knowledge and high power (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991). However, we 
have seen that the value to the organisation of outside, non-executive directors is a more 
contentious issue with the Australian and United States evidence showing a negative 
correlation between the non-executive director ratio and organisation performance, reflecting 
stewardship theory (Daily & Johnson 1997; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). These insights create 
some intrigue on the matter of the joint effects of CEO tenure and the non-executive director 
ratio. Combs et al. (2007) tested but did not prove that CEO tenure and the non-executive 
director ratio jointly correlate with a stock market measure of organisation performance in the 
event that a company experiences the unexpected death of its CEO. It can be argued that 
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based on the available empirical research evidence the influence of a strong performing long-
tenured CEO who is a good steward is maximised with a lower non-executive director ratio. 
Stewardship theory posits that long-tenured CEOs working in the best interests of the 
shareholders deliver long-term shareholder value. In this scenario a high non-executive 
director ratio would have the counter-productive effect of constraining the entrepreneurial 
instincts of a CEO who is a proven performer. An experienced CEO who is a proven 
performer is more valuable to the company than a high ratio of non-executive directors. 
Hence in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong: 
H10: The influence of CEO tenure on organisation performance is moderated by the non-
executive director ratio, such that long CEO tenure and a low non-executive director ratio 
jointly predict better organisation performance. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented the conceptual framework for this thesis to illustrate the 
relationships between the independent variables (i.e., measures related to CEO professional 
development and CEO work context), the moderating variable (non-executive director ratio) 
and the dependent variable (organisation performance). 
 Relevant theoretical arguments have been presented to explain the link between the 
professional development and work context of the CEO and organisation performance. The 
CEO and the board of directors are working jointly and closely in influencing organisation 
performance. The argument of how the non-executive director ratio can moderate the 
influence of certain element of the CEO work context (i.e., CEO tenure) on organisation 
performance has been presented. The upper echelon theory and corporate governance theories 
explained in Chapter 2 are fundamental to the development of hypotheses in this chapter.  
 Convergence theory posits that there is convergence in corporate governance practices 
around the world towards the Anglo-American practices. Drawing on convergence theory, 
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almost all hypotheses presented in this chapter will apply to Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong with the exception of the hypothesis concerning CEO duality. The literature has 
indicated a notable difference in relation to the practice of CEO duality between Australia, 
the United States and Hong Kong. Therefore, a customised conceptual framework has been 
developed separately for Australia and another framework for the United States and Hong 
Kong to illustrate this difference. The next chapter will provide details on the selection of 
methodology and research design for the research. 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter presented the conceptual framework and a series of hypotheses 
for this research. This chapter will describe how the methodology and research design will 
enable a rigorous exploration of the relationships between the variables described in the 
conceptual framework.  
 The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of the epistemology, 
ontology and methodology used for this research. The second section will discuss the process 
of obtaining the sample of the Australian, the United States and Hong Kong companies for 
the purpose of analysis. The third section will describe the source of the data for this research. 
The fourth section will highlight the process of data collection of the Australian, United 
States and Hong Kong companies. The fifth section will explain the measures for the 
independent variables, moderating variable, dependent variables and control variables. The 
sixth section will discuss the methods for conducting the analysis. The final two sections 
provide a brief discussion with regard to privacy matters and a conclusion. 
4.2 Research Methodology  
The link between research methodology and research methods is often blurred in 
research (Crotty 1998). It is helpful to explain the terminology and choices made in this area 
for this thesis as the terminology used in research literature is often inconsistent (Crotty 
1998). An appropriate and rigorous methodology should be prepared for justifying the data 
collection and analysis approach and coming up with solid and defendable conclusions 
(Scandura & Williams 2000; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008; 6 & Bellamy 2012). The choices 
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for research design with regard to data analysis and choice of measures may influence the 
nature of the conclusions that are ultimately raised (Sackett & Larson 1990; Scandura & 
Williams 2000). Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 5) argue there is not one study that complies 
with ‘a standard methodology’ and so researchers are required to shape the methodology to 
the particularity of the situation. Research projects that cross the corporate governance and 
strategic management disciplines should be carefully situated when it comes to methodology 
(O’Shannassy 2010).  
Strategic management is a relatively young field of study although it has grown 
rapidly since the late 1970s (Bowman, Singh & Thomas 2002; Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 
2008). Similarly, corporate governance is a fairly new area of research in the social sciences 
(Clarke 1998) though there has been a proliferation of research on the topic over the past two 
decades. The challenge for researchers presented by a young discipline involves ambiguity 
about what key questions should be proposed and contention about how these questions 
should be dealt with (Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008). An immature discipline lacks 
established paradigms (Kuhn 1996) and so researchers are often required to explore the 
advancement of the paradigm by concentrating on the interaction of contending theories 
(Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008). The research in this thesis spanning the corporate 
governance field and the strategic management field draws on a multi-theoretic perspective 
and integrates contending theories (e.g. agency theory and stewardship theory) to obtain a 
better understanding of the influence of the professional development and work context of the 
CEO.  
Robust methodologies and research methods contribute to the progression of a 
discipline and provide reliable and valid data that can ultimately form knowledge and theory 
(Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008). In the strategic management discipline, the progression of 
methods is evidenced from the evolution of empirical studies in the top-tier journals such as 
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Strategic Management Journal, especially more advanced quantitative techniques (Ketchen, 
Boyd & Bergh 2008). Over a 25-year time span (that is, 1980-2004), Ketchen, Boyd and 
Bergh (2008) discovered that on average there is a larger sample size and a more dominant 
use of archival sources (and less use of surveys) in more recent studies. They also discovered 
that there is a more dominant use of analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression analysis 
compared to basic means, descriptive statistics and correlations, and an increasing use of 
interaction for moderation analysis. Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh’s (2008) discovery has an 
important implication on the selection of the research methods in this research here. 
Theory building and testing can be approached deductively or inductively (Neuman 
2011; 6 & Bellamy 2012). The research in this thesis here favours the deductive direction of 
theorising. The deductive approach commences with abstract ideas or theoretic propositions, 
and then moves on to observable empirical evidence (Neuman 2011). The propositions 
illustrate the relationship between concepts and in the research are turned by scholars into 
testable empirical hypotheses (Neuman 2011). In contrast, theorising with an inductive 
orientation starts with seeing the empirical world and then developing reflection on what is 
occurring, thinking takes a progressively more abstract direction (Neuman 2011).  
Scientific research is grounded in research philosophies and the fundamental 
principles of ontological and epistemological assumptions (Neuman 2011). Ontology is 
defined as ‘the study of being’ and explains ‘what is’ (Crotty 1998, p. 10). It is mainly 
concerned with the basic nature of the real world (Neuman 2011). Epistemology describes 
‘the theory of knowledge’ that is rooted in the theoretical perspective that will be applied in 
the research and in the methodology (Crotty 1998, p. 3; Gomm 2009). It offers a 
philosophical basis for determining what types of knowledge are sufficient, possible and 
valid (Maynard 1994) and explains ‘how we know what we know’ (Crotty 1998, p. 8). Both 
ontological matters and epistemological matters have the tendency to merge together (Crotty 
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1998). For example the realism ontological notion is frequently engaged when researchers 
prefer the objectivism epistemology (Crotty 1998). 
There are several ontological assumptions including realism, critical realism, and 
nominalism (Neuman 2011). The research in this present thesis takes a blend of realism and 
critical realism ontological assumptions. Based on realist assumptions, the world and 
actualities occur ‘outside the mind’ (Crotty 1998, p. 10), separately from human beings and 
their interpretations of the real world (Neuman 2011). Humans see existing things and 
capture them to generate objective knowledge (Neuman 2011). Realism provides a basis for 
much established strategy research including aspects of organisation studies and corporate 
governance (Tsang & Kwan 1999; Kwan & Tsang 2001; O’Shannassy 2005). By contrast, 
nominalists consider human experience with the world is always happening through a scheme 
of internal subjectivity and interpretations or a lens formed by subjective beliefs, cultural 
worldview and personal experiences (Neuman 2011). A subcategory of realists is the critical 
realists who argue that capturing reality directly is not straightforward and that human 
enquiry into reality may easily become confused or distorted (Neuman 2011). Critical realism 
has largely emerged from the substantial work of Roy Bhaskar and Rom Harré (Tsang & 
Kwan 1999). Bhaskar’s (1975, p. 9) work attempted to synthesise two important strands in 
social science that call attention to the ‘social character’ of and the ‘stratification’ of science. 
He added that the fundamental principle of realism is simple; nonetheless, the complete 
exercise of this principle suggests ‘a radical account of the nature of causal laws, viz. as 
expressing tendencies of things, not conjunctions of events’ (Bhaskar 1975, p. 10). Human 
experience and perception of objects in the actual world is a useful basis for research; 
however, human senses can and often are deceptive (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2007). 
Critical realists recognise that there are some limitations of humans and their senses that 
could undermine claims to objective knowledge (Miller & Tsang 2010). 
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Crotty (1998) defines a range of epistemologies including objectivism, 
constructionism and subjectivism. Objectivism epistemology argues that reality exists 
externally from the functioning of human consciousness (Crotty 1998). Fallibilism 
epistemology argues that scholarly knowledge of reality and the world is socially generated 
(Miller & Tsang 2010). Constructionism epistemology considers that ‘reality is not objective 
and exterior’, but is constructed and provided with meaning by the human mind (Crotty 1998; 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson 2012, p. 23). Under a constructionism view of 
knowledge, ‘meaning is not discovered’; each individual may construct meaning from the 
object in dissimilar ways in connection with the same occurrence (Crottty 1998, p. 9). 
Subjectivism epistemology holds that meaning does not emerge from an interaction between 
object and subject (Crotty 1998). Under subjectivism epistemology, the subject imposes the 
meaning on the object while the object does not contribute to the creation of meaning (Crotty 
1998).  
The theoretical perspective describes human’s view of the world and the grounded 
assumptions behind the selected methodology (Crotty 1998). Positivism perspective believers 
(Donaldson 1996; Wicks & Freeman 1998) see the world in an objective way (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 1991). They adopt ‘an objective reality’ and assume ‘a hypothetico-
deductive approach’ in order to build and improve theories, find relationships amongst 
variables, arrange hypotheses, recognise empirical predictability and deduce causality 
(Gomm 2009; Tsang 2014, p. 175). A positivist normally attempts to develop 'descriptive and 
predictive principles and rules for a reality that exists independently of an observer or 
participant’ (Hallebone & Priest 2009, p. 27). Concepts and variables are generally prepared 
by the use of precise quantitative data and analytical approaches such as surveys, experiments 
and statistics to test the hypotheses (Hallebone & Priest 2009; Neuman 2011). 
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Contrary to positivism, interpretivism views reality and meaning as socially 
constructed (Berger & Luckmann 1967; Tsang 2014) and focuses on how individuals get 
along and interact with one another (Neuman 2011). The actions and meanings of the actors 
are linguistically interpreted in accordance with their subjective framework of reference 
(Williams 2000). Qualitative methods involving case studies, thorough interviews and 
ethnographies are favoured to observe how people build meaning in their daily life (Neuman 
2011; Tsang 2014). Post-positivism takes a humbler approach by no longer asserting an 
epistemologically favoured view but instead, recognising some level of subjective beliefs as 
opposed to objective certainties (Crotty 1998). There are inadequacies in the way humans 
know what they know, but ‘the limitation is ontological rather than epistemological’; it is not 
due to how humans know, but to how the realities are (Crotty 1998, p. 30). Critical inquiry is 
viewed as a ‘spiralling process’ of action and contemplation (Crotty 1998, p. 157). Critical 
realists assume an objective but stratified reality (Tsang 2014). Critical realists are satisfied 
with sufficient description of previous occurrences (Sayer 1992) and do not hold any 
particular preference for either qualitative methods or quantitative methods (Tsang 2014).  
The methodology of research is informed by the ontological assumptions, 
epistemology and theoretical perspectives; it then guides the researchers to develop the 
appropriate selection of research methods in order to achieve the research objectives and 
obtain the desired outcomes (Crotty 1998). Figure 4.1 provides a general overview of the 
research design continuum in social science research and also the debate in the strategic 
management literature. Crotty (1998) summarises the four key elements of social research as 
epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods. Figure 4.1 illustrates that 
each key element informs one another, i.e., the selection of ontology will be informing the 
choice of epistemology, and so forth (Crotty 1998).   
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Figure 4.1: The Overview of Research Design Continuum in Social Science and the 
Contemporary Debate in Management Research (Adapted from Crotty 1998; 
O’Shannassy 2005, p. 106; Miller & Tsang 2010; Lincoln, Lynham & Guba 2011; 
Neuman 2011; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson 2012) 
 
 
This present research favours the deductive direction of theorising on the deductive-
inductive continuum. Following Crotty’s (1998) explanations, this research is informed by a 
blend of realism and critical realism ontological assumptions and also a blend of objectivism 
and fallibilism epistemology. This study takes a mix of positivist and critical inquiry 
theoretical perspectives. Both critical realism and positivism are considered among the most 
important 'philosophies of science reflected in management studies' (Miller & Tsang 2010, p. 
141). There is a long tradition of studies in strategic management and corporate governance 
blending positivism and critical realism (Kwan & Tsang 2001).  
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This present research will collect and analyse archival, documented data from the 
public domain (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson 2012). Grounded in positivism, this 
research here uses a large sample of the stock exchange listed companies and defines 
concepts in a way that allows realities to be measured in a quantitative way (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe & Jackson 2012). This research uses positivist tools such as statistical analysis, 
quantitative data, hypothesis testing and measurable variables (O’Shannassy 2005; Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Jackson 2012). Taking a realist ontological assumption and a positivist 
perspective this research here explores the meaning that has existed on the professional 
development and work context of the CEOs and organisation performance. For example 
drawing on explanations from Crotty (1998) the university degree of a particular CEO is a 
university degree; it exists irrespective of whether anybody is conscious of its presence or 
not. When people recognise it as CEO education, 'they are simply discovering a meaning that 
has been lying there in wait for them all along' (Crotty 1998, p. 8). Taking an objectivist view 
and aligned with Crotty (1998), this research here objectifies values and understanding of the 
CEOs as the subject of the study in the pursuit of learning the objective truth. This research 
contributes by exploring the meaning of the linkage between the professional development 
and work context of the CEO and organisation performance. 
Critical realism interconnects ontology and epistemology by postulating a realist 
ontology and concurrently carrying a fallibilist epistemology (Miller & Tsang 2010). A 
critical realist believes that ‘an entity can exist independently of our knowledge of it’ 
(Fleetwood 2005, p. 198). However, a critical realist also assumes that our knowledge of the 
real world is socially created and so the two claims from both the ontology and epistemology 
behind critical realism encourage the important needs for and the probability of critically 
assessing theories (Miller & Tsang 2010). Taking critical realist assumptions, this research 
here will critically evaluate upper echelon theory and the prevalent theories in the corporate 
  
114
governance field. The merits of these theories will be assessed rationally and empirically and 
their knowledge claims may be challenged (Miller & Tsang 2010). The generalisability of the 
theories developed in one national context may not directly apply to other national contexts 
(Tsang & Kwan 1999). Upper echelon theory and corporate governance theories have been 
mostly developed to explain corporate governance phenomena in the United States legal 
jurisdiction and to some extent the Anglo legal jurisdiction. This thesis here will explore 
whether there is a relationship between the professional development and work context of the 
CEO and organisation performance in the Australian context, and further extend this 
exploration to the United States and Hong Kong contexts with the same measurement and 
analytical techniques. In doing so, this research contributes to the development of the existing 
theories by challenging the theories and assessing the empirical generalisation of the theories 
in different settings (Tsang & Kwan 1999). Taking a critical realist paradigm, this research 
will critically assess the existing theories and evaluate if the findings of the study can be 
generalised from one population to another population in what is a benchmark study (Tsang 
& Kwan 1999). The similarities and differences of the findings of the study between 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong will also contribute to a better understanding of 
convergence theory.  
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of the link between the key philosophical elements 
that inform the methodology for this present research. 
  
  
115
Figure 4.2: The Link between Ontology, Epistemology and Theoretical Perspective that 
Inform the Methodology for this Present Research (Adapted from Crotty 1998; 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson 2012) 
 
 
4.3 Sample 
The sample consists of the 200 largest companies by market capitalisation from the 
Australian Securities Exchange, the Russell 200 Index (i.e., the NYSE, the NASDAQ) and 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange as at the 30th of September 2010. The total sample size is 600 
firms. The market capitalisation value of each company was gathered from reliable, publicly 
available sources for validating the ranking of the companies in the respective country. These 
sources include the ASX website for the Australian companies; Yahoo Charts website and 
Form 10-K for the United States companies; and the HKSE website and Webb-Site website 
for the Hong Kong companies. 
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4.3.1 Australia 
The Standard and Poor’s/Australian Securities Exchange (S&P/ASX) 200 constituent 
list as at the 30th of September 2010 was used to select the top 200 companies by market 
capitalisation from Australia. According to Standard and Poor’s Dow Jones Indices (2015), 
the companies in the S&P/ASX 200 Index cover around 80 per cent of equity market 
capitalisation in Australia. Of the original 200 Australian companies selected, 26 companies 
were excluded because they were either delisted from the ASX between October 2010 and 
September 2012, or were suspended by the ASX, or have incomplete financial reports. A 
total of 174 companies were retained and the other 26 leading companies by market 
capitalisation were selected from the next largest companies in the S&P/ASX 300 constituent 
list. Across the final sample of 200 Australian companies only 12 companies practiced 
duality of the chairperson and CEO role, 188 companies practiced separation. 
4.3.2 The United States 
The sample for the United States comes from the 200 largest companies listed on the 
NYSE or the NASDAQ. The majority of the largest United States companies were listed on 
the NYSE. However after looking extensively at the market capitalisation value of the United 
States companies, some of the largest firms particularly from the information technology 
industry (e.g. Apple, Microsoft) were listed on the NASDAQ. Hence both stock exchanges 
were considered when obtaining the largest United States companies by market capitalisation. 
An index called the Russell Top 200 Index was mainly used to determine the top 200 
United States companies. This index comprises the largest United States companies listed on 
the NYSE or the NASDAQ. The available Russell Top 200 Index constituent list is as at June 
2012. Consequently, the information on the company market capitalisation value as at the 
30th of September 2010 was collected from the Yahoo Charts website to check whether these 
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companies were positioned in the top 200 United States companies by market capitalisation 
as at that date. Of the original 200 United States companies 177 companies were retained. 
The other companies were excluded mainly because they had been listed on their respective 
stock exchange after the 30th of September 2010. Also one company was excluded because 
the company was dual-listed on both the ASX and NASDAQ and had been included in the 
original sample of the ASX 200 companies. Further validation was done by scrutinising the 
NYSE 100 Index constituent list. The companies listed in the NYSE 100 Index were part of 
the Russell 200 Index, showing consistency between the NYSE 100 Index and the Russell 
200 Index. Similarly the NASDAQ 100 Index constituent list and the market capitalisation of 
the companies listed in this index as at the 30th of September 2010 were obtained. The largest 
NASDAQ companies by market capitalisation in the NASDAQ 100 Index were part of the 
Russell 200 Index. The list of the top NYSE companies provided by the financial market 
website ADVFN was also obtained and examined. The other 23 leading companies by market 
capitalisation were selected from the next largest companies in the NASDAQ 100 Index and 
the top NYSE companies list provided by ADVFN. Out of these 23 companies, 15 companies 
were part of the Russell 1000 Index and eight companies were foreign companies listed either 
on the NYSE or the NASDAQ with notable, large market capitalisation. The final sample 
consisted of 162 companies listed on the NYSE and 38 on the NASDAQ. 
4.3.3 Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Exchange Fact Book 2010 (HKEx 2010), the Webb-Site website, the 
Hang Seng Index constituent list and the China Securities Index Hong Kong 100 constituent 
list were used to determine the 200 largest Hong Kong companies by market capitalisation. 
The Fact Book provides the list of the top 50 Hong Kong companies in terms of market 
capitalisation and the largest companies by market capitalisation from different industrial 
sectors on the Hang Seng Index. Additionally, the Fact Book (HKEx 2010) provides the list 
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of the largest companies by market capitalisation for the ‘Hang Seng China Enterprises 
Index’ (p. 31) and ‘Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index’ (p. 32). The Webb-Site 
website was used as it provides a comprehensive list and rank of the Hong Kong companies 
based on their market values. The Hang Seng Index (HSI) and its constituent list were 
examined as the index has been instrumental to the measure of the performance of the Hong 
Kong share market (HSI 2013). The Hang Seng Mainland 25 Index, the Hang Seng 
Composite Index and the market capitalisation of the companies in both indexes were 
obtained and examined. The China Securities Hong Kong 100 Index was examined as the 
constituents of this Index covers approximately 80% of the Hong Kong market (China 
Securities Index 2013). The Webb-Site website provides information on the market 
capitalisation value of the Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies as at the 30th of 
September 2010. This information was used to ensure that the selected companies were 
positioned in the top 200 Hong Kong companies by market capitalisation as at that date. One 
company was excluded because it did not have a CEO; the role of the CEO was being 
conducted by the executive directors of that firm. Across the final sample of 200 Hong Kong 
companies, 36 companies were dual-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and a Chinese 
Stock Exchange (i.e., either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
4.3.4 CEO and Director Terminologies 
Following on from remarks by Crossland and Hambrick (2007) in identifying the 
CEO it is helpful to learn about the similarity and difference in the terminology of the CEO 
job title used in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. In general, the term CEO is 
used interchangeably in these three countries. Variations on the job title may include some 
Australian companies using the term managing director (MD) while some United States 
firms may use the term president instead of CEO. The term MD is also frequently utilised in 
Hong Kong (Cheng & Firth 2005). In a few cases the job title general manager (GM) may 
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apply to the person performing the CEO role. This particular situation was clearly notified in 
the respective company annual reports for the companies in the sample. In the United States it 
was quite common to encounter a CEO who also held the position of the chairperson of the 
board. While in Australia the majority of the CEOs were not acting as the chairperson of the 
board. The separation or the combination of the two roles of CEO and chairperson was 
clearly described in the company annual report. It was identified that in a few United States 
and Hong Kong companies the CEO was also acting as the Vice Chairman of the board.  
In identifying job titles there are distinctions in the terminology used for the director 
positions between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The Australian and Hong 
Kong companies commonly use the term executive director while the American companies 
use the term inside director. Similarly the Australian and Hong Kong companies commonly 
use the term non-executive director while the American companies use the term outside 
director. 
4.4 Data Sources  
The data for this study was obtained from secondary, publicly available sources by 
downloading three years of annual reports by the end of fiscal year 2010, 2011 and 2012 
from each respective company’s website and extracting the relevant information. For the 
United States firms, publicly available Form 10-K (or Form 20-F for the foreign companies 
that were listed on the NYSE or the NASDAQ) and Proxy Statement by the end of fiscal year 
2010, 2011 and 2012 were also downloaded. Following Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen 
(2001), the 2010 data was used for the independent variables, control variables and moderator 
variable. The 2011 and 2012 organisation performance data were used for the dependent 
variable.  
A few additional types of publicly available archival databases such as Morningstar 
DatAnalysis, BoardRoom Review, Company 360, BusinessWeek website, Webb-site website, 
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published CEO biographies, company website and company news releases were used in the 
case where the information from the annual reports was insufficient.   
4.5 Data Collection  
During the process of data collection it became quickly apparent that this work 
provides an early insight into convergence and divergence of corporate governance practices. 
Initially the annual reports of the selected companies were downloaded and scrutinised for 
data availability. In general the top stock exchange listed companies in the Anglo-American 
countries (i.e., Australia and the United States) have developed transparent annual reports and 
disclosed sufficient information with regard to CEO background, board of director 
composition and financial records for the purpose of this research. Similarly, the leading 
stock exchange listed companies in Hong Kong in general have displayed a good level of 
transparency in terms of the annual reports disclosure compared to Anglo-American 
corporations. The extensiveness of the information disclosed in the annual reports specifically 
with regard to certain independent variables including identification of an insider CEO, CEO 
output functional background and CEO international work experience might vary between 
companies within one country and across different countries. For this reason and following 
key relevant studies (Zajac 1990; Datta & Rajagopalan 1998; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010; 
Rodenbach & Brettel 2012) these variables were measured as dichothomous variables (i.e. 
one or zero) in this study here. The use of a dichothomous variable as opposed to a 
continuous variable enables the researcher to nominate with more confidence into which 
category a particular case would fall in the event that there was little variation of information 
that might lead to lack of data (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Additional reliable publicly 
available archival databases were also used in the case where the information from the annual 
reports was considered inadequate. 
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The annual reports of the sampled companies provide the required data by the fiscal 
year. During data collection it was identified that there was some variation with regard to the 
fiscal year between different companies in different countries. The end of fiscal year could 
vary from the 30th of March, 30th of June and 30th of September to the 31st of December 
between companies. The common fiscal year for the United States and Hong Kong stock 
exchange listed companies was the 31st of December. The differences in the end of fiscal year 
might affect the measurement of CEO share ownership percentage (independent variable), 
log of sales (control variable) and ROA (dependent variable) in a way that these data might 
‘represent periods that differ by as much as six months’ (Weiner & Mahoney 1981, p. 461). 
The measurement of the other variables including CEO tenure, CEO duality, board size and 
the non-executive director ratio used in this research was based on the 30th of September 
2010.   
It is also worthwhile noting on this data collection matter that considerable thought 
went into selection of the largest companies Australia, the United States and Hong Kong as 
being most suitable for this research. In the beginning of the research project, the annual 
reports of several leading stock exchange listed companies across various Asian countries 
such as Japan, China, South Korea, India and Hong Kong were downloaded to examine their 
suitability for analysis. It was found that the selected small sample of stock exchange listed 
companies in the legal jurisdictions of Japan, China, South Korea and India did not disclose 
sufficient CEO information when compared with the Hong Kong stock exchange listed 
companies. With regard to the Japanese companies, further information might be available in 
the directors’ handbook but this handbook was not available in the English language, creating 
a challenge for the data collection. Hong Kong was considered as the most ideal Asian 
country for this study because of the availability of archival data for analysis. Hong Kong 
companies provide an accessible level of disclosure for gathering data (Cheng & Firth 2005). 
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The early stage of the data collection experience indicates that there were variations in the 
disclosure requirements between various Asian stock exchanges.   
4.5.1 Australia 
In general the annual reports of the ASX listed companies provided sufficient 
information on the CEO and the directors plus transparent disclosure of the financial figures. 
The information with regard to the CEO and the directors was found in the Director’s Report 
section of the annual report. There was a clear indication of the job title of the individual - 
whether he or she was the chairperson of the board, the CEO, the non-executive director or 
the executive director of the company. Biographical information about each individual made 
available for the public typically included age, education, the initial date of appointment to 
the position (normally both month and year were shown), previous work experience, 
functional background, directorships of other listed companies, CEO duality status and the 
number of shares owned. The Financial Report section of the annual report provided the 
necessary financial data with regard to the revenues, net profit and total assets of the firm. 
There were a few differences with regard to the level of disclosure among the ASX 200 
companies. It was discovered that a few ASX listed firms might disclose less information on 
their CEOs and directors. The excluded information might include the time when a CEO first 
joined the company (i.e., the insider/outsider status) and information on international work 
experience. Published CEO biographies, the BusinessWeek website and a few additional 
types of publicly available archival databases in Australia including Morningstar 
DatAnalysis, BoardRoom Review and Company 360 were used to fill any information gaps in 
the annual report. 
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4.5.2 The United States 
In the United States the Form 10-K (or Form 20-F for foreign company) and the 
Proxy Statement provide supporting information including biographies of the CEO and 
directors of the company, in addition to the annual report. The company annual report 
typically displayed a list of the names of the directors on the board and the CEO. The status 
of the outside or inside directors was observed from this list where the title and the 
originating company of the director were shown. Information about the CEO and the 
directors might also be disclosed in the Form 10-K under ‘Item 10 – Directors, Executive 
Officers and Corporate Governance’. More comprehensive information in relation to the 
CEO and directors is found in the Proxy Statement. The biographical information available 
from the annual reports, Form 10-K and Proxy Statement has a similar good level of 
transparency to that from the annual reports of the Australian companies. A few differences 
are found between Australian company annual reports and the United States company annual 
reports with regard to the information on the initial date of appointment to the CEO position. 
A few United States companies did not disclose this information up to the month (and date) 
of the appointment, i.e., only the year was shown. In this case the respective company 
website, the BusinessWeek website and any published CEO biographies were checked. In the 
case where the month and (or) the date of CEO appointment was not available, CEO tenure 
was measured from the year of appointment to the CEO position following previous key 
studies (e.g. Bigley & Wiersema 2002; Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006). The Financial 
Statements section of the Form 10-K and the annual report provided the necessary 
information with regard to the sales, net income and total assets of the firm. 
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4.5.3 Hong Kong 
The annual reports of the Hong Kong companies provided adequate information on 
the CEOs and directors plus transparent disclosure on the financial figures. In general the 
level of information disclosed by the Hong Kong companies in the annual report was similar 
to that disclosed by the Australian companies. The Director’s Report section of the annual 
report provides biographical information on the CEO and the directors. The Financial Report 
section provides information on turnover (i.e. revenues), net profit and total assets of the firm. 
4.6 Measures of Variables 
4.6.1 Independent Variables 
The literature review and the conceptual framework developed in this study identify a 
range of variables as suitable for inclusion as independent variables for the analysis in 
relation to the professional development and work context of the CEO. The selected variables 
for measuring the professional development of the CEO are: CEO insider/outsider status, 
CEO functional background, CEO international work experience, CEO MBA education and 
CEO number of university degrees. The selected variables for measuring the work context of 
the CEO are: CEO and chairperson duality, CEO tenure, and CEO share ownership 
percentage. Again, following Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) 2010 data was used 
for the independent variables, control variables and moderator variable. 
4.6.1.1 CEO Insider/Outsider Status  
CEO insider/outsider status is a dichotomous variable. An insider CEO who has been 
in the organisation or any of its subsidiaries before and at the time of appointment as CEO 
was coded one, and zero otherwise (Luo, Kanuri & Andrews 2014). This data was taken from 
company annual reports. Publicly available Proxy Statements and the Form 10-K (or Form 
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20-F) were used for the United States corporations. In the case where the information was 
insufficient, published CEO biographies, company news releases, the Businessweek website, 
Morningstar DatAnalysis and BoardRoom Review were also utilised. Also in a very few 
cases, past company annual reports were downloaded to check if the individual had been 
working with the company (e.g. as a member of the top management team) prior to his or her 
CEO appointment. 
4.6.1.2 CEO Functional Background 
Following key relevant studies (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Michel & Hambrick 1992; 
Datta & Rajagopalan 1998; Herrmann & Datta 2005; Cho & Hambrick 2006; Tuggle, 
Schnatterly & Johnson 2010; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010), CEOs who have been strongly 
oriented to functional backgrounds, such as marketing, sales, product research and 
development (R&D), merchandising, entrepreneurship and engineering are classified as 
possessing output functional backgrounds. CEOs who have strong work experience in other 
functional areas—including accounting, process research and development (R&D), 
operations and production—are classified as possessing non-output or throughput functional 
backgrounds (Miles & Snow 1978; Hambrick 1981; Finkelstein 1992; Datta & Rajagopalan 
1998; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). A CEO who has a dominant functional background in an 
output-oriented field was coded one, and zero otherwise. This data was taken from company 
annual reports, the Businessweek website, published CEO biographies, the Form 10-K (or 
Form 20-F) and Proxy Statements for the United States firms. 
4.6.1.3 CEO International Work Experience 
Following key relevant studies (Sambharya 1996; Herrmann 2002; Slater & Dixon-
Fowler 2009), CEO international work experience was measured as a categorical variable. 
CEO international work experience was coded one if the CEO had previously undertaken an 
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international work assignment or gained work experience in an international division or 
overseas, and zero otherwise (Herrmann 2002). The category was given based on evidence of 
international work assignments in company annual reports, the Form 10-K (or Form 20-F) 
and Proxy Statements for the United States corporations, and other publicly available sources 
including published CEO biographies, news releases, Businessweek website and company 
website (Slater & Dixon-Fowler 2009). 
4.6.1.4 CEO MBA Education  
CEO MBA education was measured by the completion and possession of an MBA 
degree. A CEO who has an MBA degree was coded one, and zero otherwise. This data was 
taken from company annual reports, the Businessweek website, the Form 10-K (or Form 20-
F) and Proxy Statements for the United States firms. 
4.6.1.5 CEO Number of University Degrees 
The number of university degrees was measured by the total sum of university 
qualifications that the CEO had undertaken and completed. The type of university degree 
considered in this study ranges from a diploma degree, bachelor degree, master’s by 
coursework degree, master’s by research degree, doctor of philosophy (PhD) degree and a 
doctorate degree (e.g. Doctor of Business Administration and Juris Doctor). This data was 
taken from company annual reports, the Businessweek website, the Form 10-K (or Form 20-
F) and Proxy Statements for the United States firms.  
During data collection, it was identified that certain CEOs had completed an advanced 
management program from a top business school as part of their professional development. 
However, the program was offered only for a short period of time. Therefore, it was not 
classified as a university qualification in this present study. Also the data collection process 
identified a few CEOs who had been awarded an honorary doctorate degree or several 
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honorary doctorate degrees. A university usually awards the honorary doctorate degree to an 
individual who has made a substantial contribution to the business community or general 
society. However, the award of this degree did not require the CEOs to complete a set of 
courses, assignments, theses or examinations. Therefore, this degree was not considered as a 
formal university educational qualification in this present study. 
4.6.1.6 CEO and Chairperson Duality 
Following Westphal and Zajac (1995), CEO and chairperson duality was coded one if 
the CEO also held the position of the chairperson of the board, and zero otherwise. The 
categorisation was based on the information from company annual reports and also the Proxy 
Statements for the United States firms. 
4.6.1.7 CEO Tenure 
CEO tenure was measured in years, months and days from the day of appointment to 
the CEO position. In a few cases where only the year of the CEO appointment was shown, 
CEO tenure was measured by calculating the years a CEO had been in the position (Bigley & 
Wiersema 2002; Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006). The data was mainly taken from 
company annual reports. In addition, the DatAnalysis database and the BoardRoom database 
have been used for the Australian firms. For the United States corporations the Form 10-K (or 
Form 20-F) and Proxy Statements were used. For the Hong Kong firms the Webb-Site 
website was used. The Businessweek website was used in the case where the information 
from the annual reports for all jurisdictions was insufficient. 
4.6.1.8 CEO Share Ownership Percentage 
CEO share ownership percentage was measured as ‘the percentage of a firm’s shares 
owned by the CEO’ by dividing ‘the total number of shares owned by the CEO’ with ‘the 
total number of shares outstanding for the firm’ (Bigley & Wiersema 2002, p. 715). The data 
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was taken from company annual reports and also Proxy Statements for the United States 
firms. 
4.6.2 Moderating Variable and Moderating Term 
The moderator variable used in this study is the non-executive director ratio. It is 
measured as a ratio by dividing the number of non-executive directors—or outside directors 
in the instance of the United States corporations—with the total board size (Bonn, Yoshikawa 
& Phan 2004). The data was taken from company annual reports, the Form 10-K (or Form 
20-F) and Proxy Statements for the United States firms. The non-executive director ratio has 
been commonly used in the corporate governance literature as a measure of board 
composition, board balance or board independence (Westphal & Zajac 1995; Zajac & 
Westphal 1995; Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). The presence of non-executive directors on the 
board has been argued to exert a direct influence on organisation performance (Geletkanycz 
& Hambrick 1997). Resource dependence theory highlights the benefit of non-executive 
directors in securing external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Dalton et al. 1998).  
Taking an agency theory perspective a high percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board will provide strong monitoring of the long-tenured CEO. Hypothesis 10 suggests 
that the influence of CEO tenure on organisation performance is moderated by the non-
executive director ratio, such that a low non-executive director ratio and high CEO tenure 
jointly predict better organisation performance. Hypothesis 10 is a moderated relationship 
where there is a relationship between two variables jointly and a third. After centring CEO 
tenure and the non-executive director ratio respectively the moderation term CEO tenure x 
the non-executive director ratio was prepared (Aiken & West 1991). Moderated multiple 
regression analysis is later used to test the relationship of the moderation term with the 
dependent variable organisation performance.  
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4.6.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this research is organisation performance. There is a 
tradition of measuring organisation performance as a dependent variable in business and 
management research (Richard et al. 2009). The measure for organisation performance in this 
study is company average return on assets (ROA) (Zajac & Westphal 1996b; Bigley & 
Wiersema 2002) for the 2011 and 2012 financial years—two years data. ROA is one of the 
most popular organisational performance measures in the studies of CEO professional 
development and work context effect and has been used regularly in the strategic 
management and corporate governance literature (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004; Newbert 
2008; Richard et al. 2009). To ensure that the measurement of ROA is consistent across the 
three countries, the value of ROA was not obtained from financial databases but instead was 
calculated by dividing net income by total assets (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader 2003; Quigley 
& Hambrick 2012). ROA was documented for each company financial year (Quigley & 
Hambrick 2012). The data on both net income and total assets was obtained from the 
financial statements section of the annual reports and the Form 10-K (or Form 20-F) for the 
United States firms.  
4.6.4 Control Variables 
A number of matters may impact organisation performance either in a negative way 
or positive way (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004) in the CEO professional development and 
work context through their effect on managerial discretion (Shen & Cannella 2002b; 
Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Therefore, several control variables have been 
included for this research here with the selection informed by prior corporate governance 
studies. Firm industry classification (i.e., major industry and second major industry), firm 
age, firm size and board size were controlled in this study here to help identify the specific 
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effect of the CEO professional development and CEO work context on organisation 
performance.  
4.6.4.1 Industry Classification 
Dummy variables were developed for different industrial sectors. The industrial 
sectors were classified as mining and metals, information technology (IT) or 
telecommunications, financial services, industrial materials (excluding mining and metals), 
consumers and services, health care, and energy or utilities sectors based on the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The GICS is used in this present study as it is a 
global standard of industry classification for many Standard and Poor’s companies in 
Australia and other countries (ASX 2013). The data was obtained from websites of the 
respective stock exchanges (i.e., ASX, NYSE, NASDAQ and HKSE) and also Webb-Site 
website for the Hong Kong firms. The two major industries (i.e., major industry and second 
major industry) in the Australian, United States and Hong Kong sample respectively were 
included as control variables. 
4.6.4.2 Firm Age 
Firm age was controlled in this study because it can affect organisation performance 
positively or negatively. For example an older company is more likely to maintain a bigger 
network of relations, which can assist the company to gain access to a wider variety of 
resources (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004); alternately an older company may have a more 
inflexible organisational structure and this can impact negatively on organisation 
performance (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004). Firm age was measured as the number of 
years, months and days since the firm was listed on the stock exchange. Due to variation in 
the number of years listed on the stock exchange among the companies in the sample and 
since bivariate correlations and linear regressions are intended to discover linear 
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relationships, a common logarithm transformation was used to normalise the skewed 
distribution and to reduce the impact of the outlying variables (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; 
Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). Therefore, the firm age in this present study is measured as the 
common logarithm of the number of years since the company was originally listed on its 
respective stock exchange. The data was obtained from the ASX website and the DatAnalysis 
database for the Australian firms. For the United States firms the NYSE website and the 
NASDAQ website was used. For the Hong Kong firms the HKSE website and Webb-Site 
website was used. Where required the respective company website was also a data source. 
4.6.4.3 Firm Size 
Firm size was controlled in this research here because it is related to organisation 
performance differences (Roth 1995) and also the challenge of the information processing 
demands and complexity of the CEO work (Henderson & Fredrickson 1996; Carpenter & 
Sanders 2002). Following past key studies (Westphal & Zajac 1995; Carpenter, Sanders & 
Gregersen 2001; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2009), company annual 
sales were used to measure firm size. Firm sales mainly provide an indicator of the company 
size (Hambrick & Mason 1984). Similar to firm age, due to variation in the sales figures 
among the top 200 companies, a common logarithm transformation was used to normalise the 
skewed distribution (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Therefore the firm size in this study here 
was measured as the common logarithm of sales in 2010 (Westphal & Zajac 1995; Carpenter, 
Sanders & Gregersen 2001; Carpenter & Sanders 2002). The data was taken from the 
financial statements section of company annual reports and also the Form 10-K (or Form 20-
F) for the United States firms.  
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4.6.4.4 Board Size 
Board size was also controlled in this study as it could bring either a positive or 
negative impact on organisation performance. Large board size can increase the chance of 
having more experts on the board bringing a positive effect on organisation performance but 
the alternative view is that it may lead to ineffective monitoring from a large number of non-
executive directors resulting in a negative effect on organisation performance (Lipton & 
Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993; Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; Jalal & Prezas 2012). Board size 
was measured as ‘the total number of directors on the board’ (Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010, p. 
338). The data was obtained from company annual reports plus the Form 10-K (or Form 20-
F) and Proxy Statements for the United States firms. 
4.6.5 Summary of Measures 
 Table 4.1 has been prepared to provide a summary of the measures that were used in 
this study. 
Table 4.1: Summary of Measures  
Variables Measures 
Industry classification  Dummy variable (i.e., one or zero). The classification 
was based on the GICS for the major industry and 
second major industry in Australia, the United States 
and Hong Kong respectively. 
Firm age Log of years of the company since it was listed on the 
respective stock exchange. 
Firm size Log of sales 2010. 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. 
CEO insider One if the individual has been in the organisation 
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before and at the time of appointment as CEO, and 
zero otherwise. 
CEO output-oriented functional 
background 
One if the individual predominantly worked in the 
functional areas of marketing, sales, merchandising, 
product R & D, entrepreneurship and/or engineering 
before the time of appointment as CEO, and zero 
otherwise. 
CEO international work experience One if the CEO had previously undertaken an 
international work assignment, and zero otherwise. 
CEO MBA education One if the CEO had completed an MBA degree, and 
zero otherwise. 
CEO number of university degrees Total number of formal university degrees that the 
CEO holds. 
CEO duality One if the CEO also holds the position of the 
chairperson, and zero otherwise. 
CEO tenure Total length of tenure since the day of appointment to 
the CEO position. 
CEO share ownership percentage Total number of shares owned by the CEO divided by 
total number of shares outstanding for the company 
calculated as a percentage. 
Non-executive director ratio The number of non-executive directors on the board 
divided by board size. 
Organisation performance The average of ROA 2011 and ROA 2012. ROA was 
calculated by dividing net income by total assets.  
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4.7 Methods and Analytic Procedures 
4.7.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Preliminary analysis was carried out to assess the data accuracy, missing data and 
other issues in relation to normality and outliers. The information entered into the data file 
was proofread against the respective company annual reports and available archival databases 
for accuracy. The data was obtained from accurate, robust and reliable company annual 
reports and publicly available archival databases. The descriptive statistics including the 
means and range were examined to screen for accuracy.  
With regard to missing data, for Australia 26 companies of the original 200 ASX 
companies were excluded because they had missing data in relation to the financial 
performance ranging between 2011 and 2012. The other 26 largest companies by market 
capitalisation were selected from the next largest companies in the S&P/ASX 300 constituent 
list. For Hong Kong there was one company with a missing value of Average ROA 2011-
2012; the company had not submitted its annual reports by the end of financial years 2011 
and 2012 at the time when data collection for this research was completed. The missing data 
was treated and excluded from the analysis by the SPSS software by selecting the exclude 
cases pairwise choice.  
The descriptive statistics for Australia, the United States and Hong Kong are 
presented in Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, respectively. The values of mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis were noted for each variable. Normality of the variables was 
checked by statistical methods from the value of skewness and kurtosis obtained from SPSS 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). The value of skewness and kurtosis provides an indication of the 
symmetry and the peakedness of the distribution, respectively (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Australian Sample 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Materials industry 0.21 0.41 1.44 0.17 0.06 0.34 
Mining industry 0.20 0.40 1.51 0.17 0.29 0.34 
Log of firm age 1.08 0.38 -0.43 0.17 0.88 0.34 
Log of sales 8.83 0.99 -0.82 0.17 1.18 0.34 
Board size 7.37 2.17 0.97 0.17 1.83 0.34 
Insider CEO 0.65 0.48 -0.63 0.17 -1.62 0.34 
CEO output-oriented 
functional 
background 
0.42 0.50 0.33 0.17 -1.91 0.34 
CEO international 
work experience 
0.66 0.48 -0.66 0.17 -1.58 0.34 
CEO MBA degree 0.19 0.39 1.59 0.17 0.54 0.34 
CEO number of 
university degrees 
1.37 0.81 0.09 0.17 -0.48 0.34 
CEO duality 0.06 0.24 3.73 0.17 12.06 0.34 
CEO tenure 5.80 5.59 1.86 0.17 4.34 0.34 
CEO share ownership 
percentage 
2.51 7.51 4.78 0.17 25.46 0.34 
NED ratio 0.80 0.11 -1.02 0.17 0.82 0.34 
Average ROA 2011-
2012 
3.64 11.52 -0.96 0.17 8.23 0.34 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for the United States Sample 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Consumer industry 0.25 0.43 1.16 0.17 -0.65 0.34 
IT/telecom industry 0.16 0.36 1.92 0.17 1.71 0.34 
Log of firm age 1.35 0.46 -1.06 0.17 1.11 0.34 
Log of sales  10.29 0.47 0.08 0.17 -0.06 0.34 
Board size 11.43 2.59 2.14 0.17 15.35 0.34 
Insider CEO 0.86 0.35 -2.09 0.17 2.40 0.34 
CEO output-oriented 
functional 
background 
0.43 0.50 0.26 0.17 -1.95 0.34 
CEO international 
work experience 
0.61 0.49 -0.45 0.17 -1.81 0.34 
CEO MBA degree 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.17 -1.81 0.34 
CEO number of 
university degrees 
1.76 0.79 0.03 0.17 0.27 0.34 
CEO duality 0.68 0.47 -0.75 0.17 -1.45 0.34 
CEO tenure 6.81 5.91 2.36 0.17 8.44 0.34 
CEO share ownership 
percentage 
1.40 4.42 5.25 0.17 30.60 0.34 
NED ratio 0.88 0.06 -1.52 0.17 1.62 0.34 
Average ROA 2011-
2012 
7.79 6.14 1.20 0.17 3.08 0.34 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics for the Hong Kong Sample 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Statistic Standard 
Error 
Consumer industry 0.33 0.47 0.75 0.17 -1.45 0.34 
Financial industry 0.32 0.47 0.78 0.17 -1.41 0.34 
Log of firm age 0.88 0.53 -0.57 0.17 0.54 0.34 
Log of sales 9.43 0.75 -0.57 0.17 3.88 0.34 
Board size 11.25 3.31 0.69 0.17 0.08 0.34 
Insider CEO 0.86 0.35 -2.03 0.17 2.15 0.34 
CEO output-oriented 
functional 
background  
0.50 0.50 0.02 0.17 -2.02 0.34 
CEO international 
work experience 
0.37 0.48 0.57 0.17 -1.70 0.34 
CEO MBA degree 0.39 0.49 0.48 0.17 -1.79 0.34 
CEO number of 
university degrees 
1.60 0.88 0.07 0.17 -0.14 0.34 
CEO duality 0.25 0.43 1.20 0.17 -0.58 0.34 
CEO tenure 5.91 6.15 2.00 0.17 4.57 0.34 
CEO share ownership 
percentage 
11.35 23.22 1.94 0.17 2.41 0.34 
NED ratio 0.58 0.18 -0.02 0.17 -0.93 0.34 
Average ROA 2011-
2012 
5.86 6.27 0.49 0.17 3.85 0.34 
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In Australia, Table 4.2 identifies a positive skew and positive kurtosis in the number 
of CEO duality cases although this CEO duality variable is not included in the bivariate 
correlations and moderated regression analysis in this research. The mean value of this 
variable shows that the percentage of CEO who also holds the chair position is below 10 per 
cent (i.e., six per cent). The requirement for a dichotomous variable to be included in the 
analysis is that there be a minimum 90 per cent and 10 per cent split between groups, or more 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). There is a positive skew and positive kurtosis in the percentage 
of CEO share ownership. The CEO share ownership percentage ranges from 0 to 57 per cent; 
the mean value of the CEO share ownership is 2.5 per cent, while the median value is 0.2. In 
the United States, Table 4.3 identifies a positive skew and positive kurtosis in the percentage 
of CEO share ownership. The CEO share ownership percentage ranges from 0 to 36 per cent; 
the mean value of the CEO share ownership is 1.4 per cent, while the median value is 0.3. In 
Hong Kong, Table 4.4 identifies a positive skew and positive kurtosis in the length of CEO 
tenure. The length of the CEO tenure ranges from 0.04 to 34.7 years; the mean value of the 
CEO tenure is 5.9 years, while the median value is 4.1 years. Since this present study uses a 
relatively large sample size of 200 companies for each country, variables which indicate a 
positive or negative skew normally would not move away enough from normality to have a 
crucial impact on the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). Also, the impact of deviation 
from zero kurtosis reduces in the case where there is a large sample size (Tabachnick & 
Fidell 2007). Taking this point into consideration and following the measures of the CEO 
tenure variable and the CEO share ownership variable used in the previous studies (Simsek 
2007; Walters, Kroll & Wright 2007), these variables were not transformed in this present 
research. 
Nevertheless, the presence of outliers or extreme values in the variables was 
examined for the CEO professional development analysis for each of Australia, the United 
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States and Hong Kong as they can distort the statistics results by affecting the values of the 
regression coefficients in the regression analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). In a similar 
way, the presence of outliers in the variables was examined for the CEO work context 
analysis for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The Casewise Diagnostics 
analysis on the SPSS Statistical Package software was used to identify the outliers in the 
multiple regression analysis and the moderated regression analysis. The Casewise 
Diagnostics identified the outliers outside three standard deviations, such as the companies 
that have an extremely high or low value of ROA. It is noted that these companies come from 
various industry classifications including financial industry, IT and telecommunication 
industry, mining and metals industry, energy industry, and consumer industry. ROA can be 
affected by various factors; it should be noted that a few outliers identified in this study were 
due to one or more factors, such as acquisition, joint ventures, increasing market demand, 
high operating costs, impairment expenses, volatile markets and (or) challenging global 
economy conditions. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) advised that a few number of cases with an extreme 
value—compared to all the other cases—should be deleted. Following their advice, a few 
number of outliers identified in the Casewise Diagnostics in the multiple regression analysis 
for CEO professional development and the dependent variable organisation performance 
were adjusted and deleted for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. Similarly, 
a few number of outliers identified in the Casewise Diagnostics in the moderated regression 
analysis for CEO work context and the dependent variable organisation performance were 
adjusted and deleted for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. Remarks on the 
deletion of outliers will be presented in the hypothesis test section of Chapter 5 Results. 
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4.7.2 Methods 
Research methods outline the activities, procedures and techniques for collecting and 
analysing data connected to the research question and hypotheses (Crotty 1998). The methods 
of the data collection in this research have been described in the preceding sections leading to 
databases prepared for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. After conducting 
the preliminary analysis to check for missing data, outliers, skewness and kurtosis, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted on SPSS to identify areas of similarity and difference in the cross-
sectional CEO professional development and CEO work context data between Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong.  
In the ANOVA, the country variable representing three different country groups— 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong—was selected as the independent variable on 
SPSS. Each of the CEO professional development variables including the insider CEO 
variable, the CEO output-oriented functional background variable, the CEO international 
work experience variable, the CEO MBA degree variable and the CEO number of university 
degrees variable was selected as the dependent variable in the ANOVA. Then, each of the 
CEO work context variables including the CEO duality variable, the CEO tenure variable and 
the CEO share ownership percentage variable was selected as the dependent variable in the 
ANOVA. The one-way ANOVA was run separately for each of the CEO professional 
development and CEO work context variables with the country variable on SPSS to identify 
where convergence is occurring in the Australian, United States and Hong Kong data sets. 
The F-ratio value was noted for every ANOVA test. An additional post-hoc test specifically 
the Tukey’s test was performed on SPSS in the case where the ANOVA results discovered a 
relatively high F ratio value and a significant difference in the CEO professional development 
and CEO work context data between the three country groups. The Tukey’s test identifies 
how significant the difference in the CEO professional development and CEO work context 
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data is between pairs of country groups—i.e., between Australia and the United States, 
Australia and Hong Kong, and the United States and Hong Kong. The Tukey’s test assumes 
equal group sample sizes and provides a superior ‘protection against type I errors’ (Stevens 
2012, p. 184). It is one of the most commonly used post-hoc analysis techniques and allows 
researchers to ‘control the experimentwise type I error rate’; however, ‘such control comes at 
a cost in statistical power’ (Ruxton & Beauchamp 2008, p. 691). The limitation of the 
Tukey’s test relates to the loss of statistical power—when more comparisons are conducted—
in order to maintain a certain level of control (Ruxton & Beauchamp 2008). 
After conducting the ANOVA, the research hypothesis tests were performed using 
bivariate correlations and hierarchical regression analysis by country in the order of 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The bivariate correlation statistic (Pearson’s 
correlations) was carried out to examine the correlation between each of the selected 
variables. A number of significant relationships were noted in the bivariate correlation 
statistics at this early stage of analysis which helps later with the hypothesis tests reported in 
Chapter 5. Before performing the regression analysis, the variables were examined for 
multicollinearity from the bivariate correlation tables. The data did not indicate 
multicollinearity issues which normally involve the two variables with a correlation of the 
order of approximately 0.70 or more in the same bivariate correlation analysis (Tabachnick & 
Fidell 2007).  
Before proceeding it should be noted following on remarks from Bonn, Yoshikawa 
and Phan (2004) that some of the data in this study were not directly comparable due to 
accounting differences between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The general 
accounting standards used in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong are the Australian 
Accounting Standards (AAS), the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
the Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards (Australian Trade Commission 2014; Institute 
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of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2014; Hong Kong Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 2014), respectively. The AAS comply with the requirements of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Australian Trade Commission 2014). 
According to the IFRS (2014), the United States Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have been collaborating 
for over a decade to attain convergence of the United States GAAP toward the IFRS. Given 
this preceding background and following Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan’s (2004) cross-country 
comparative study, multiple regression analyses and moderated regression analyses in this 
study here were tested separately for the Australian, United States and Hong Kong 
companies.  
The conceptual framework incorporates variables for the CEO professional 
development, the CEO work context, the non-executive director ratio and the organisation 
performance. A total of six hierarchical regression models were prepared. Three models were 
prepared for CEO professional development and the dependent variable organisation 
performance in each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. Three models were then 
prepared for CEO work context and the dependent variable organisation performance in each 
of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
Model one for the conceptual framework incorporating variables for CEO 
professional development and the organisation performance examined the linear relationships 
between the control variables and the dependent variable organisation performance only. In 
model two, the control variables were entered in step one then the independent variables such 
as insider CEO, CEO output-oriented functional background, CEO international work 
experience, CEO MBA degree and CEO number of university degrees were entered in step 
two. With these variables included in model two the tests for hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and 
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H5 were completed. Both model one and model two will be presented in Chapter 5 in Table 
5.17 for Australia, Table 5.20 for the United States and Table 5.23 for Hong Kong. 
Model one for the conceptual framework incorporating variables for CEO work 
context, the non-executive director ratio and the organisation performance examined the 
linear relationships between the control variables and the dependent variable organisation 
performance. In model two, the control variables were re-entered and the independent 
variables such as CEO duality, CEO tenure and CEO share ownership percentage as well as 
the moderating variable the non-executive director ratio were entered. The linear 
relationships between these independent variables and organisation performance were 
examined to test hypotheses H6, H7, H8 and H9. The independent variable CEO duality was 
not included in model two (and also model three) specifically for Australia because of the 
low incidence of CEO duality in the top 200 ASX companies. In model three, moderated 
regression analysis was carried out by entering the control variables, independent variables, 
moderating variable, and the interactive term CEO tenure x the non-executive director ratio 
for the purpose of testing H10. Model one, model two and model three will be presented in 
the next chapter in Table 5.18 for Australia, Table 5.21 for the United States and Table 5.24 
for Hong Kong. 
In each of the multiple regression and moderated regression analyses the variable 
inflation factor (VIF) index was measured to see the impact of the ‘other independent 
variables on a regression coefficient’ (Cooper & Schindler 2003, p. 617). All the values of the 
VIF index were checked to ensure they are far below 10 for all the models indicating there is 
no multicollinearity issue (Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). The value of 
R-squared and adjusted R-squared was noted for each regression model to provide a general 
overview of how much the independent variable would explain the sample variation in the 
selected dependent variable and the goodness of fit of the regression model (Wooldridge 
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2009). A t-test statistic was conducted on SPSS to test each hypothesis and to identify if each 
of the independent variables has a statistically significant relationship with the dependent 
variable (Wooldridge 2009). The values of the unstandardised coefficient (B) and its standard 
error were obtained from SPSS and will be reported in the regression analysis results. The p-
values that indicate ‘the smallest significance level at which the null hypothesis would be 
rejected’ were obtained from SPSS for the t-tests (Wooldridge 2009, p. 133). An F-test 
statistic was conducted on SPSS to determine the significance of the multiple regression 
models and the moderated multiple regression models (Wooldridge 2009); the F-value was 
noted for each regression model. The simple regression slope for the significant interactive 
term was plotted to provide a better interpretation of the results (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
Since an interactive term was used, all variables except the dependent variable were centred 
accordingly to avoid the problems of multicollinearity (Aiken & West 1991).  
4.7.3 Robustness of the Analysis 
 Steps have been employed in the research design of this study to manage the possible 
risk of endogeneity bias. First, it should be emphasised that many existing studies have 
chosen multiple regression analysis (e.g. Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 
2004) and moderation regression analysis (e.g. Walters, Kroll & Wright 2007; Zona, Zattoni 
& Minichilli 2013; Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014) as the most robust methods for 
exploring the relationship between CEO attributes or board characteristics and firm 
performance. It has also been discussed previously that there has been an increasing use of 
techniques such as ANOVA, multiple regression analysis and moderated regression analysis 
in recent studies (Ketchen, Boyd & Bergh 2008). The use of regression models has been well 
recommended in the literature particularly for analysing moderation effects (Aiken & West 
1991; Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014). Second, this study has carefully considered 
including a number of control variables such as firm control variables and board size variable 
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that could possibly affect the CEO’s discretion in influencing organisation performance 
(Shen & Cannella 2002b; Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). The control variables 
have been included in both the multiple regression analysis and the moderated multiple 
regression analysis to reduce the probability of these other variables external from the focus 
of the study influencing the results. Third, the design of this present research has set out to 
include a number of independent variables that capture important aspects of the CEO 
professional development and work context. This reduces the risk of endogeneity problems 
that can arise from omitting some key variables (Wooldridge 2009). Fourth, robustness tests 
were performed for checking the correlation between the independent variables and the error 
terms of the CEO professional development model and the CEO work context model for each 
of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong and for confirming that the endogeneity issues 
have been attended to (Wooldridge 2009; Situmeang, Leenders & Wijnberg 2014). The 
outcomes of the tests, which will be discussed further in the next chapter in section 5.5, do 
not indicate any issues with endogeneity providing a strong support for the use of the 
multiple and moderated regression analysis as the most appropriate methods for this present 
research.   
4.8 Privacy 
This research collected secondary data from publicly available sources for the purpose 
of the research analysis and finding. The personal data of CEOs and directors and the data on 
organisation performance have been extracted from publicly available annual reports and 
publicly available databases. The data would be prepared and stored only for the purpose of 
research. The results of the analysis were provided in aggregate form ensuring the identity 
and confidentiality of each individual and each company. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodology and research design for the thesis. This 
research blends positivism and critical realism, favouring deductive theory testing on the 
deductive-inductive continuum. There is a long tradition of studies in corporate governance 
and strategic management blending positivism and critical realism (Kwan & Tsang 2001). 
The sample consists of the 200 largest companies by market capitalisation from the 
Australian Stock Exchange, the Russell 200 Index (the NYSE, the NASDAQ), and the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, respectively, as at the 30th of September 2010. The total sample size is 
600 firms. The data for this study was obtained from secondary, publicly available sources by 
downloading three years of company annual reports as at the end of fiscal year 2010, 2011 
and 2012 and extracting the relevant information. A few additional types of publicly available 
archival databases such as MorningStar DatAnalysis, BoardRoom Review, Company 360, 
BusinessWeek website, Webb-Site website, company news releases and published CEO 
biographies were used in the case where the information from the annual report was 
insufficient. The measures of the selected variables and the quantitative methods for 
conducting the analysis have been explained in this chapter. Chapter 5 next will present the 
results of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter discussed the methodology and research design for conducting 
the research. This chapter will present the results of the study prepared using techniques 
including analysis of variance (ANOVA), bivariate correlations, multiple regression analysis 
and moderated regression analysis.  
 The results of ANOVA tests will be initially presented to provide an appraisal of areas 
of similarity and difference in cross-sectional CEO professional development and CEO work 
context variables between the Australian, the United States and Hong Kong data samples. 
This statistical technique provides an interesting overall insight into the convergence debate 
prior to conducting the hypothesis tests. 
Next the chapter will then present the research hypothesis tests by country in the order 
of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The results of the one-way bivariate 
correlations will be set out and then followed by presentation of the results of hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis and moderated multiple regression analysis. The moderated 
regression plot for the statistically significant interaction term will be presented to provide a 
better interpretation of the findings.  
 The final two sections of the chapter will discuss the results of a robustness test for 
mitigating the risk of endogeneity bias, and a summary table highlighting areas of similarity 
or convergence in results for the hypothesis tests across Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong. The descriptive statistics reported in Chapter 4 indicate no concerns in relation 
to missing data, skewness or kurtosis in the three data sets, providing an appropriate basis to 
take the analysis forward. 
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5.2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)  
 The results of ANOVA have been prepared to show the areas of difference and 
similarity in each of the cross-sectional CEO professional development and CEO work 
context data between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. As noted previously it 
provides an interesting overall insight into where convergence is occurring in the Australian, 
United States and Hong Kong data sets prior to conducting the hypothesis tests. 
5.2.1 Insider CEO 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.1 below show that the cross-sectional 
insider CEO data differed significantly (i.e., p < 0.001) between Australia, the United States 
and Hong Kong. The relatively high F ratio value indicates that there was a higher variance 
between the country groups than the variance within each country group (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.1: ANOVA Results for the Insider CEO Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
Insider CEO Between groups 5.743 2 2.872 18.166 0.000 
 Within groups 94.375 597 0.158   
  Total 100.118 599    
 
 The difference in the insider CEO data between the country groups was found to be 
significant and therefore Tukey’s test was performed. Tukey’s test results presented in Table 
5.2 suggest an area of significant difference or divergence in the cross-sectional insider CEO 
data: firstly between Australia and the United States, and secondly between Australia and 
Hong Kong. 
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Table 5.2: The Tukey’s Test Results for the Insider CEO Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Insider 
CEO 
Australia US -0.210* 0.040 0.000 -0.30 -0.12 
 HK -0.205* 0.040 0.000 -0.30 -0.11 
 US Australia 0.210* 0.040 0.000 0.12 0.30 
  HK 0.005 0.040 0.991 -0.09 0.10 
 HK Australia 0.205* 0.040 0.000 0.11 0.30 
  US -0.005 0.040 0.991 -0.10 0.09 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
5.2.2 CEO Output-oriented Functional Background 
The ANOVA results in Table 5.3 show that there is no significant difference in the 
cross-sectional CEO output-oriented functional background data between Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong. The low F ratio value indicates that the variance between the 
country groups was similar to the variance within each of the country groups (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.3: ANOVA Results for the CEO Output Functional Background Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO output 
functional 
background 
Between groups 0.630 2 0.315 1.272 0.281 
Within groups 147.870 597 0.248   
Total 148.500 599    
 
Tukey’s test was not performed since there was no significant difference in the CEO 
output-oriented functional background data between the country groups. The findings suggest 
an area of similarity or convergence in the cross-sectional CEO output-oriented functional 
background data between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
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5.2.3 CEO International Work Experience 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.4 below show that the cross-sectional CEO 
international work experience data differed significantly between Australia, the United States 
and Hong Kong. The relatively high F ratio value indicates a higher variability between the 
country groups than the variability within each group (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.4: ANOVA Results for the CEO International Work Experience Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO international 
work experience 
Between groups 9.743 2 4.872 20.904 0.000 
Within groups 139.130 597 0.233   
 Total 148.873 599    
 
The Tukey’s test results presented in Table 5.5 below suggest an area of significant 
difference or divergence in the cross-sectional CEO international work experience data: 
firstly between Australia and Hong Kong, and secondly between the United States and Hong 
Kong. 
Table 5.5: The Tukey’s Test Results for the CEO International Work Experience 
Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CEO 
international 
work 
experience 
Australia US 0.045 0.048 0.620 -0.07 0.16 
 HK 0.290* 0.048 0.000 0.18 0.40 
US Australia -0.045 0.048 0.620 -0.16 0.07 
 HK 0.245* 0.048 0.000 0.13 0.36 
HK Australia -0.290* 0.048 0.000 -0.40 -0.18 
 US -0.245* 0.048 0.000 -0.36 -0.13 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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5.2.4 CEO MBA Education 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.6 below show that the cross-sectional CEO 
MBA education data differed significantly between Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong. The relatively high F ratio value indicates a higher variance between the country 
groups than the variance within each group (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.6: ANOVA Results for the CEO MBA Education Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO MBA 
education 
Between groups 5.203 2 2.602 12.355 0.000 
Within groups 125.715 597 0.211   
 Total 130.918 599    
 
The Tukey’s test results presented in Table 5.7 below suggest an area of significant 
difference or divergence in the cross-sectional CEO MBA education data: firstly between 
Australia and the United States, and secondly between Australia and Hong Kong. 
Table 5.7: The Tukey’s Test Results for the CEO MBA Education Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CEO 
MBA 
education 
Australia US -0.200* 0.046 0.000 -0.31 -0.09 
 HK -0.195* 0.046 0.000 -0.30 -0.09 
US Australia 0.200* 0.046 0.000 0.09 0.31 
 HK 0.005 0.046 0.993 -0.10 0.11 
HK Australia 0.195* 0.046 0.000 0.09 0.30 
 US -0.005 0.046 0.993 -0.11 0.10 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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5.2.5 CEO Number of University Degrees 
 The ANOVA results in Table 5.8 show that the cross-sectional data in relation to the 
number of university degrees a CEO possesses differed significantly between Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong. The relatively high F ratio value explains a higher variance 
between the country groups than the variance within each group (Pallant 2013). 
Table 5.8: ANOVA Results for the CEO Number of University Degrees Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO number of 
university 
degrees  
Between groups 15.373 2 7.687 11.217 0.000 
Within groups 409.100 597 0.685   
Total 424.473 599    
 
The Tukey’s test results presented in Table 5.9 below suggest an area of significant 
difference or divergence in the cross-sectional data in relation to the number of university 
degrees a CEO possesses: firstly between Australia and the United States, and secondly 
between Australia and Hong Kong. 
Table 5.9: The Tukey’s Test Results for the CEO Number of University Degrees 
Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CEO 
number of 
university 
degrees 
Australia US -0.390* 0.083 0.000 -0.58 -0.20 
 HK -0.230* 0.083 0.016 -0.42 -0.04 
US Australia 0.390* 0.083 0.000 0.20 0.58 
 HK 0.160 0.083 0.130 -0.03 0.35 
HK Australia 0.230* 0.083 0.016 0.04 0.42 
 US -0.160 0.083 0.130 -0.35 0.03 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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5.2.6 CEO Duality 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.10 below show that the cross-sectional 
CEO duality data differed significantly between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
The extremely high F ratio value indicates a very high variability between the country groups 
than the variability within each group (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.10: ANOVA Results for the CEO Duality Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO duality Between groups 39.823 2 19.912 128.999 0.000 
 Within groups 92.150 597 0.154   
 Total 131.973 599    
  
 The Tukey’s test results presented in Table 5.11 below show that the cross-sectional 
CEO duality data differed significantly: firstly between Australia and the United States, 
secondly between Australia and Hong Kong, and thirdly between the United States and Hong 
Kong. This suggests an area of significant difference or divergence in the cross-sectional 
CEO duality data between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
Table 5.11: The Tukey’s Test Results for the CEO Duality Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CEO 
duality 
Australia US -0.615* 0.039 0.000 -0.71 -0.52 
 HK -0.185* 0.039 0.000 -0.28 -0.09 
US Australia 0.615* 0.039 0.000 0.52 0.71 
 HK 0.430* 0.039 0.000 0.34 0.52 
HK Australia 0.185* 0.039 0.000 0.09 0.28 
 US -0.430* 0.039 0.000 -0.52 -0.34 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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5.2.7 CEO Tenure 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.12 below show no significant difference in 
the cross-sectional CEO tenure data across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The 
low F ratio value indicates the variance between the different country groups was similar to 
that within each of the country groups (Pallant 2013).  
Table 5.12: ANOVA Results for the CEO Tenure Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO tenure Between groups 121.494 2 60.747 1.753 0.174 
 Within groups 20687.384 597 34.652   
 Total 20808.878 599    
 
 Since there was no significant difference between the country groups, the Tukey’s test 
was not performed for the CEO tenure variable. The findings suggest an area of similarity or 
convergence in the cross-sectional CEO tenure data between Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong.  
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5.2.8 CEO Share Ownership Percentage 
 The ANOVA results presented in Table 5.13 show that the cross-sectional CEO share 
ownership percentage data differed significantly between Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong. The high F ratio value shows that there is a higher variance between the country 
groups than the variance within each group (Pallant 2013). 
Table 5.13: ANOVA Results for the CEO Share Ownership Percentage Variable 
  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. 
CEO share 
ownership 
percentage 
Between groups 11887.812 2 5943.906 28.979 0.000 
Within groups 122452.739 597 205.113   
Total 134340.550 599    
 
The Tukey’s test results presented in Table 5.14 suggest an area of significant 
difference or divergence in the cross-sectional CEO share ownership percentage data away 
from Australia and the United States in Hong Kong.  
Table 5.14: The Tukey’s Test Results for the CEO Share Ownership Percentage 
Variable 
 (I)  
Country 
Group 
(J)  
Country 
Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CEO share 
ownership 
percentage 
Australia US 1.107 1.432 0.720 -2.26 4.47 
 HK -8.840* 1.432 0.000 -12.21 -5.48 
US Australia -1.107 1.432 0.720 -4.47 2.26 
 HK -9.947* 1.432 0.000 -13.31 -6.58 
HK Australia 8.840* 1.432 0.000 5.48 12.21 
 US 9.947* 1.432 0.000 6.58 13.31 
Note: The star (*) denotes that the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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5.2.9 Summary of Similarities and Differences in the CEO Professional 
Development and Work Context between Countries 
 Table 5.15 below summarises the ANOVA results and provides an important 
indication of the areas of convergence and divergence in the cross-sectional CEO 
professional development and CEO work context data between Australia, the United States 
and Hong Kong. The results provide evidence of a moment of convergence in the cross-
sectional CEO output-oriented functional background data and the CEO tenure data, 
separately, in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong data sets. The dark-green boxes in 
Table 5.15 highlight these areas of convergence. However, the results also evidence a 
moment of divergence in the cross-sectional CEO duality data between Australia, the United 
States and Hong Kong. The red box in Table 5.15 highlights this area of divergence. 
Table 5.15: Summary of ANOVA Results Highlighting Areas of Convergence and 
Divergence in the Cross-Sectional CEO Professional Development and CEO Work 
Context Data between Australia (AUS), the United States (US) and Hong Kong (HK) 
CEO Professional Development Variable 
or CEO Work Context Variable 
AUS - US or 
US - AUS 
AUS - HK or 
HK – AUS 
US – HK or 
HK – US 
Insider CEO Divergence Divergence Convergence 
CEO output-oriented functional background Convergence across AUS, US and HK 
CEO international work experience Convergence Divergence Divergence 
CEO MBA education Divergence Divergence Convergence 
CEO number of university degrees Divergence Divergence Convergence 
CEO and chairperson duality Divergence across AUS, US and HK 
CEO tenure Convergence across AUS, US and HK 
CEO share ownership percentage Convergence Divergence Divergence 
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 Table 5.15 also highlights a few additional pockets of convergence in certain CEO 
professional development and CEO work context data between Australia and the United 
States, and between the United States and Hong Kong. The light-green boxes in Table 5.15 
highlight these additional areas of convergence. There are also a few additional areas of 
divergence in certain CEO professional development and CEO work context data between 
Australia and the United States, between Australia and Hong Kong, and between the United 
States and Hong Kong. The orange boxes in Table 5.15 highlight these additional areas of 
divergence. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Test 
5.3.1 Australia 
 Table 5.16 in the following page presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlation results for the Australian companies. The bivariate correlation results show that 
there are no multicollinearity issues, as there are no two variables with a correlation 
approaching 0.70 or more in the same bivariate correlation analysis that will be used in the 
regression models presenting the results of the hypothesis tests in Table 5.17 and Table 5.18 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
Table 5.17 below has been prepared to present the hierarchical multiple regression 
results highlighting the relationships between each of the control variables and the dependent 
variable (DV)—organisation performance, and between the independent variables—the CEO 
professional development variables—and the organisation performance variable for 
Australia. The reported multiple regression results presented in Table 5.17 are based on the 
Australian sample after deleting three extreme cases identified using Casewise Diagnostics in 
SPSS.  
 In the regression analysis, model 1 includes the control variables only. The model 1 F 
statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) in Table 5.17 was not significant for Australia. In 
step 1 of model 1 for Australia, there were no significant correlations between the control 
variables and the DV average return on assets as shown in Table 5.17. After entry of the step 
2 variables the overall model in the ANOVA table was not significant for Australia; however, 
the F Change value for model 2 was marginally significant for Australia at p < 0.1 level as 
shown in Table 5.17. In step 1 of model 2, there were no significant correlations between the 
control variables and average return on assets for Australia in Table 5.17. Step 2 of model 2 
will next be explained in the context of the hypotheses.  
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Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Statistic Results for Australia 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Major industry (materials) 0.21 0.41 1              
2 Second major industry (mining and metals) 0.20 0.40 -0.26** 1             
3 Log of firm age 1.08 0.38 0.03 0.09 1            
4 Log of sales 2010 8.83 0.99 0.16* -0.37** 0.19** 1           
5 Board of director size 7.37 2.17 0.01 -0.15* 0.10 0.55** 1          
6 Insider CEO 0.65 0.48 0.07 -0.13* -0.29** 0.08 0.05 1         
7 CEO output functional background 0.42 0.50 0.21** 0.01 0.13* 0.07 0.08 -0.16* 1        
8 CEO international work experience 0.66 0.48 -0.04 0.10 0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.14* 0.04 1       
9 CEO MBA degree 0.19 0.39 0.06 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.13* 0.05 0.06 1      
10 CEO number of university degrees 1.37 0.81 0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.08 0.11 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.47** 1     
11 CEO tenure 5.80 5.59 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.14* -0.00 -0.17** -0.08 1    
12 CEO share ownership percentage 2.51 7.51 -0.07 -0.05 -0.13* -0.15* -0.17** 0.18** 0.04 0.03 -0.14* -0.17** 0.26** 1   
13 Non-executive director ratio 0.80 0.11 0.11 -0.17** 0.11 0.32** 0.22** -0.15* 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.06 -0.17** -0.28** 1  
14 Average ROA 2011-2012 3.64 11.52 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.23** -0.20** 1 
N = 200. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
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Table 5.17: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Professional Development Variables with Organisation Performance for Australia 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls   
Constant 3.94 (0.69)*** 3.96 (0.68)*** 
Materials 0.08 (1.77) -0.99 (1.80) 
Mining and Metals -2.84 (1.94) -2.79 (1.96) 
Log of Firm Age -0.03 (1.90) 0.06 (1.99) 
Log of Sales 2010 0.25 (0.94) 0.16 (0.94) 
Board of Directors Size -0.05 (0.39) -0.09 (0.38) 
Independent Variables   
Insider CEO   1.42 (1.55) 
CEO Output Background  4.15 (1.45)** 
CEO International Work  -1.64 (1.45) 
CEO MBA Degree  0.73 (2.01) 
CEO Number of Uni Degrees  -0.55 (0.99) 
   
R2 0.02 0.07 
F 0.64 1.34 
F Change 0.64 2.01+ 
Adjusted R2 -0.01 0.02 
df 5, 191 10, 186 
N = 197. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis one (H1) predicts that the selection of an insider CEO is associated with 
better organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics presented in Table 5.16, 
there was no significant correlation between an insider CEO and average return on assets for 
Australia. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 there was no correlation 
between an insider CEO and average return on assets as shown in Table 5.17. Both the 
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outcomes of the bivariate correlation statistics and multiple regression analysis do not support 
H1 in Australia. 
 Hypothesis two (H2) predicts that the selection of a CEO who has a functional 
background in an output-oriented field is positively associated with organisation 
performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics presented in Table 5.16, there was no 
significant correlation between a CEO with an output-oriented functional background and 
average return on assets for Australia. This outcome of the bivariate correlation statistic does 
not support H2 in Australia. However, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 for 
Australia there was a highly significant positive correlation between a CEO with an output-
oriented functional background and average return on assets as presented in Table 5.17 after 
removing the respective outliers recommended by SPSS. The outcome of the multiple 
regression analysis provides support for H2 in Australia.  
 Hypothesis three (H3) predicts that a CEO with international work experience is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics 
shown in Table 5.16, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with international 
work experience and average return on assets for Australia. Similarly, in the regression 
analysis in step 2 of model 2 for Australia there was no significant correlation between a 
CEO with international work experience and average return on assets as shown in Table 5.17. 
Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation statistics and multiple regression analysis do 
not support H3 in Australia. 
 Hypothesis four (H4) predicts that the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics 
presented in Table 5.16, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA 
degree and average return on assets for Australia. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 
2 of model 2 there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA degree and 
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average return on assets in Table 5.17. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and 
multiple regression analysis do not support H4 in Australia. 
 Hypothesis five (H5) predicts that there is a positive relationship between the number 
of university degrees that a CEO possesses and organisation performance. In the bivariate 
correlation statistics shown in Table 5.16, there was no significant correlation between the 
number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and average return on assets for Australia. 
Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 there was no significant correlation 
between the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and average return on assets 
in Table 5.17. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis 
do not support H5 in Australia. 
 In model 1 R2 explains 2 per cent of the variance in the DV and a further increment in 
model 2 of 5 per cent; this gives a total R2 in model 2 of 7 per cent. The highest variance 
inflation factor (VIF) value in model 1 and model 2 is 1.8. This value is far below 10 and 
complements the bivariate correlation results that there are no issues with regard to 
multicollinearity (Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
Table 5.18 in the following page presents the second set of hierarchical moderated 
multiple regression results for Australia highlighting the relationships between each of the 
control variables, the independent variables—the CEO work context variables, the 
moderating variable and the moderator term, and the dependent variable organisation 
performance. The reported moderated regression results presented in Table 5.18 were based 
on the Australian sample after deleting three extreme cases identified using Casewise 
Diagnostics in SPSS. It should be noted that the deleted extreme cases in the moderated 
regression analysis here are slightly different to the deleted outliers in the multiple regression 
analysis (Table 5.17). Consequently, there is a small variation between the final sample in 
Table 5.17 and the final sample in Table 5.18, resulting in a slight difference in the values in 
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the control models in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 but not in the significant and non-significant 
variables. 
Table 5.18: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Work Context Variables and Non-executive Director Ratio with Organisation 
Performance for Australia 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls    
Constant 3.96 (0.70)*** 3.92 (0.67)*** 3.60 (0.67)*** 
Materials 0.08 (1.80) 0.75 (1.73) 1.25 (1.72) 
Mining and Metals -0.60 (1.98) -0.29 (1.91) -0.18 (1.88) 
Log of Firm Age -0.09 (1.96) 0.86 (1.90) 0.56 (1.87) 
Log of Sales 2010 1.78 (0.93)+ 2.43 (0.91)** 2.47 (0.90)** 
Board of Directors Size -0.57 (0.40) -0.35 (0.38) -0.42 (0.38) 
Independent Variables 
CEO Tenure 
  
-0.05 (0.13) 
 
-0.04 (0.13) 
CEO Share Ownership  0.31 (0.10)** 0.28 (0.10)** 
Moderator Variable    
NED Ratio  -17.59 (6.98)* -15.80 (6.91)* 
Moderator Term    
CEO Tenure x NED Ratio   -3.31 (1.27)* 
    
R2 0.03 0.13 0.16 
F 1.01 3.38** 3.85*** 
F Change 1.01 7.16*** 6.79* 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.09 0.12 
df 5, 191 8, 188 9, 187 
N = 197. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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In the regression analysis, model 1 includes the control variables only. In this model, 
the F statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) in Table 5.18 was not significant for 
Australia. In Australia in the controls, there was a marginally significant positive correlation 
between the logarithm of sales for 2010 and the DV average return on assets as shown in 
Table 5.18. Model 2 adds the independent variables. Model 3 will be interpreted for each of 
the hypothesis tests when the presence of the moderation term is included (Edwards 2008). In 
the regression analysis, after entry of the step 3 variables the overall model in the ANOVA 
table was highly significant (p < 0.001) for Australia and the F Change value for model 3 was 
significant (p < 0.05) for Australia as shown in Table 5.18. In step 1 of model 3 the logarithm 
of sales for 2010 was positively significant for Australia in Table 5.18. Steps 2 and 3 of 
model 3 will now be explained in the context of the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis six, which posits that there is a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and organisation performance, was not tested for Australia. The reason for this is because 
across the final sample of 200 Australian publicly listed companies only six per cent 
practiced CEO duality and the other 94 per cent separated the role of CEO and chairperson. 
Rummel (1970) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommended removing the dichotomous 
variable from the analysis in these circumstances; the requirement for a dichotomous variable 
is that there be a minimum 90 per cent and 10 per cent split between groups, or more. The 
first reason relates to the truncated correlation coefficients between the dichotomous 
variables and other variables (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). The second reason is because the 
'scores for the cases in the small category are more influential than those in the category with 
numerous cases' (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007, p. 73).  
 Hypothesis seven (H7) predicts that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlations presented in Table 5.16, 
there was no significant correlation between CEO tenure and average return on assets for 
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Australia. Similarly, in the moderated multiple regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there 
was no significant correlation between CEO tenure and average on assets for Australia in 
Table 5.18. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation statistics and moderated multiple 
regression analysis do not support H7 in Australia.   
 Hypothesis eight (H8) predicts that higher CEO share ownership percentage is 
positively correlated to organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics 
presented in Table 5.16, there was a highly significant positive correlation between CEO 
share ownership percentage and average return on assets for Australia. Similarly, in the 
moderated multiple regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 CEO share ownership percentage 
was highly significant with a positive correlation in Table 5.18. Both the outcomes of the 
bivariate correlation and moderated multiple regression analysis support H8 in Australia. 
 Hypothesis nine (H9) predicts that there is a negative association between the non-
executive director ratio and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics 
presented in Table 5.16, there was a highly significant negative correlation between the non-
executive director ratio and average return on assets for Australia. Similarly, in the moderated 
multiple regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was a significant negative correlation 
between the non-executive director ratio and average return on assets for Australia as shown 
in Table 5.18. The outcomes of both the bivariate correlations and moderated multiple 
regression analysis support H9 in Australia. 
 Hypothesis 10 (H10) posits that the influence of CEO tenure on organisation 
performance is moderated by the non-executive director ratio, such that high CEO tenure and 
a low non-executive director ratio jointly predict better organisation performance. In the 
moderated multiple regression analysis in step 3 of model 3, the moderator term between 
CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio was significant in a negative relationship 
with average return on assets in Australia in Table 5.18. The outcome of the moderated 
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multiple regression analysis provides support for H10 in Australia; the moderation plot will be 
presented and interpreted in section 5.4 below. 
In Table 5.18 in model 1 R2 explains 3 per cent of the variance in the DV, there is 
then an increment in model 2 of 10 per cent in R2, and a further increment in model 3 of 3 per 
cent; this gives a total R2 in model 3 of 16 per cent. The highest VIF value in model 1, model 
2 and model 3 is 1.8. This value is well below 10 and complements the bivariate correlation 
results that there are no issues with regard to multicollinearity (Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; 
Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
5.3.2 The United States 
 Table 5.19 in the following page presents the bivariate correlation results for the 
United States companies. The bivariate correlation results show that there are no 
multicollinearity issues for the multiple regression analysis, as there are no two variables with 
a correlation approaching 0.70 in the same bivariate correlation analysis (Tabachnick & 
Fidell 2007).   
 Table 5.20 below has been prepared to present the hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis results highlighting the relationships between each of the control variables, the CEO 
professional development independent variables and the dependent variable organisation 
performance for the United States. The reported multiple regression results presented in 
Table 5.20 were based on the United States sample after deleting three extreme cases 
identified using Casewise Diagnostics in SPSS. 
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Table 5.19: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Statistic Results for the United States 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Major industry (consumer) 0.25 0.43 1               
2 Second major industry (IT/telecom) 0.16 0.36 -0.25** 1              
3 Log of firm age 1.35 0.46 -0.07 -0.03 1             
4 Log of sales 2010 10.29 0.47 0.14* -0.09 0.31** 1            
5 Board of directors size 11.43 2.59 -0.06 -0.20** 0.18** 0.21** 1           
6 Insider CEO  0.86 0.35 0.00 -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 1          
7 CEO output functional background 0.43 0.50 -0.02 0.27** -0.11 -0.12* -0.12* -0.17** 1         
8 CEO international work experience 0.61 0.49 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.10 1        
9 CEO MBA degree 0.39 0.49 -0.08 -0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.14* 0.06 -0.19** -0.01 1       
10 CEO number of university degrees 1.76 0.79 -0.12* -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.19** -0.12* 0.04 -0.01 0.48** 1      
11 CEO duality 0.68 0.47 0.03 -0.20** 0.09 0.22** 0.06 -0.00 -0.04 -0.07 0.12* 0.07 1     
12 CEO tenure 6.81 5.91 -0.04 0.11 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.17** -0.13* -0.03 -0.14* 0.22** 1    
13 CEO share ownership percentage 1.40 4.42 0.10 0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13* 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.13* -0.31** 0.06 0.46** 1   
14 Non-executive director ratio 0.88 0.06 -0.07 -0.16* 0.15* 0.16* 0.24** -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.32** -0.16* -0.30** 1  
15 Average ROA 2011-2012 7.79 6.14 0.25** 0.11 -0.09 -0.23** -0.29** 0.03 0.19** 0.11 -0.11 -0.13* -0.11 0.00 0.04 -0.19** 1 
N = 200. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
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Table 5.20: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Professional Development Variables with Organisation Performance for the United 
States 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls   
Constant 7.65 (0.36)*** 7.63 (0.34)*** 
Consumer 3.39 (0.89)*** 2.90 (0.86)** 
IT and Telecom 2.22 (1.04)* 1.59 (1.03) 
Log of Firm Age 0.62 (0.85) 0.37 (0.82) 
Log of Sales 2010 -2.58 (0.83)** -2.63 (0.80)** 
Board of Director Size -0.38 (0.15)* -0.34 (0.14)* 
Independent Variables   
Insider CEO   2.44 (1.04)* 
CEO Output Background  1.62 (0.75)* 
CEO International Work  2.29 (0.72)** 
CEO MBA Degree  -0.95 (0.84) 
CEO Number of Uni Degrees  -0.38 (0.51) 
   
R2 0.16 0.26 
F 7.47*** 6.52*** 
F Change 7.47*** 4.82*** 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.22 
df 5, 191 10, 186 
N = 197. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
In the regression analysis, the model 1 F statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) in 
the Model Summary Table was highly significant for the United States as shown in Table 
5.20. In step 1 of model 1 for the United States, Table 5.20 shows that in the controls there 
was a highly significant positive correlation between the major industry (i.e., the consumer 
industry) and average return on assets. The second major industry (i.e., the IT and telecom 
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industry) was significant (p < 0.05) with a positive correlation. The logarithm of sales for 
2010 was negatively significant. Board of director size was significant with a negative 
correlation. After entry of the step 2 variables the overall model in the ANOVA table was 
highly significant for the United States and the F Change value for model 2 was highly 
significant. Table 5.20 shows that in step 1 of model 2 for the United States, the major 
industry in the United States (i.e., the consumer industry) was positively significant. The 
logarithm of sales for 2010 was negatively significant. Board of director size was negatively 
significant. Step 2 of model 2 will now be explained in the context of the hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis one (H1) predicts that the selection of an insider CEO is associated with 
better organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistics presented in Table 5.19, 
there was no significant correlation between an insider CEO and average return on assets for 
the United States. This outcome of the bivariate correlation does not support H1 in the United 
States. However, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 for the United States there 
was a significant positive correlation between an insider CEO and average return on assets as 
displayed in Table 5.20 after removing the respective outliers recommended by SPSS. The 
outcome of the multiple regression analysis provides support for H1 in the United States. 
 Hypothesis two (H2) predicts that the selection of a CEO who has a functional 
background in an output-oriented field is positively associated with organisation 
performance. In the bivariate correlation statistic presented in Table 5.19, there was a highly 
significant positive correlation between a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background and average return on assets for the United States. Similarly, in the regression 
analysis in step 2 of model 2 for the United States, there was a significant positive correlation 
between a CEO with an output-oriented functional background and average return on assets 
in Table 5.20. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis 
provide support for H2 in the United States.  
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 Hypothesis three (H3) predicts that a CEO with international work experience is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistic 
presented in Table 5.19, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with 
international work experience and average return on assets for the United States. This 
outcome of the bivariate correlation does not support H3 in the United States. However, in the 
regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 there was a significant positive correlation between a 
CEO with international work experience and average return on assets in Table 5.20 after 
removing the respective outliers recommended by SPSS. The outcome of the regression 
analysis supports H3 in the United States.  
 Hypothesis four (H4) predicts that the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistic 
presented in Table 5.19, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA 
degree and average return on assets for the United States. Similarly, in the regression analysis 
in step 2 of model 2 there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA degree 
and average return on assets in Table 5.20. Both the outcome of the bivariate correlation and 
multiple regression analysis do not support H4 in the United States. 
 Hypothesis five (H5) predicts that there is a positive relationship between the number 
of university degrees that a CEO possesses and organisation performance. In the bivariate 
correlation statistic presented in Table 5.19, there was a significant negative correlation 
between the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and average return on assets 
for the United States. This outcome of the bivariate correlation does not support H5 in the 
United States. In the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 for the United States there was 
no significant correlation between the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and 
average return on assets in Table 5.20. The outcome of the regression analysis does not 
support H5 in the United States. 
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In Table 5.20 in model 1 R2 explains 16 per cent of the variance in the DV; after an 
increment in model 2 of 10 per cent for the United States the overall R2 in model 2 is 26 per 
cent. The highest VIF value in model 1 and model 2 is 1.4. This value is far below 10 and 
complements the bivariate correlation results that indicate there are no issues with regard to 
multicollinearity with use of these variables in multiple regression (Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; 
Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
Table 5.21 in the next page presents the hierarchical moderated multiple regression 
analysis results highlighting the relationships between each of the control variables, the CEO 
work context independent variables, the moderating variable and the moderator term, with the 
dependent variable organisation performance for the United States. The reported moderated 
regression results presented in Table 5.21 were based on the United States sample after 
deleting two extreme cases identified using Casewise Diagnostics in SPSS.  
In the regression analysis, the model 1 F statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) in 
Table 5.21 was highly significant (p < 0.001) for the United States. In the United States in the 
controls only in model 1, there was a highly significant positive correlation between the 
major industry (i.e., the consumer industry) and average return on assets. The second major 
industry in the United States (i.e., the IT and telecom industry) was significant with a positive 
correlation. The logarithm of sales for 2010 was negatively significant. Board of director size 
was significant with a negative correlation. Model 2 adds the independent variables. The 
model 3 variables will be interpreted for the hypothesis tests (Edwards 2008).  
In the regression analysis after entry of the step 3 variables, the overall model in the 
ANOVA table was highly significant for the United States, but the F Change value for model 
3 was not significant. In step 1 of model 3 for the United States, the major industry (i.e., the 
consumer industry) was highly significant with a positive correlation as shown in Table 5.21.  
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Table 5.21: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Work Context Variables and Non-executive Director Ratio with Organisation 
Performance for the United States 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls    
Constant 7.57 (0.37)*** 7.57 (0.37)*** 7.55 (0.37)*** 
Consumer 3.55 (0.90)*** 3.52 (0.92)*** 3.55 (0.92)*** 
IT and Telecom 2.37 (1.06)* 2.05 (1.10)+ 2.07 (1.10)+ 
Log of Firm Age 1.05 (0.86) 1.15 (0.86) 1.15 (0.86) 
Log of Sales 2010 -2.59 (0.85)** -2.44 (0.87)** -2.50 (0.89)** 
Board of Directors Size -0.38 (0.15)* -0.36 (0.15)* -0.36 (0.15)* 
Independent Variables 
CEO Duality 
 
 
 
-0.60 (0.89) 
 
-0.58 (0.89) 
CEO Tenure  0.04 (0.07) 0.03 (0.08) 
CEO Share Ownership  -0.10 (0.10) -0.11 (0.10) 
Moderator Variable    
NED Ratio  -9.94 (7.07) -9.55 (7.13) 
Moderator Term    
CEO Tenure x NED Ratio   -0.50 (1.03) 
    
R2 0.16 0.18 0.18 
F 7.41*** 4.57*** 4.12*** 
F Change 7.41*** 1.03 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 
df 5, 192 9, 188 10, 187 
N = 198. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
The second major industry (i.e., the IT and telecommunication industry) was marginally 
significant with a positive correlation. The logarithm of sales for 2010 was negatively 
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significant. Board of director size was negatively significant. Steps 2 and 3 of model 3 will 
now be explained in the context of the hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis six (H6) predicts that there is a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in Table 5.19, there was 
no significant correlation between CEO duality and average return on assets for the United 
States. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was no significant 
correlation between CEO duality and average return on assets as shown in Table 5.21. Both 
the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and moderated multiple regression analysis do not 
support H6 in the United States. 
 Hypothesis seven (H7) predicts that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in Table 5.19, 
there was no significant correlation between CEO tenure and average return on assets for the 
United States. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was no 
significant correlation between CEO tenure and average return on assets as shown in Table 
5.21. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and moderated multiple regression 
analysis do not provide support for H7 in the United States. 
 Hypothesis eight (H8) predicts that higher CEO share ownership percentage is 
positively correlated to organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in 
Table 5.19, there was no significant correlation between CEO share ownership percentage 
and average return on assets for the United States. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 
2 of model 3 there was no significant correlation between CEO share ownership percentage 
and average return on assets in Table 5.21. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and 
moderated multiple regression analysis do not provide support for H8 in the United States. 
 Hypothesis nine (H9) predicts that there is a negative association between the non-
executive director ratio and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented 
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in Table 5.19, there was a highly significant negative correlation between the non-executive 
director ratio and average return on assets for the United States. This outcome of the bivariate 
correlation provides support for H9 in the United States. However, in the regression analysis 
in step 2 of model 3 there was no significant relationship between the non-executive director 
ratio and average return on assets as shown in Table 5.21. The outcome of the moderated 
multiple regression analysis does not provide support for H9 in the United States. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10) posits that the influence of CEO tenure on organisation 
performance is moderated by the non-executive director ratio, such that high CEO tenure and 
a low non-executive director ratio jointly predict better organisation performance. In the 
regression analysis in step 3 of model 3, the moderator term between CEO tenure and the 
non-executive director ratio was not significant in the United States as shown in Table 5.21. 
The outcome of the moderated multiple regression analysis does not support H10 in the 
United States. 
In Table 5.21 the model 1 R2 explains 16 per cent of the variance in the DV; there is 
an increment in model 2 of 2 per cent taking R2 to 18 per cent and no further increment in 
model 3 for the United States. The highest VIF value in model 1, model 2 and model 3 is 1.6. 
This value is well below 10 and complements the bivariate correlation results indicating that 
there are no issues with regard to multicollinearity in the data for use in multiple regression 
(Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
5.3.3 Hong Kong 
 Table 5.22 in the following page presents the bivariate correlation results for the Hong 
Kong companies. The bivariate correlation results show that there are no multicollinearity 
issues, as there are no two variables with a correlation approaching 0.70 or more in the same 
bivariate correlation analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). The variables are suitable for 
multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
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Table 5.22: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlation Statistic Results for Hong Kong 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Major industry (consumer) 0.33 0.47 1               
2 Second major industry (financial) 0.32 0.47 -0.48** 1              
3 Log of firm age 0.88 0.53 -0.09 0.11 1             
4 Log of sales 2010 9.43 0.75 -0.14* 0.07 -0.10 1            
5 Board size 11.25 3.31 -0.18** 0.24** 0.13* 0.33** 1           
6 Insider CEO 0.86 0.35 0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.00 1          
7 CEO output functional background 0.50 0.50 0.10 -0.32** -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.10 1         
8 CEO international work experience 0.37 0.48 0.14* 0.10 0.27** -0.11 0.03 -0.10 -0.11 1        
9 CEO MBA degree 0.39 0.49 -0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.00 -0.05 1       
10 CEO number of university degrees 1.60 0.88 -0.20** 0.03 0.21** 0.19** 0.21** -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.50** 1      
11 CEO duality 0.25 0.43 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15* 0.14* 0.13* -0.07 -0.21** -0.15* 1     
12 CEO tenure 5.91 6.15 -0.04 0.14* 0.35** -0.05 0.16* 0.10 0.05 0.10 -0.12* 0.02 0.25** 1    
13 CEO share ownership percentage 11.35 23.22 0.12* -0.01 -0.16* -0.18** -0.19** 0.16* 0.17** -0.05 -0.11 -0.21** 0.51** 0.17** 1   
14 Non-executive director ratio 0.58 0.18 -0.07 0.12 -0.05 0.17** 0.10 -0.06 -0.18** 0.20** -0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 1  
15 Average ROA 2011-2012 5.86 6.27 0.22** -0.16* -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 0.25** 0.19** 0.05 -0.06 -0.15* 0.10 0.05 0.19** -0.20** 1 
N = 200. N for Average ROA 2011-2012 = 199. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (one-tailed). 
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 Table 5.23 below has been prepared to present the hierarchical multiple regression 
results highlighting the relationships between each of the control variables and the CEO 
professional development independent variables with the dependent variable organisation 
performance for Hong Kong. 
Table 5.23: Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Professional Development Variables with Organisation Performance for Hong Kong 
 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls   
Constant 5.94 (0.40)*** 5.94 (0.38)*** 
Consumer 1.31 (0.97) 0.90 (0.97) 
Financial -1.44 (0.98) -0.89 (1.01) 
Log of Firm Age 0.29 (0.77) 0.21 (0.78) 
Log of Sales 2010 -1.74 (0.62)** -1.85 (0.62)** 
Board of Directors Size -0.05 (0.13) -0.05 (0.13) 
Independent Variables   
Insider CEO   3.07 (1.10)** 
CEO Output Background  2.24 (0.81)** 
CEO International Work  1.38 (0.85) 
CEO MBA Degree  -0.19 (0.93) 
CEO Number of Uni Degrees  -0.11 (0.55) 
   
R2 0.10 0.18 
F 4.12** 4.15*** 
F Change 4.12** 3.86** 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.14 
df 5, 191 10, 186 
N = 197. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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The reported multiple regression results presented in Table 5.23 are based on the 
Hong Kong sample after deleting two extreme cases identified using Casewise Diagnostics in 
SPSS and excluding one case with a missing value. In the regression analysis, the model 1 F 
statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) was highly significant for Hong Kong as shown in 
Table 5.23. In step 1 of model 1 for Hong Kong, Table 5.23 shows that in the controls only 
the logarithm of sales for 2010 was negatively significant. After entry of the step 2 variables 
the overall model in the ANOVA table was highly significant for Hong Kong and the F 
Change value for model 2 was highly significant as shown in Table 5.23. In step 1 of model 2 
for Hong Kong, the logarithm of sales for 2010 was negatively significant as displayed in 
Table 5.23. Step 2 of model 2 will now be explained in the context of the hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis one (H1) predicts that the selection of an insider CEO is associated with 
better organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in Table 5.22, there 
was a highly significant positive correlation between an insider CEO and average return on 
assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 there was a 
highly significant positive correlation between an insider CEO and average return on assets 
as displayed in Table 5.23. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and multiple 
regression analysis provide support for H1 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis two (H2) predicts that the selection of a CEO who has a functional 
background in an output-oriented field is positively associated with organisation 
performance. In the bivariate correlation statistic presented in Table 5.22, there was a highly 
significant positive correlation between a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background and average return on assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis 
in step 2 of model 2, there was a highly significant positive correlation between a CEO with 
an output-oriented functional background and average return on assets as displayed in Table 
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5.23. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis provide 
support for H2 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis three (H3) predicts that a CEO with international work experience is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation shown in 
Table 5.22, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with international work 
experience and average return on assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis 
in step 2 of model 2 there was no significant correlation between a CEO with international 
work experience and average return on assets as shown in Table 5.23. It should be noted here 
that the p value is 0.11 indicating that the correlation is close to being marginally significant 
at the 10 per cent level in a positive direction. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation 
and multiple regression analysis do not support H3 in Hong Kong.  
 Hypothesis four (H4) predicts that the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree is 
positively associated with organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in 
Table 5.22, there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA degree and 
average return on assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of 
model 2 there was no significant correlation between a CEO with an MBA degree and 
average return on assets in Table 5.23. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and 
multiple regression analysis do not support H4 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis five (H5) predicts that there is a positive relationship between the number 
of university degrees that a CEO possesses and organisation performance. In the bivariate 
correlation statistic presented in Table 5.22, there was a significant correlation between the 
number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and average return on assets for Hong 
Kong in a negative direction. This outcome of the bivariate correlation statistic does not 
support H5 in Hong Kong. In the regression analysis in step 2 of model 2 there was no 
significant correlation between the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and 
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average return on assets in Table 5.23. The outcome of the multiple regression analysis does 
not support H5 in Hong Kong. 
In model 1 R2 explains 10 per cent of the variance in the DV; there is an increment in 
the model 2 R2 of 8 per cent for Hong Kong giving a total R2 of 18 per cent. The highest VIF 
value in model 1 and model 2 is 1.6. This value is far below 10 and complements the 
bivariate correlation results that there are no issues with regard to multicollinearity (Myers 
1990; Ryan 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
Table 5.24 in the following page presents the hierarchical moderated multiple 
regression results highlighting the relationships between each of the control variables, the 
CEO work context independent variables, the moderating variable and the moderator term, 
and the dependent variable organisation performance for Hong Kong. 
The reported moderated regression results presented in Table 5.24 are based on the 
Hong Kong sample after deleting one extreme case identified using Casewise Diagnostics in 
SPSS and excluding one case with a missing value. In the regression analysis, the model 1 F 
statistic and F Change statistic (F Change) was marginally significant (p < 0.1) for Hong 
Kong as shown in Table 5.24. In Hong Kong in the controls only the major industry (i.e., the 
consumer industry) was marginally significant with a positive correlation in Table 5.24. After 
entry of the step 2 variables the overall model in the ANOVA table was highly significant for 
Hong Kong and the F Change value for model 2 was highly significant as shown in Table 
5.24. Model 2 adds the independent variables. Model 3 will be interpreted for the hypothesis 
tests with the moderator term present (Edwards 2008). In the regression analysis after entry 
of the step 3 variables the overall model in the ANOVA table was highly significant for Hong 
Kong, but the F Change value for model 3 was not significant as presented in Table 5.24. In 
step 1 of model 3 for Hong Kong, there were no significant correlations between the control 
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variables and average return on assets in Table 5.24; steps 2 and 3 of this model will now be 
explained in the context of the hypotheses. 
Table 5.24: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Associations of CEO 
Work Context Variables and Non-executive Director Ratio with Organisation 
Performance for Hong Kong 
Variables Model 1 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Model 3 
Organisation 
Performance 
B (s.e.) 
Controls    
Constant 5.75 (0.42)*** 5.74 (0.41)*** 5.73 (0.41)*** 
Consumer 1.96 (1.03)+ 1.65 (1.01) 1.65 (1.01) 
Financial -0.91 (1.05) -0.93 (1.03) -0.93 (1.03) 
Log of Firm Age 0.06 (0.82) 0.06 (0.87) 0.06 (0.87) 
Log of Sales 2010 -0.66 (0.61) -0.22 (0.61) -0.22 (0.61) 
Board of Directors Size -0.06 (0.14) -0.03 (0.14) -0.03 (0.14) 
Independent Variables 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.85 (1.14) 
 
-0.85 (1.15) 
CEO Tenure  0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 
CEO Share Ownership  0.05 (0.02)* 0.05 (0.02)* 
Moderator Variable    
NED Ratio  -6.35 (2.41)** -6.35 (2.42)** 
Moderator Term    
CEO Tenure x NED Ratio   -0.02 (0.37) 
    
R2 0.06 0.12 0.12 
F 2.25+ 2.93** 2.62** 
F Change 2.25+ 3.62** 0.00 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.08 0.08 
df 5, 192 9, 188 10, 187 
N = 198. + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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 Hypothesis six (H6) predicts that there is a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in Table 5.22, there was 
no significant correlation between CEO duality and average return on assets for Hong Kong. 
Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was no significant correlation 
between CEO duality and average return on assets for Hong Kong in Table 5.24. Both the 
outcomes of the bivariate correlation and moderated multiple regression analysis do not 
support H6 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis seven (H7) predicts that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation statistic presented in Table 
5.22, there was no significant correlation between CEO tenure and average return on assets 
for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was no 
significant correlation between CEO tenure and average return on assets for Hong Kong in 
Table 5.24. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and moderated multiple regression 
analysis do not provide support for H7 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis eight (H8) predicts that higher CEO share ownership percentage is 
positively correlated to organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented in 
Table 5.22, there was a highly significant positive correlation between CEO share ownership 
percentage and average return on assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the regression analysis 
in step 2 of model 3 CEO share ownership percentage was significant with a positive 
correlation in Table 5.24. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and moderated 
multiple regression analysis provide support for H8 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis nine (H9) predicts that there is a negative association between the non-
executive director ratio and organisation performance. In the bivariate correlation presented 
in Table 5.22, there was a highly significant negative correlation between the non-executive 
director ratio and average return on assets for Hong Kong. Similarly, in the moderated 
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regression analysis in step 2 of model 3 there was a significant negative correlation between 
the non-executive director ratio and average return on assets for Hong Kong as shown in 
Table 5.24. Both the outcomes of the bivariate correlation and the moderated multiple 
regression analysis support H9 in Hong Kong. 
 Hypothesis 10 (H10) posits that the influence of CEO tenure on organisation 
performance is moderated by the non-executive director ratio, such that high CEO tenure and 
a low non-executive director ratio jointly predict better organisation performance. In the 
moderated multiple regression analysis in step 3 of model 3 the moderator term between CEO 
tenure and the non-executive director ratio was not significant in Hong Kong in Table 5.24. 
The outcome of the moderated multiple regression analysis does not support H10 in Hong 
Kong. 
 In model 1 R2 explains 6 per cent of the variance in the DV; there is an increment in 
model 2 of 6 per cent and no increment in model 3 for Hong Kong giving an overall R2 of 12 
per cent. The highest VIF value in model 1, model 2 and model 3 is 1.5. This value is far 
below 10 and complements the bivariate correlation results that there are no issues in relation 
to multicollinearity (Myers 1990; Ryan 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).  
5.4 Moderated Regression Plot 
The interaction term between CEO tenure and the non-executive director (NED) ratio 
tested in hypothesis 10 proved to be statistically significant in predicting organisation 
performance for Australia. It is useful to plot interaction terms which are statistically 
significant to provide a clearer interpretation of the results (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). For 
this reason, the interaction term between CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio was 
plotted for the dependent variable average return on assets. The moderation plot is presented 
in Figure 5.1 in the following page.  
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Figure 5.1: The Interaction Term Plot between CEO Tenure and the Non-executive 
Director Ratio for the Dependent Variable Average Return On Assets for Australia 
 
The simple regression slope was plotted for one standard deviation above the mean of 
the NED ratio (in red colour) and one standard deviation below the mean of the NED ratio (in 
green colour). The plot reveals at high levels of CEO tenure and a low non-executive director 
ratio, average return on assets evidences its highest value. Average return on assets is lowest 
where CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio is high. 
5.5 Robustness of the Analysis 
Section 4.7.3 in the previous chapter explained several steps that have been taken in 
the research design of this study to manage the risk of endogeneity bias. There is a wide 
range of approaches to addressing the issue of endogeneity in corporate governance research 
from randomised controlled experiments to logical argument, with a variety of approaches 
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and techniques in between (Aguinis & Edwards 2014). In the first instance in the analysis this 
study makes use of a number of control variables that give insight into the influence of 
industry, organisation size, maturity of the business and management, and board of director 
expertise on the dependent variable. These control variables help to minimise the chance of 
some other independent variable not included in this study predicting the dependent variable, 
though we do not exclude the chance that there is another variable or variables not included 
in this study that may influence the dependent variable. We have demonstrated logical 
arguments in support of the direction of causality in the theory development for the 
hypotheses and there is a history of studies taking a similar theoretical position in relation to 
causality. 
With no particular variable in the study suspected of being endogenous a series of 
tests were performed on multiple explanatory variables in the Australian, United States and 
Hong Kong data, separately. The residual of each of the independent variables in each of 
these data sets was obtained by regressing a particular variable on all other independent and 
presumed at this point exogenous variables used in the study (Wooldridge 2009). A residual 
was obtained for each independent variable. Then, using an F-test, a test for joint significance 
was made in the relevant multiple regression model (Wooldridge 2009). No concerns 
emerged in the two models for each of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong 
respectively, leading to the conclusion that there are no concerns with endogeneity bias in 
this study (Wooldridge 2009). This creates a strong case for use of the more efficient multiple 
regression analysis employed in this study here, in contrast with the less efficient two stage 
least squares alternative that can generate quite large standard errors (Wooldridge 2009).  
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5.6 Summary and Comparison of Results between Australia, the United 
States and Hong Kong 
 Table 5.25 below presents a table of summary highlighting the similarities and 
differences in results for the hypothesis tests. The significant results are indicated by the 
green boxes. The table highlights an area of similarity in prediction by the cross-sectional 
CEO output-oriented functional background of the dependent variable organisation 
performance across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong.  
Table 5.25 also highlights other areas of similarity in prediction by certain CEO 
professional development and CEO work context variables of the dependent variable 
organisation performance between any two of these countries as follows. Between Australia 
and Hong Kong, there is a significant relationship between CEO share ownership percentage 
and organisation performance in a positive direction. Between Australia and Hong Kong, 
there is a significant relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation 
performance in a negative direction. Between the United States and Hong Kong, there is a 
significant relationship between an insider CEO and organisation performance in a positive 
direction. 
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Table 5.25: Comparison between the Expected Results, Bivariate Correlation Statistic Results, Multiple Regression Analysis Results and Moderated Regression Analysis Results across Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong 
  Australia The United States Hong Kong 
Hypothesis (H) Expected 
Results Bivariate 
Correlation 
Results 
Multiple / 
Moderated 
Regression 
Results 
Bivariate 
Correlation 
Results 
Multiple / 
Moderated 
Regression 
Results 
Bivariate 
Correlation 
Results 
Multiple / 
Moderated 
Regression 
Results 
H1: Insider CEO + + + + + + + 
H2: CEO output-oriented functional background + + + + + + + 
H3: CEO with international work experience + - - + + + + 
H4: CEO with an MBA degree + + + - - - - 
H5: CEO number of university degrees + - - - - - - 
H6: CEO and chairperson duality - N/A N/A - - + - 
H7: CEO tenure + + - + + + + 
H8: CEO share ownership percentage + + + + - + + 
H9: Non-executive director ratio - - - - - - - 
H10: CEO tenure x non-executive director ratio - N/A - N/A - N/A - 
 
Notes: The green boxes indicate significant results with a significant correlation at p <  0.05 or better. Hypothesis six for Australia was not tested and is not applicable (N/A) because across the final sample of 200 ASX companies only six per cent combined 
the CEO and chairperson position. The moderator term between CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio was included only in the moderated regression analysis for testing hypothesis 10. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented the results of the study. The ANOVA results highlight 
areas of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO output functional background and CEO tenure 
data respectively across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. However, the ANOVA 
results also highlight a continuing moment of divergence in the cross-sectional CEO duality 
data across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong, and in the cross-sectional CEO share 
ownership percentage data between Hong Kong and the Anglo-American countries studied 
here. Interestingly, only six per cent of the Australian companies practised CEO and 
chairperson duality; however, 68 per cent and 25 per cent of the United States and the Hong 
Kong companies respectively still practised duality. The Australian CEOs, United States 
CEOs and Hong Kong CEOs on average possessed 2.5, 1.4 and 11.4 per cent of company 
shares respectively.  
 The results of a one-way bivariate correlation statistic have been presented for 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong in this chapter. Significant multiple regression 
results after removing the respective outliers recommended by SPSS are as follows. Across 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong, a CEO who has a dominant functional 
background in an output-oriented field has a positive effect on firm performance. Both in 
Australia and Hong Kong, CEO share ownership percentage has a positive effect on firm 
performance, while the non-executive director ratio has a negative effect on organisation 
performance. Both in the United States and Hong Kong, an insider CEO has a positive 
influence on organisation performance. In the United States, a CEO with international work 
experience has a positive effect on organisation performance. The moderated regression 
results and the moderation plot indicate that long CEO tenure and a low non-executive 
director ratio are jointly associated with better ROA for Australia. The next chapter will 
discuss the results and the theoretical implications of the research findings.   
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
  The previous chapter presented the results of the study. An overarching finding from 
the results chapter is evidence of continuing divergence in terms of the CEO duality issue 
across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The findings also highlight an area of 
convergence in prediction by the CEO output-oriented functional background variable of the 
dependent variable, organisation performance, across the three countries. This chapter will set 
out the research findings and the discussions that are directed to answering the five research 
questions.  
 We have seen in the introduction in Chapter 1 that contributions of theory come from 
testing the validated theories with the observed phenomena; contributions to theory come 
from improving the existing theories through the observed phenomena (Whetten 2009). The 
theoretical contributions and implications of the research findings will be discussed in this 
chapter in consideration of the Whetten (2009) remarks. This chapter will discuss any useful 
insights from investigating the data for the control variables, the moderating variable, the 
dependent variable and the bivariate correlation statistic results across these three countries. 
6.2 Research Question One  
 The first research question asks whether there is a theoretical basis for the argument 
that there is a trend to convergence of Anglo-American and Asian corporate governance 
practices—in large stock exchange listed companies—in relation to CEO professional 
development and the CEO work context that has an effect on organisation performance. 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong have been selected to represent the Anglo, 
American and Asian corporate governance models, respectively, in this study. 
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 An extensive review of the corporate governance literature has been conducted and 
presented in the literature review in Chapter 2. It has been shown that convergence theory 
provides a fundamental theoretical basis for the argument that there is a trend of convergence 
of corporate governance practices toward the Anglo-American model that maximises 
shareholder value (Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009; Rasheed & 
Yoshikawa 2012). Convergence theory should have implications for the differences in CEO 
practices between countries. If convergence occurs, then there will be evidence of 
similarity—first in the cross-sectional CEO professional development and work context data, 
and second in the relationship between the professional development and work context of the 
CEO and organisation performance in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong.  
 To gain a better understanding of such a convergence trend, this study has purposely 
built three corporate governance databases—one for each country—to enable testing of a 
series of convergence theory hypotheses. This is to establish a benchmark for understanding 
similarities and differences, and to achieve the second research objective. In doing so, this 
cross-country comparative research will provide a contribution of convergence theory by 
critically testing the theory with the observed CEO professional development data, the CEO 
work context data, and the analysis of the effect of the professional development and work 
context of the CEO within and between the three countries (Whetten 2009). This research 
provides a contribution to convergence theory by examining the observed phenomena and 
linking them back again to critically assess and improve convergence theory (Whetten 2009). 
6.3 Research Question Two 
 This section will address the second research question by discussing the ANOVA 
results to identify and benchmark areas of similarity in cross-sectional CEO professional 
development and CEO work context data between large stock exchange listed companies in 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong.   
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6.3.1 CEO Professional Development 
 The strongest area of convergence in the cross-sectional CEO professional 
development data between the three countries was evidenced in terms of CEO functional 
background. There is empirical evidence from the big stock exchange listed companies in all 
three countries that indicates an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO output-oriented 
functional background data. This finding indicates that there is a similar percentage of CEOs 
with an output-dominated functional background in the largest 200 stock exchange 
companies by market capitalisation from all three countries. This study found an area of 
similarity in the cross-sectional insider CEO data between the United States and Hong Kong. 
This implies that the leading United States and Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies 
were more inclined to select the CEO, in succession, from inside the company than were 
those in Australia. Further, there is an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO 
international work experience data between the large Australian and United States stock 
exchange listed companies. This implies that the international work assignment has become a 
common and integral part of managerial development in large United States and Australian 
stock exchange listed companies. 
 This study found an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO MBA education data 
between the United States and Hong Kong. The leading United States and Hong Kong stock 
exchange listed companies were more inclined to select a CEO with an MBA than were those 
in Australia. This finding supports the research findings in the literature that an MBA 
education influences the choice of CEO in the United States (Baruch 2009) and Hong Kong, 
notwithstanding the limited literature available. There is an area of similarity in the cross-
sectional data between the United States and Hong Kong in terms of the number of university 
degrees held by a CEO. This finding indicates that, in general, the United States and Hong 
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Kong stock exchange listed companies have a slight preference for selecting a CEO with a 
higher educational level than the Australian companies have.  
6.3.2 CEO Work Context 
The strongest trend of divergence in the cross-sectional CEO work context data 
between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong was evidenced in terms of CEO duality. 
The findings with regard to a significant area of difference in the cross-sectional CEO duality 
data between Australia and the United States implies that there is still variation in certain 
practices of corporate governance regarding CEO duality within the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. The area of difference in the CEO duality data was also 
evidenced between Australia and Hong Kong, and between the United States and Hong 
Kong. Across the final sample of 200 stock exchange listed companies for each country, only 
six per cent of the large Australian stock exchange listed companies practised CEO duality in 
comparison with 68 per cent and 25 per cent of the United States and Hong Kong companies, 
respectively. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was introduced in 2002 has the potential to 
essentially change the governance of the board of directors in the United States (Krause, 
Semadeni & Cannella 2014). The change might affect the practice of CEO duality, however 
the research here found that a large proportion of the leading United States stock exchange 
listed companies were still practising CEO duality in 2010. Consequently, the process of 
convergence in the CEO duality practice from Australia to the United States may take longer; 
further studies are needed to explore the changing trend of United States CEO duality 
practice over time. It is likely that the full convergence of this may not take place after all, as 
the need to combine the CEO and chairperson positions may vary between United States 
companies.  
There is an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO tenure data between large 
stock exchange listed companies in the three countries. This study found that, on average, the 
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United States stock exchange listed companies had the longest tenure for a serving CEO in 
office (6.8 years) compared to those in Hong Kong (5.9 years), and those in Australia (5.8 
years). This study found an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO share ownership 
percentage data between Australia and the United States, but also an area of difference in the 
cross-sectional CEO share ownership data between these two countries and Hong Kong. The 
descriptive statistic results suggest that on average the CEOs of the stock exchange listed 
companies in Hong Kong possessed a relatively higher percentage of shares than did the 
CEOs of the Australian and United States companies. This study found that across the final 
sample of 200 Hong Kong companies, 25 CEOs possessed more than 50 per cent of the 
shares of the company. In contrast, only one CEO in the Australian sample and none of the 
CEOs in the United States sample possessed more than 50 per cent of the company shares. 
This finding strengthens an argument in the literature that the strong distinction between the 
Hong Kong corporate governance system and the Anglo-American system relates to the 
ownership structure of publicly listed companies. 
6.3.3 Theoretical Implications 
The findings provide a contribution to the development of convergence theory. This is 
achieved by identifying and benchmarking areas of similarity for 2010 in the cross-sectional 
CEO output-oriented functional background data and the cross-sectional CEO tenure data, 
respectively, across the largest 200 stock exchange listed companies by market capitalisation 
in each country—Australia, the United States, and Hong Kong.  
Nevertheless, this research found evidence of divergence in the cross-sectional CEO 
share ownership percentage data in Hong Kong, away from Australia and the United States, 
as highlighted in the ANOVA results and the descriptive statistic results. On average, the 
CEOs of these Hong Kong companies possessed a higher percentage of company shares than 
did the CEOs of the Australian and United States companies; this is likely to be related to the 
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prevalence of family ownership in Hong Kong’s corporate governance setting. Another 
apparent point of divergence relates to CEO duality; this was strongly evidenced in Australia 
and the United States. Further, the descriptive statistics show evidence of divergence in the 
cross-sectional data for the non-executive director ratio in Hong Kong away from Australia 
and the United States. On average, the company board of the leading stock exchange listed 
companies in Hong Kong consisted of a smaller percentage of non-executive directors than in 
Australia or the United States. The findings of divergence provide a contribution to 
convergence theory by highlighting evidence of areas of difference between countries in 
certain CEO professional development and CEO work context data. The findings provide 
support for the argument in corporate governance research that recognises that ‘one size does 
not fit all’ (Clarke 2007, p. 57). United States corporate governance reports—such as the 
NACD Blue Ribbon Commission Report—recommended separating the CEO and 
chairperson positions (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). In reality, a large number of the leading 
United States stock exchange listed companies still have not implemented the report’s 
recommendation. 
6.4 Research Question Three 
 This section will address the third research question by discussing the results of 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis and moderated multiple regression analysis. These 
analyses were undertaken to identify areas of similarity in prediction of the dependent 
variable, organisation performance, by cross-sectional CEO professional development and 
CEO work context variables, which would support a convergence argument.  
6.4.1 Significant Relationship across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong  
Hypothesis two predicts that the selection of a CEO who has a functional background 
in an output-oriented area is positively associated with organisation performance. The 
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empirical evidence from Australia, the United States and Hong Kong shows an area of 
similarity in the positive prediction by the cross-sectional CEO output-oriented functional 
background variable of the dependent variable, organisation performance, across the three 
countries; the evidence supports the convergence argument. The finding thus provides 
support for hypothesis two in all three countries. 
6.4.1.1 CEO Output-oriented Functional Background and Organisation Performance 
The literature that explores the relationship between the CEO output-oriented 
functional background and organisation performance in Australia and Hong Kong is limited. 
Existing research in relation to upper echelons’ functional background has usually been 
conducted for the United States. However, it should be noted that a limited number of studies 
explored the main relationship between a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background and ROA. Perhaps the closest study to this present study was conducted by 
Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson (2010). From their bivariate correlation analysis, they did 
not find a significant relationship between the percentage of directors with an output-oriented 
functional background on the board and the ROA. Therefore, this present study contributes to 
the development of upper echelon theory and research by filling this gap in the literature. 
Past research has discussed the value of selecting a successor CEO with an output-
oriented functional background, particularly in a high-growth industry that gives emphasis to 
change and innovation (Datta & Rajagopalan 1998). CEOs often need to deal with the less 
controllable factors in a high-growth environment; work experience in an output-oriented 
functional area—such as sales and marketing—has been argued to provide the CEOs with the 
required abilities to manage difficult and unpredictable situations (Datta & Rajagopalan 
1998). The finding of the research here shows that selection of a CEO who has an output-
oriented functional background, and who puts a strong focus on products and innovation will 
benefit large stock exchange listed companies in all three countries. This is an important 
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finding for the corporate governance field, with implications for research and practice. This 
research here is likely to be the first to provide comprehensive empirical evidence that the 
upper echelon theory view that predicts a relationship between CEO functional background 
and organisation performance is empirically supported across large Australian, United States, 
and Hong Kong corporate settings. Therefore, this view is not only generally applicable to the 
United States corporate setting, but also to the Australian and Hong Kong settings. The 
abilities and experience gained from working in output functional areas will help the CEO to 
direct the company in a positive way and to deal with a contemporary business environment, 
which is often characterised by uncertainty, fast product cycle and tough competition 
(Tushman & O’Reilly 1997; Hamel 2000).  
The bivariate correlation result for the United States shows a significant positive 
relationship between CEO output-oriented functional background and the information 
technology (IT) and telecommunication industry. This finding supports the Buyl et al. (2011) 
finding. They found that a CEO who can promote fast product-innovation and time-to-market 
is very important in an innovative, unpredictable and dynamic industry such as IT. A strong 
commitment to functional areas—in particular sales and marketing—at the highest level, such 
as the CEO, is likely to speed up the time for innovative products to reach the market (Cooper 
& Kleinschmidt 1994; Buyl et al. 2011). Innovation can then be promoted according to the 
accessible resources and abilities of the organisation (Atuahene-Gima 1996).  
CEOs with an output-oriented functional background tend to focus their attention on 
growth and the pursuit of new opportunities, and they continuously observe markets and 
products (Hambrick & Mason 1984). In general, CEOs who come from output functional 
departments, such as sales and marketing, have a strong awareness of customers’ needs 
(Webster, Malter & Ganesan 2005). They have an ability to bundle various key information 
items into closely targeted product offerings (Buyl et al. 2011). These CEOs are committed to 
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engage in understanding their customers’ view and, therefore, they will add value to the 
company, especially during the process of developing new product offerings (Webster, 
Malter & Ganesan 2005).  
In the Hong Kong context—which upholds the importance of family businesses, 
entrepreneurship and business networks—selecting a CEO with a strong entrepreneurial 
mindset or substantial work experience in an output functional department is beneficial to 
organisation performance. The literature (see for example Cho & Hambrick 2006; Tuggle, 
Schnatterly & Johnson 2010) indicates that upper echelons with an output-oriented functional 
background focus more on products and entrepreneurial matters than do those with a 
throughput functional background. These upper echelons are engaged in assessing product-
market matters, and consequently, they will be more likely to concentrate on entrepreneurial-
related stimuli and matters related to new business development (Hambrick 1981; Cho & 
Hambrick 2006; Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson 2010). CEOs who come from output-
oriented functional areas such as entrepreneurship, marketing and sales have built a strong 
relationship and network with various key stakeholders, in particular with their suppliers and 
customers. They are more likely to develop and implement strategies that are tied closely to 
the revenues and profits of the company. This will ultimately result in better organisation 
performance in terms of ROA. 
6.4.2 Significant Relationship across the United States and Hong Kong 
Hypothesis one predicts that selection of an insider CEO is positively associated with 
organisation performance. The empirical evidence from Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong identifies an area of similarity in the positive prediction by the cross-sectional 
insider CEO variable of the dependent variable, organisation performance, across the United 
States and Hong Kong. This finding supports hypothesis one, but only for the United States 
and Hong Kong. 
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6.4.2.1 Insider CEO and Organisation Performance 
The finding from the United States is in agreement with the Zajac (1990) study of the 
largest United States companies. It found a positive relationship between an insider CEO and 
average ROA in the bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis results. Insider 
CEOs benefit from acquiring company-specific and industry-specific skills and knowledge 
from their previous work experience within the company (Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010; Jalal 
& Prezas 2012). In general, insider and outsider CEOs bring different varieties of skill, 
knowledge, experience and network resources; thereby, the main stakeholders of the 
company may perceive an insider CEO differently to an outsider CEO (Chung & Luo 2013). 
It is expected that insider CEOs will need less time to learn about their new job (Jalal & 
Prezas 2012). They will have a better perception of the company’s capabilities and 
weaknesses in their early tenure than outsider CEOs will have (Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). 
Therefore, it can be expected that they will face less difficulty in adapting to their new role 
and in selecting the most suitable changes for the organisation (Shen & Cannella 2002b). 
Insider CEOs tend to introduce and execute changes that build on existing organisational 
competencies; such changes could ultimately improve organisation performance in a fairly 
‘incremental but continuous way’ (Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010, p. 343). The chance of a 
business failure is reduced, as these changes normally do not incorporate completely new 
strategies or competencies that are untested within the company (Zhang & Rajagopalan 
2010). Consequently, insider CEOs would gain respect and mutual trust from the board of 
directors and the TMT. 
The trend of the positive relationship between an insider CEO and organisation 
performance was also evidenced in Hong Kong. The literature review highlighted the 
importance of family ownership in the Hong Kong context. CEO succession has been an 
especially important matter in an environment where family businesses are prevalent (Ting 
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2013), as they are in Hong Kong. From 171 insider CEOs out of 200 CEOs in the leading 
Hong Kong publicly listed companies, this present study identified 41 CEOs as either the 
founder of the corporation who had been in their respective firm since the company’s 
inception, or who was a close kin of the company founder. In the family-business 
environment, an insider CEO who is likewise the principal of the corporation will possess 
considerable power (Ting 2013). That allows him or her greater scope to develop strategies 
and make decisions affecting organisational outcomes when compared to an outsider CEO 
(Ting 2013). It is less likely for CEOs who are promoted from inside the organisation to be 
regarded as competitors for power; therefore, these CEOs usually present less threat to the 
remaining stakeholders (Shen & Cannella 2002b; Chung & Luo 2013). The effect of this 
situation could be a smoother CEO transition process (Shen & Cannella 2002b; Chung & Luo 
2013). Agency theorists contend that agents will act opportunistically and they need to be 
closely incentivised and carefully monitored for them to perform in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). In family-controlled 
companies, it can be expected that insider CEOs—who are a family member and a major 
shareholder of the company—act as an agent and as a principal of the corporation. They can 
decrease agency costs because their interests will be aligned with the interests of other 
principals (Fama & Jensen 1983; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta & Pittino 
2014). Consequently, the insider CEO can be expected to perform better than an outsider 
CEO who is merely an agent and, therefore, is at a distance from the principals (Miller et al. 
2014).   
6.4.3 Significant Relationships across Australia and Hong Kong  
Hypothesis eight predicts that there is a positive relationship between CEO share 
ownership percentage and organisation performance. The empirical evidence from Australia, 
the United States and Hong Kong identifies an area of similarity in the positive prediction of 
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the dependent variable, organisation performance, by the cross-sectional CEO share 
ownership percentage variable for Australia and for Hong Kong; however, the percentage of 
CEO share ownership does not have a crucial impact on organisation performance in the 
United States. This finding thus provides support for hypothesis eight, but just for Australia 
and Hong Kong. It is of note that there is also an area of similarity in the negative prediction 
by the cross-sectional non-executive director ratio variable of this dependent variable for 
Australia and for Hong Kong. This finding provides support for hypothesis nine—which 
predicts that there is a negative association between the non-executive director ratio and 
organisation performance—for these two countries. The integration of these two findings 
suggests that for Australia and Hong Kong, corporate governance structures that remunerate a 
CEO with substantial share ownership will be positively associated with organisation 
performance. However, corporate governance structures that simply focus on maintaining 
superior board independence by means of having a majority of non-executive directors on the 
board will be negatively associated with organisation performance. 
6.4.3.1 CEO Share Ownership Percentage and Organisation Performance 
 The finding of this study showing a positive relationship between the CEO share 
ownership percentage and organisation performance in Australia and Hong Kong provides 
support for stewardship theory. Agency theory and managerial hegemony theory proponents 
raised concerns regarding the CEOs who own a high percentage of company shares, as these 
CEOs will gain more power and, consequently, may perform in a way to satisfy their 
personal agendas (Daily & Johnson 1997). Taking a managerial hegemony perspective, 
CEOs with a high percentage of share ownership possess greater discretion and voting power 
leading to a power disparity between the CEO and the board of directors. However, the effect 
of this situation is not as predicted by agency theorists; in fact, these CEOs will act more 
carefully in making key organisational decisions because their personal wealth is closely tied 
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to that of the company (Jayaraman et al. 2000; Dalton et al. 2003). The literature has 
indicated that substantial CEO share ownership can help to reduce agency problems 
(Jayaraman et al. 2000) and, accordingly, can serve to protect shareholders’ interests 
(Buchholtz & Ribbens 1994). The findings imply that share ownership may serve as an 
incentive mechanism for the CEOs to develop better managerial skills and to perform more 
diligently (Jayaraman et al. 2000). Stewardship theory applies, as the finding indicates that 
share ownership can motivate the CEO to become a better steward of a firm in the Australian 
legal jurisdiction. The substantial power that derives from possessing a high percentage of 
shares will enable the CEOs—based on their judgements and experience from dealing with 
daily managerial and operational issues—to express, and address, concerns of the company.  
The same trend of a positive effect of CEO share ownership percentage can be seen in 
Hong Kong. Similar to the Australian case, the Hong Kong finding provides support for 
stewardship theory. It indicates that CEOs with substantial share ownership can be trusted to 
bring a positive impact to organisation performance; they are an important steward and 
human resource of the company. They possess substantial power, and so they have more 
discretion in executing strategic decisions and in gaining access to key resources and 
networks. This study found that across the 200 in the final Hong Kong sample, 25 CEOs 
owned more than 50 per cent of the company shares. Across these 25 CEOs, 16 were 
identified as either the founder of the corporation or a close relative of the company founder. 
In family-controlled companies, it is likely that CEOs with substantial share ownership—
including founder CEOs and CEOs with a close tie to the founding family—will have more 
power than the board. Consequently, a managerial hegemony situation may occur, where the 
board acts as a rubber stamp on a CEO’s choices (Herman 1981; Hendry & Kiel 2004). 
However, further studies are needed to explore the tension between CEO power and board 
power in publicly listed companies in Hong Kong.  
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The trend of a significant positive relationship between CEO share ownership percentage and 
organisation performance was not seen in the United States. This finding is in agreement with 
the Bigley and Wiersema (2002) study of large United States companies. They found from 
their bivariate correlation analysis no significant relationship between CEO stock ownership 
and average ROA. This finding is aligned with the finding of Dalton et al. (2003). Utilising 
meta-analytic techniques, they did not find full support for a positive relationship between 
insider executive equity ownership (including CEO equity) and financial performance in 
large United States companies drawn from various indexes, including the S&P 500, the 
Fortune 500 and the Forbes 500. 
6.4.3.2 Non-executive Director Ratio and Organisation Performance 
The literature indicates that Australian companies have implemented world best 
practice with regard to board composition (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). Australian reports such 
as the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and the Bosch Report 
recommend that a company board should comprise a majority of outside, non-executive 
directors (Bosch 1995; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; ASX 2010). These recommendations were 
followed by a large number of the leading ASX companies, as evidenced in the data 
underlying the research here. Across the final sample of 200, 129 ASX companies had only 
one inside, executive director on the board, and seven ASX company boards did not include 
an executive director—that is, the CEO was not a member of the board. Therefore, a total of 
68 per cent of the leading 200 ASX companies had an extremely high non-executive director 
ratio (that is, a ratio of either one or very close to one). Grounded in agency theory, a high 
non-executive director ratio, it was argued, would promote superior board independence from 
management (Zahra & Pearce 1989; Pearce & Zahra 1991). However, the finding of this 
present research suggests that the prevalence of a high non-executive director ratio in the 
Australian corporate setting will not directly lead to better ROA of organisation performance. 
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Instead, the empirical evidence shows that a high non-executive director ratio predicts poorer 
organisation performance.  
This finding has several implications for corporate governance practices and research 
in Australia. First, the finding does not give empirical support to agency theory and resource 
dependence theory but, rather, favours stewardship theory. The finding may imply that stock 
exchange listed companies in Australia should consider the possible benefits of including 
capable inside, executive directors on the board, rather than being too concerned with the 
issues of board independence, the monitoring of the CEO, and the provision of external 
resources. Second, the finding raises questions over the effectiveness of a board that consists 
only of non-executive directors. The presence of some inside, executive directors on the 
board can enhance board processes in making well-informed decisions, as executive directors 
possess firm-specific expertise and experience gained from managing daily operational issues 
(Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Kiel et al. 2012). Aside from the agency role and the resource 
dependence role, the literature has indicated that the board does make an important 
contribution to the process of strategic decision-making (Bonn & Pettigrew 2009). The 
effectiveness of the roles of the board in providing key relevant advice to the TMT and 
participating in strategic decision-making may be reduced if the board mainly consists of 
non-executive directors. 
A similar trend of a negative influence from the non-executive director ratio was also 
evidenced in the Hong Kong setting. The literature has indicated that there has been a push 
toward including more non-executive directors on Hong Kong company boards (Cheng & 
Firth 2005). However, there are questions of whether the strategy to recruit outside, non-
executive directors can provide the best return for the company (Au, Peng & Wang 2000). 
The finding of the present research supports the Garcia-Ramos and Garcia-Olalla (2014) 
finding in that in the family-business setting, agency theory is only supported when there is a 
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low percentage of non-executive directors on the board. The finding gives support to 
stewardship theory, in which case the presence of a majority of inside, executive directors on 
the board will predict better organisation performance (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014). 
For Hong Kong, the literature points out that including too many non-executive directors on 
the board is often regarded as a mechanism to control the senior executives or the inside, 
family directors (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014). This can result in a loss of motivation 
among the key stewards (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014). The literature has indicated 
that the corporate governance system in Hong Kong is characterised by a close relationship 
between business networks (Crawford 2001), and a high level of interlocking shareholdings 
among companies (Brewer 1997; Keong 2002). Consequently, it is challenging to obtain 
completely ‘independent board members in a small corporate market’, such as Hong Kong 
(Chen et al. 2005, p. 442). Further, the inclusion of inside, executive directors will help to 
promote better organisation performance in family businesses especially, since they possess 
key knowledge, resources, expertise and experience that the non-executive directors normally 
do not possess (Garcia-Ramos & Garcia-Olalla 2014).  
The findings with regard to the negative influence of the non-executive director ratio 
provide empirical evidence that supports the observation in Clarke (2014b) in relation to the 
possibility of a limited effect of board independence on organisation performance. The 
research here shows that the limited effect of board independence was not only evidenced in 
Hong Kong, but in Australia and the United States as well. This research found a negative 
relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation performance in the 
United States, although this relationship is not statistically significant. This non-significant 
United States finding is aligned with the finding of Dalton et al. (1998). Using a meta-
analysis technique, they found no significant relationship between board composition—as 
measured by the non-executive director ratio—and financial performance. 
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6.4.4 Non-significant Findings across Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong 
Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 204) have talked about ‘the possibility of non-
findings’ in research on upper echelon theory; that is, the possibility of obtaining no 
significant results. The results of the study here indicate that some observable CEO 
professional development and work context variables do not yield a reliable representation of 
CEOs’ ‘makeup’ (Hambrick & Mason 1984, p. 204). Specifically, it was found that CEO 
MBA education, the number of university degrees that a CEO possesses, or CEO tenure did 
not influence organisation performance in Australia, the United States, or Hong Kong. 
Further, there was no significant relationship between CEO duality and organisation 
performance in the United States or Hong Kong. Geletkanycz and Tepper (2012) explain that 
the unsupported hypotheses are in themselves informative. Therefore, this section will 
discuss useful insights from the results that lack significance to establish a better 
understanding of the upper echelon, agency, stewardship, managerial hegemony, and 
resource dependence theories.  
6.4.4.1 CEO MBA Education and Organisation Performance 
Hypothesis four—which predicts that the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree is 
positively associated with organisation performance—was not supported for Australia, the 
United States, or Hong Kong. Empirical evidence that explores the relationship between a 
CEO with an MBA education and organisation performance is limited in the United States, 
and is even more limited in Australia and Hong Kong. The finding of this study fills that gap. 
Although the results are not significant, the unstandardised coefficient values—or the B 
values—in the multiple regression results inform the direction of the relationship between a 
CEO with an MBA degree and organisation performance: it is positive in Australia (see Table 
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5.17), but negative in the United States (Table 5.20) and Hong Kong (Table 5.23). The 
finding from Australia is somewhat aligned with the finding of a Lindorff and Jonson (2013) 
study of Australian companies. They found no relationship between CEO MBA qualification 
and organisation performance, although they used return to shareholders as their performance 
measure. They acknowledged that there are differences in each individual’s career path, 
skills, intelligence and experience and, moreover, that the MBA education is likely to 
produce a different set of results for different individuals. CEOs with an MBA will differ in 
the ways in which they apply the skills and knowledge from the degree to their decisions and 
actions.  
There are a few possible explanations for this non-significant finding. Organisation 
performance may be attributable to CEO skills or knowledge that are not taught in the MBA 
courses, and are thus not captured in the analysis (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). In general, when 
they are appointed CEOs are many years beyond their MBA graduation; it is likely that 
subsequently the skills, learning and experience that they obtained from their degree will not 
have a crucial impact on organisation performance (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). 
The MBA curricula are constantly subject to revision to meet contemporary business needs. 
Thus, executives would need to update their business-management knowledge continuously, 
well beyond their MBA graduation date. The MBA education provides executives with 
general business skills, and executives need to adjust what they learned from the MBA to 
cater for the specific needs of their company. There are professional development programs 
run by other providers, and it is likely that an MBA education does not give a unique 
advantage to CEOs (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). The findings suggest that a CEO with an MBA 
education will not provide value-added benefits to the performance of leading Australian, 
United States and Hong Kong publicly listed companies.  
  
206
Some studies in the United States (for example Finkelstein 1992; Bigley & Wiersema 
2002) have highlighted the benefit of selecting a CEO with an MBA degree from an elite 
university. Such a CEO is likely to have opportunities to access invaluable social networks, 
and the prestige of the elite university can be transferred to the CEO (D’Aveni 1990; Bigley 
& Wiersema 2002). This could be the focus of future research, particularly in the national 
settings of Australia and Hong Kong where there is a recognised gap in this research area. 
Researchers are cautioned to check data availability beforehand. During data collection for 
the present research, it was discovered that some companies did not disclose information 
regarding the name of the university conferring their CEO’s MBA.  
6.4.4.2 CEO Number of University Degrees and Organisation Performance 
The prediction from hypothesis five that there is a positive relationship between the 
number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and organisation performance was not 
supported for Australia, the United States, or Hong Kong. Previous studies have typically 
linked formal education to cognitive complexity (Wally & Baum 1994), innovation (Barker 
& Mueller 2002), and growth (Norburn & Birley 1988). However, the effect of the CEO 
educational level on organisational performance—such as profitability and ROA—has not 
been as widely explored (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). This present research fills 
this gap. No evidence was found of a significant relationship between the number of the 
CEOs’ university degrees and organisation performance across the three countries. Possibly, 
the reason for this non-significant result is similar to the arguments related to the non-
significant relationship between a CEO with an MBA education and organisation 
performance: CEOs are usually well beyond their university education. CEOs’ university 
education is less likely to be a crucial factor for their decisions that ultimately affect 
organisation performance (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). It was noted that across 
the final sample of 200 CEOs for each country, seven Australian CEOs, nine United States 
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CEOs and 19 Hong Kong CEOs had a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). Across this same final 
CEO sample of 600, there were 174 Australian CEOs, 190 United States CEOs, and 179 
Hong Kong CEOs who possess at least one university degree. This implies that the majority 
of the top stock exchange companies in these countries—especially in the United States—are 
inclined to select a CEO with at least one university degree. 
The bivariate correlation results show a significant negative correlation between the 
number of university degrees held by a CEO and firm performance in the United States and 
Hong Kong. In Australia, this correlation was negative but not statistically significant. 
Although the multiple regression results show no significant relationship between the number 
of the CEOs’ university degrees and organisation performance, the bivariate correlation 
results add to our understanding that the educational level of the CEO may be associated with 
a negative impact on organisation performance. In a related study of United States 
companies, Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2011) found that CEOs without a degree outperformed 
CEOs with a degree. It is possible that CEOs with a greater number of university degrees 
may have a tendency to screen for and analyse risk more carefully and thoroughly before 
making business decisions. This can lead to a higher risk-avoidance propensity, which may 
affect firm performance negatively. Studies based on qualitative interviews are needed to 
explore the value to organisation performance of the university education of senior 
executives, particularly CEOs. 
6.4.4.3 CEO Duality and Organisation Performance 
Hypothesis six—which predicts that CEO duality would have a negative relationship 
with organisation performance—was not supported for the United States or Hong Kong. The 
moderated multiple regression results suggest that although CEO duality is related to lower 
organisation performance in the United States and Hong Kong, its influence is weak and not 
statistically significant.  
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This finding is aligned with some existing studies conducted in the United States and 
Hong Kong (Rechner & Dalton 1989; Daily & Dalton 1992, 1993; Dalton et al. 1998; Lam & 
Lee 2008), which did not find a significant relationship between CEO duality and 
organisation performance. A possible reason for this non-significant finding is that neither 
stewardship, upper echelon, nor agency theory can sufficiently predict the effect of CEO 
duality. This is because it may have a positive influence under specific settings—for example 
a particular industry or ownership structure—and a negative influence under other settings 
(Boyd 1995; Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). Lam and Lee (2008) found that the relationship 
between CEO duality and organisation performance in Hong Kong is dependent on the 
ownership structure (family or non-family) of the firm. Future research could consider the use 
of moderating variables when exploring the effect of CEO duality on organisation 
performance.   
6.4.4.4 CEO Tenure and Organisation Performance 
Hypothesis seven—which predicts that long CEO tenure would have a positive 
relationship with organisation performance—was not supported for Australia, the United 
States, or Hong Kong. Some existing studies (Boone, Brabander & Van Witteloostuijn 1996; 
Iaquinto & Fredrickson 1997; Balkin, Markman & Gomez-Mejia 2000) found no relationship 
between CEO tenure and organisation performance. Balkin, Markman and Gomez-Mejia 
(2000) conducted a study of the United States companies listed in the Forbes 1994–1995 
special issues. They used CEO tenure as one of the control variables. In the bivariate 
correlation results, they found no significant correlation between CEO tenure and ROA.  
Iaquinto and Fredrickson (1997) conducted a study of 65 United States companies in 
two separate industries and found no significant correlation between top management tenure 
and ROA in the bivariate correlation and multiple regression results. Boone, Brabander and 
Van Witteloostuijn (1996) studied small Belgium companies and did not find a significant 
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correlation between CEO tenure and organisation performance in either their bivariate 
correlation or multiple regression results. The study here found no relationship between CEO 
tenure and organisation performance in the three countries studied. Similar to the argument 
related to the non-significant effect of CEO duality, it is possible that the stewardship, 
resource dependence, upper echelon, and agency theories cannot sufficiently predict the 
influence of CEO tenure on organisation performance. It is likely that CEO tenure may have 
a positive influence in certain settings—for example a small-to-medium enterprise—and a 
negative influence in others. This leads to an opportunity to consider the use of moderating 
variables (other than the non-executive director ratio that has been used in the present 
research) to explore under which conditions long CEO tenure can provide a benefit to 
organisation performance. 
6.4.5 Theoretical Implications 
The previous sections identified significant results and non-significant results. The 
trend of the significant results across different countries enhances the external validity of the 
theories that are implied in the respective hypotheses. Hambrick (2007) recognises that the 
majority of previous empirical studies on upper echelons have typically used a sample of 
United States companies. Prevalent corporate governance theories, including agency theory 
and managerial hegemony theory, have been largely developed to gain a better understanding 
of the key corporate governance issues arising in the Anglo-American context (Boyd, Haynes 
& Zona 2011). In Australia, research focusing on the influence of the CEO on organisation 
performance is limited, but is developing (O’Shannassy 2010). As corporate governance 
practices evolve and develop around the world, an understanding of the influence of the CEO 
in empirical research continues to evolve as well. It has been evidenced in the literature 
review and in the development of hypotheses that there is now a wide corporate governance 
literature, which includes a strong and rigorous body of United States research conducted in a 
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business community where, traditionally, there has been extensive practice of CEO duality. 
There is an opportunity to complement these completed studies by building research 
knowledge on other countries, especially countries with strong corporate governance 
institutional leanings to best practice, such as Australia (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a).  
The exploration of the Australian companies improves understanding of how the 
views from upper echelon theory and corporate governance theories can explain corporate 
governance phenomena in the Anglo corporate setting. Hong Kong companies operate in a 
unique business environment, mixing Chinese (that is, Eastern) tradition with British (that is, 
Western) influence (Au, Peng & Wang 2000). The exploration of the Hong Kong companies 
contributes to theory by discovering ‘whether predictions based on findings from the West 
hold with firms in Hong Kong’ (Au, Peng & Wang 2000, p. 30). In doing so, this research 
seeks to recognise the boundaries of current theories when the theories are applied in an 
Asian setting (Au, Peng & Wang 2000).   
6.4.5.1 Contribution to Upper Echelon Theory 
The findings of this thesis provide a better understanding of how upper echelon theory 
can (or cannot) be applied to explain the relationship between the professional development 
and work context of the CEO and organisation performance in Australia, the United States, 
and Hong Kong. Typically, existing upper echelon research (for example Hutzschenreuter & 
Horstkotte 2013; Nielsen & Nielsen 2013; Qian, Cao & Takeuchi 2013) focused on 
investigating the effect of TMT composition on organisational outcomes. The existing stream 
of research found that organisational outcomes, at the minimum, are dependent on the TMT 
composition and TMT processes (Hambrick 2007). Although the exploration of the executive 
teams may produce better results to explain firm outcomes, upper echelon theory does not 
always require an emphasis on the TMT; indeed, various important contributions have come 
from exploring the effect of individual CEOs on organisational outcomes (Hambrick 2007).  
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This thesis provides a contribution of upper echelon theory by applying some of the 
theory’s assumptions and then testing to establish whether they apply to the Australian, 
United States and Hong Kong corporate settings (Whetten 2009). This research found that the 
influence of certain CEO professional development and work context variables could vary 
from one country to another. The findings from Australia provide empirical support for upper 
echelon theory, which indicates that better firm performance can be predicted by the selection 
of a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, or a high percentage of CEO share 
ownership. The findings from Hong Kong provide empirical support for upper echelon 
theory, indicating that better firm performance can be predicted by selecting an insider CEO 
or a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, or a high percentage of CEO share 
ownership. The findings from the United States provide empirical support for upper echelon 
theory, indicating that better organisation performance can be predicted by selecting an 
insider CEO, a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, or a CEO with 
international work experience. However, the findings that the CEO work context variables do 
not have any crucial impact on organisation performance in the United States do not provide 
empirical support for upper echelon theory. This is an interesting discovery, considering that 
the United States data have been argued to yield a higher probability of producing results that 
provide support for upper echelon theory (Hambrick 2007). The present research provides a 
contribution to upper echelon theory by showing that in the United States, the CEO 
professional development backgrounds (with the exception of the CEO education) matter 
more to organisation performance in terms of ROA than do the CEO work context issues. 
Future research for the United States should focus more on exploring the effect of the CEO 
professional development background than on the effect of the CEO work context issues.  
It is of note that a previous study conducted by Crossland and Hambrick (2007) 
discovered that the overall influence of CEOs in the United States was considerably higher 
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than it is in other developed economies such as Germany and Japan. In a more recent study, 
they explored the differences in CEO discretion across 15 countries, including Australia and 
the United States, but not Hong Kong (Crossland & Hambrick 2011). They found that the 
overall CEO effect on ROA was greater in Australia than in the United States. However, their 
study indicated that the overall CEO effects on other organisation performance measures in 
the United States—such as return on sales, market to book ratio and return on investment 
capital—were bigger than those in Australia. The study here has limited the measure of 
organisation performance to average ROA. For the United States, it is possible that an 
exploration of the influence of the CEO work context variables on organisation performance 
measures other than ROA might provide some support for upper echelon theory. This should 
be explored further in future research.  
Upper echelon theory builds on the assumptions that every individual CEO is 
different and that the strategic options accessible to them differ (Hambrick 2007). The 
assumptions of upper echelon theory may have considerably greater validity in certain legal 
jurisdictions or societies than in others (Hambrick 2007). Consequently, the effect of CEO 
professional development and work context may vary across different national contexts. The 
study here contributes to the development of global corporate governance research by 
identifying areas of similarity and difference in the predictions from the cross-sectional CEO 
professional development and CEO work context variables of the dependent variable, 
organisation performance, between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The use of 
multiple countries may offset the possible risk from generalising (Zona, Zattoni & Minichilli 
2013).  
An important contribution to upper echelon theory comes from discovering which 
CEO professional background and CEO work context issues matter most to organisation 
performance and the ones that do not (Crossland & Hambrick 2007) for the three countries. 
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In the post-GFC period, after controlling for industry, firm size, firm age and board size there 
is agreement that selection of a CEO with an output-oriented functional background would 
positively influence organisation performance across the leading stock exchange listed 
companies in all three countries. CEOs with an output-dominated background are especially 
valued in a turbulent business environment (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Datta & Rajagopalan 
1998). In the period shortly after the GFC, CEOs often needed to face an even greater number 
of unpredictable situations than before, and the finding suggests that CEOs who are product-
focused would provide better value to their organisation then than those who are process-
focused. This finding contributes to upper echelon theory by providing empirical evidence 
and support to its argument that in all three countries, under demanding and stressful 
conditions, CEOs can be expected to reflect on their own functional background when 
developing key organisational decisions (Hambrick & Mason 1984; Qian, Cao & Takeuchi 
2013).  
The non-significant findings provide a contribution to upper echelon theory by 
clarifying that across the three countries, organisation performance does not seem to benefit 
from the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree, a CEO who holds a greater number of 
university degrees, or a CEO with long tenure. This research shows that CEO duality by itself 
is not a significant CEO work context predictor of the dependent variable organisation 
performance in the United States and Hong Kong. In discussing the non-significant findings, 
it is helpful to consider the possible ‘floor effects’ in many of these CEO professional 
development and CEO work context measures. For example, it is possible that there is a 
baseline number of university degrees—or a floor—for a CEO to get his or her early job and 
succeed in that job. Every CEO would have all the fundamental attributes from the 
completion of his or her university study and other things would matter more. In this sense, 
the university degrees might be a strong predictor of a CEO’s overall success, but it is not a 
  
214
strong predictor of organisation performance in the CEO’s daily jobs. Indeed, this research 
evidences other CEO professional development and work context factors would matter more 
to organisation performance.  
In their original upper echelon study, Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that formal 
education to some extent provides an indication of a CEO’s skill foundation and knowledge; 
professional management education—such as an MBA—promotes a tendency for 
administrative complexity. The question remains of whether a CEO with an MBA will 
provide unique value-added benefit to firm performance. The study here contributes to upper 
echelon theory by discovering that there is no relationship between a CEO with an MBA and 
organisation performance, at least in terms of ROA, in the large stock exchange listed 
companies in the three countries studied. Lindorff and Jonson (2013) explain the possibilities 
that high organisation performance is associated more with good leadership practice or in the 
presence of a charismatic leader. They also argue that organisation performance may be 
predicted by CEO characteristics which are hard to develop externally, although the present 
study did find the value to firm performance of certain observable CEO characteristics. In 
terms of professional development, CEOs may obtain the necessary skills, experience and 
knowledge that help to improve organisation performance from sources other than an MBA 
education (Lindorff & Jonson 2013).  
The literature from the discipline of business education informs of the deficiencies of 
the MBA curriculum (Mintzberg 2004; Navarro 2008). Navarro (2008) found that the MBA 
programs of the leading United States business schools lack focus in multidisciplinary 
integration and practical elements. Many Australian and United States business schools 
possess a similar type of accreditation for their MBA programs that is through the 
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the Association of MBAs 
(AMBA), or the European Quality Improvement System (EQUIS) (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). 
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Therefore, criticisms of Australian MBAs are as relevant there as they are of MBAs in other 
countries (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). From a different point of view, Pfeffer (2005) argued 
that MBA students learn differently from their education and that the majority of them are 
buying a credential to advance their career or salaries, as opposed to acquiring an education 
with intrinsic value. This discussion brings a recommendation for further studies that would, 
ideally, interview or survey CEOs who possess an MBA degree. This should enable 
researchers to gain more insight into CEO perception of whether the MBA learning 
experience that they have undertaken contributes to their decision-making processes and, 
ultimately, to organisation performance. The present study found that CEO educational level 
is not a CEO professional development predictor of organisation performance in large stock 
exchange listed companies in the three countries. This finding provides empirical support for 
the Hambrick and Mason (1984) view expressed in their early piece of research on upper 
echelon theory. They posited that the number of university degrees of a management group 
had no effect on organisation performance.  
6.4.5.2 Contribution to Convergence Theory 
This thesis develops and extends convergence theory by discovering a new area of 
convergence in the cross-sectional CEO output-oriented functional background data, and in 
the positive relationship found between CEO output-oriented functional background and 
organisation performance across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. This finding 
provides support for the convergence argument. There is an opportunity for further studies to 
discover whether there is also a positive influence of a CEO with an output-oriented 
functional background on organisation performance in leading stock exchange listed 
companies in other countries. Additionally, a study that explores the effect of CEOs who 
have a strong background in entrepreneurship, and sales or marketing on the performance of 
small-to-medium enterprises in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong could provide 
  
216
novel and interesting insights. Ultimately, such insights would probably contribute to a better 
understanding of upper echelon theory and convergence theory. 
The present research extends convergence theory by discovering a few other areas of 
convergence in its results as follows. Between Australia and Hong Kong, there were two 
moments of convergence (that is, similarity): first in the positive relationship between CEO 
share ownership percentage and organisation performance, and second in a negative 
relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation performance. Between 
the United States and Hong Kong, there was a moment of convergence in terms of the 
positive relationship between an insider CEO and organisation performance.  
6.4.5.3 Contribution to a Multi-theoretic Perspective  
The research reported here contributes to theory by linking the upper echelon, agency, 
stewardship, managerial hegemony, resource dependence, and convergence theories as being 
relevant to the development of a series of research hypotheses (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 
1996). This gives the thesis a multi-theoretic perspective. The research hypotheses taken 
together make a contribution to theory by identifying the link between the CEO professional 
development variables, the CEO work context variables, and the organisation performance 
variable. The research provides a more complete understanding of the applicability of the 
when, how, and where of upper echelon, convergence, agency, stewardship, managerial 
hegemony, and resource dependence theories. The use of a multi-theoretic perspective 
provides a better understanding of the relationship between the professional development and 
work context of the CEOs and organisation performance, and the interactions that take place 
on the board of directors of stock exchange listed companies (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). 
This research has considered and selected the CEO professional development and CEO work 
context variables that are most relevant to the corporate governance field and which have 
implications for theory development (Whetten 1989).  
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The findings show that upper echelon theory and the corporate governance theories 
implied in the respective hypothesis (for example agency theory and stewardship theory) 
cannot sufficiently predict the influence of a CEO with an MBA, the number of university 
degrees possessed, or CEO tenure in the three countries. In addition, the upper echelon, 
agency, and stewardship theories have limitations in predicting the link between CEO duality 
and organisation performance in the United States and Hong Kong. It is likely that these CEO 
professional development or CEO work context variables may have a positive influence on 
organisation performance under particular settings, and a negative influence under other 
settings. Further study should look at the effect of the contextual factors in moderating the 
relationship between these variables and organisation performance. This should extend an 
understanding about the conditions under which these variables will matter to organisation 
performance.  
There has been much research attention given to the influence of CEO tenure on 
organisation performance, especially in a legal jurisdiction such as the United States with its 
wide practice of duality (Fitzroy, Hulbert & Ghobadian 2012). Sharper insight into CEO 
tenure and organisation performance in a legal jurisdiction where the prevailing practice is 
separation—such as in Australia—is useful, especially given the debate as to whether this 
relationship is linear positive, linear negative, or a quadratic (that is, the inverted U shape), or 
indeed, whether there is any relationship at all. Stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory provide theoretical support for the argument that long-tenured CEOs who are good 
stewards with sound access to useful resources are likely to work for organisations that 
perform strongly over time. The Waldman et al. (2001) study of the Fortune 500 companies 
found a positive relationship between CEO tenure and net profit margin in their hierarchical 
regression result. The relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance was 
not significant in the results for all three countries studied here. This finding implies that long 
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CEO tenure alone does not matter to organisation performance in a legal jurisdiction where 
there is either a wide practice of duality—such as the United States—or a wide practice of 
separation—such as Australia. This research did discover that in Australia CEO tenure is 
related to organisation performance, depending on the non-executive director ratio. There is a 
possibility that CEO tenure is related to organisation performance, depending on other board 
work context variables (for example average board tenure and average board share ownership 
percentage). This could be explored in future research.  
6.4.5.4 Contribution to Australian Corporate Governance  
The literature suggests that the Australian corporate governance system has been 
largely influenced by agency theorists’ recommendations (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). This is 
reflected in the data of this research that shows, on average, a small number of CEO duality 
cases, a very low CEO share ownership percentage, and a very high non-executive director 
ratio among the largest Australian stock exchange listed companies by market capitalisation. 
This suggests a low managerial hegemony situation in the Australian context, where the 
board seems to hold considerable power in monitoring the CEO. However, the findings show 
that a high percentage of CEO share ownership has a positive impact on organisation 
performance, whereas a high non-executive director ratio has a negative impact on it. Taking 
the multi-theoretic perspective of the agency, stewardship, and managerial hegemony 
theories, a high percentage of CEO share ownership will increase CEO power (Finkelstein 
1992). However, remunerating the CEO with share ownership seems to benefit firm 
performance, as it can ultimately reduce principal-agent problems (Jayaraman et al. 2000). In 
this situation, a CEO should be trusted to perform more attentively and diligently to bringing 
higher returns to the company, as his or her personal fortune is closely linked to the 
organisation’s wealth (Jayaraman et al. 2000).  
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Further, in Australia, agency theory was supported when the non-executive director 
ratio was low. The benefits of having a majority of non-executive directors on the board are 
largely based on agency theory and resource dependence theory views. Agency theory 
proponents assert that non-executive directors bring greater effectiveness, accountability and 
transparency to CEO monitoring (Fama & Jensen 1983; Yoshikawa, Zhu & Wang 2014). 
Resource dependence theory advocates argue that non-executive directors serve to bring key 
resources and legitimacy to the organisation (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). However, 
the present research found that a board structure consisting of a high percentage of non-
executive directors does not immediately lead to a better firm ROA. This significant finding 
provides a contrary view that somewhat moves away from agency theory and resource 
dependence theory recommendations. This empirical finding has an important theoretical 
implication for corporate governance practice in Australia. It alters the way we think about 
the relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation performance as it 
suggests that the design of the board does not always have to incorporate a majority of non-
executive directors but, rather, companies should consider selecting and including some key 
members of the TMT to be part of the board. Integrating agency theory perspectives and 
stewardship theory perspectives, executive directors should be trusted to perform in the best 
interests of the organisation, and a moderate percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board should be sufficient to ensure that the agency role of the board will be performed 
effectively. From a resource dependence perspective, the inclusion of executive directors on 
the board will strengthen its access to the internal resources of the company. During difficult 
times, such as after the GFC, the firm-specific expertise, knowledge and experience of the 
executive directors will be greatly valued to help manage internal affairs and to enhance the 
advisory role of the board. The presence of executive directors on the board will improve the 
flow and speed of communication between the board, the TMT and other key stakeholders—
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including line managers, employees, customers and suppliers. In Australia, finding the 
optimum balance between executive directors and non-executive directors on the board is 
essential to sound corporate governance and performance. Kiel et al. (2012) inform the 
importance of having executive directors who can act, behave and think independently in the 
Australian setting. 
In Australia, the positive relationship between a CEO with an output-oriented 
functional background and organisation performance extends understanding of upper echelon 
theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. A CEO who has a strong focus 
on product-innovation, entrepreneurship, and sales or marketing is an important steward for 
achieving better organisation performance. From a resource dependence perspective, CEOs 
with functional backgrounds in sales, marketing, or entrepreneurship possess key 
organisational resources, including access to a strong network of suppliers and customers. 
CEOs who have been largely exposed to functional areas such as engineering or product 
R&D have more opportunities, every day, to handle technical problems that are related to the 
company products. They possess comprehensive knowledge of firm products, which is useful 
for developing product strategy and, ultimately, for positively influencing organisation 
performance. In the Australian context, benefits related to stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory are present when selecting a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background.  
6.4.5.5 Contribution to United States Corporate Governance 
In general, the findings from the United States show similar trends to those from 
Australia in terms of a very low CEO share ownership percentage and a very high non-
executive director ratio, with the exception of the high number of CEO duality cases found in 
the leading United States stock exchange listed companies. The research found that CEO 
professional development backgrounds—specifically the CEO insider or outsider status, CEO 
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functional background, and CEO international work experience—matter more to organisation 
performance than do the CEO work issues (CEO duality, tenure and share ownership 
percentage). The reason for these findings may be related to the Hambrick (2007) argument, 
which explains that if a society sets a high level of control over the work of the CEO, then the 
effect of the CEO work context variables on organisational outcomes is likely to be 
suppressed. The findings have important theoretical implications particularly for upper 
echelon theory and should have practical implications for the professional development and 
training of senior executives in United States stock exchange listed companies.  
Selection of an insider CEO has a crucial impact on organisation performance in the 
United States. Agency theory applies from the viewpoint that the board has the opportunity to 
learn about the characteristics of an insider CEO candidate before the CEO appointment is 
decided, and has the chance to update its judgement on the candidate more precisely over 
time (Zajac 1990). A positive outcome of the CEO succession process reflects the ability of 
the board of directors to select the right individual for the position (Huson, Parrino & Starks 
2001). This will strengthen shareholder trust in the board and in the CEO, hence minimising 
the typical conflicts between principal and agent. Stewardship theory applies from the 
viewpoint that an insider CEO represents a trustworthy steward of the corporation, as his or 
her credibility, reputation and achievements for the organisation have been clearly 
demonstrated prior to their appointment to the CEO role. From a resource dependence theory 
perspective, an insider CEO will possess a better mastery of company limitations, capabilities 
and internal resources than an outsider CEO can have (Greiner, Cummings & Bhambri 2003; 
O’Shannassy 2011). Therefore, in the United States context, benefits related to the agency, 
stewardship, and resource dependence theories are present when selecting an insider CEO. 
Similar to the findings from Australia, in the United States there is benefit to 
organisation performance from selecting a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
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background, thus providing support to the upper echelon, stewardship and resource 
dependence theories. Moreover, in the United States there is benefit to organisation 
performance from selecting a CEO with international work experience. This finding has 
several theoretical implications. From a resource dependence theory perspective, CEOs with 
international work experience are a valuable human resource for the corporation, as they have 
had the opportunity to build a global network of professional and personal relationships 
(Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001). The social-capital advantage of a CEO with 
international work experience may enhance intra-firm and inter-firm trust and reputation, 
leading to better organisation performance (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001). CEOs 
with international work experience have a better understanding of various business practices 
and regulations in different countries, and a good knowledge of local and global markets 
(Chen & Stucker 1997). They acquire a vital international management skill set from being 
exposed to different languages, value systems, cultural standards, and institutional 
environments (Ricks, Toyne & Martinez 1990; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001). They 
will have superior abilities and more confidence in investing in unknown and complex 
overseas business operations, and in managing these operations (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary 
2003; Rodenbach & Brettel 2012). From a stewardship theory perspective, the networks and 
the communication skill set possessed by a CEO from his or her international work 
experience will increase shareholder trust in the CEO in leading the business in the 
contemporary global economy. This may contribute positively to organisation performance.   
6.4.5.6 Contribution to Hong Kong Corporate Governance 
The data from the Hong Kong companies indicate the strong presence of an insider 
CEO, a higher percentage of CEO share ownership, coupled with the presence of a more 
balanced and mixed board in terms of its number of non-executive directors and executive 
directors. In the Hong Kong context, benefits associated with managerial hegemony theory 
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and stewardship theory are present when a company is selecting an insider CEO, 
remunerating a CEO with a high percentage of share ownership, or opting for a low non-
executive director ratio. The Hong Kong findings suggest that managerial hegemony 
situations which may happen—for example when a CEO possesses a high percentage of 
share ownership—do not always lead to poor corporate performance. The negative effect of 
the non-executive director ratio implies that the recommendation from agency theory to have 
a majority of non-executive directors on the board may not be ideally suited to the Hong 
Kong stock exchange listed companies.  
Similar to the findings from the United States, in Hong Kong the selection of an 
insider CEO is positively related to organisation performance. An insider CEO will gain 
better access to the company resources and networks that are crucial for the leadership 
change process than an outsider CEO can access (Chung & Luo 2013). An insider CEO 
successor has the opportunity to build in-depth company and industry knowledge and a 
network of support from inside the company (Hambrick & Mason 1984). Putting these 
findings into the Hong Kong context, the benefit of an insider CEO is intensified where 
family and business group networks are dominant. The benefits associated with stewardship 
theory and resource dependence theory are present when choosing an insider CEO, especially 
when the retiring CEO has performed well in the role (Zajac & Westphal 1996b). In Hong 
Kong, it is likely that the retiring CEO is the founder of the corporation and may pass on the 
CEO position to one of his or her family members. An insider, family CEO successor will 
gain better access to unique resources that may not be made available to an outsider, non-
family CEO. 
Similar to the findings from Australia and the United States, in Hong Kong the 
benefits associated with stewardship theory and resource dependence theory are present when 
selecting a CEO with an output-oriented functional background. Similar to the findings from 
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Australia, in Hong Kong the finding with regard to the positive effect of CEO share 
ownership percentage provides support to the stewardship, agency and managerial hegemony 
theories. Following agency theory logic, a CEO who is a family member and who possesses a 
high percentage of shares in his or her respective company will perform better than a non-
family CEO who is merely a company agent (Miller & Le-Breton-Miller 2006). Taking a 
managerial hegemony perspective, CEOs with high share ownership will have the power, 
incentive and capability to monitor and control their managers, thereby minimising agency 
costs and increasing returns (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Miller & Le Bretton-Miller 2006). 
From a stewardship theory perspective, CEOs with substantial share ownership should be 
motivated by more than merely economic self-interest; they want to contribute to the 
company’s longevity, its mission and its stakeholders (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; 
Davis, Schoorman, Mayer & Tan 2000). These CEOs develop an in-depth emotional 
attachment to their firms, since their fortune and their reputation are closely linked to those of 
the business (Bubolz 2001; Ward 2004; Miller & Le Bretton-Miller 2006). Consequently, 
they are motivated to perform in the best interests of their company, resulting in better firm 
performance.  
Overall, the significant findings in Hong Kong and Australia are similar in terms of 
the significant effects of the CEO functional background and the non-executive director ratio 
on organisation performance. This shows the areas of convergence between Hong Kong and 
Australia. In addition, in Hong Kong selection of a CEO from inside or outside the firm 
would have a significant impact on organisation performance.   
6.5 Research Question Four 
 This section will address the fourth research question by discussing the results of 
hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis to identify whether the influence of CEO 
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tenure on the dependent variable, organisation performance, is moderated by the non-
executive director ratio in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. 
6.5.1 Significant Relationship in Australia 
Hypothesis ten predicts that high CEO tenure and a low non-executive director ratio 
jointly predict better organisation performance. This study found that the non-executive 
director ratio moderates the relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance 
in having a negative significant influence, providing support to hypothesis ten in Australia. 
The knowledge gained here is that in Australia where the majority of the CEOs are not 
holding the position of chairperson, the length of CEO tenure does matter to firm 
performance, depending on a certain level of the non-executive director ratio. The moderation 
plot presented in Figure 5.1 reinforces stewardship theory and resource dependence theory, as 
it suggests that a long-tenured CEO provides the highest financial-performance outcome 
when the non-executive director ratio is low. The most likely interpretation of this result is 
that to achieve peak levels of financial performance, the design of an Australian board of 
directors should look to another key choice, rather than merely following an agency theory 
recommendation to include a majority of non-executive directors on a board. In addition to 
exploring the direct relationship between the non-executive director ratio and organisation 
performance, a deeper understanding of corporate governance phenomena can be obtained 
from exploring the joint relationship between the non-executive director ratio variable and 
another governance-mechanism variable (Yoshikawa, Zhu & Wang 2014). The moderation 
plot indicates that the key specification is the presence of a CEO who has maintained a long 
and successful period of tenure, coupled with a lower non-executive director ratio.  
This finding provides useful insights into the optimum board design in the Australian 
corporate setting. From the descriptive statistics, the optimum non-executive director ratio for 
reaching the best financial performance is 0.69—that is, at the mean (0.80) minus one 
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standard deviation (0.11). Since the mean of the board size in the top 200 ASX companies 
was approximately seven, the finding implies that the optimum board design will consist of 
five non-executive directors and two executive directors. Therefore, it can be interpreted from 
the finding, and the moderation plot, that the inclusion of an additional executive director 
other than the CEO to join a long-tenured CEO should benefit organisation performance. 
6.5.2 Non-significant Findings across the United States and Hong Kong 
The trend of a negative influence of the interaction term between CEO tenure and the 
non-executive director ratio on organisation performance was evidenced in the United States 
and Hong Kong, although this relationship is statistically not significant. The finding from 
the United States is in some way aligned with the findings of Combs et al. (2007). They 
found that CEO tenure and the proportion of outside directors do not jointly correlate with 
organisation performance in the United States; however, it should be noted that they used a 
different measure of organisation performance (that is, a stock market measure). 
6.5.3 Theoretical Implications 
This research provides a contribution to upper echelon theory and an extension of the 
original upper echelon model. It is undertaken by including a moderating variable related to 
the board and exploring the effect of the interaction term between CEO tenure and the non-
executive director ratio on organisation performance across Australia, the United States and 
Hong Kong. An exploration of the interaction effect can provide a better understanding of the 
specific conditions under which a particular corporate governance theory applies, leading to a 
better understanding of that theory (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011; Boyd et al. 2012). The 
findings from the large Australian stock exchange listed companies indicate that long CEO 
tenure alone does not predict better organisation performance. However, the moderation 
hypothesis shows the specific condition, where long CEO tenure can predict better 
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organisation performance, and when stewardship theory applies in the Australian corporate 
context. That condition is when the non-executive director ratio is low. It would be useful, 
and interesting, for future research to explore the moderating effect of other variables related 
to the board. For example average board tenure could be used in an exploration of the 
influence of CEO tenure on organisation performance to identify other conditions where long 
CEO tenure can have a crucial impact on firm performance.  
The findings for Australia imply that organisations will benefit when they have a 
long-tenured CEO and when they include a few competent executive directors on the board. 
Integrating resource dependence theory and stewardship theory, long-tenured CEOs have 
better access to key organisational resources; they have built credibility, reputation and trust 
to maintain their CEO position; therefore, they should perform for the benefit of the company 
(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996; Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001). Several non-executive 
directors should be maintained to monitor the long-tenured CEO; however, it is also 
important to provide the CEO with more executive and entrepreneurial freedom to develop 
the business. The findings show that the presence of executive directors to work with the 
long-tenured CEO and non-executive directors at the board level will result in superior 
organisation performance. The findings provide a contrary view to agency theory and alter 
the way we think about the effect of the interaction term between CEO tenure and the non-
executive director ratio on organisation performance. Given the importance of executive 
directors to organisation performance in Australia and the limited amount of research 
conducted in this area, future research should further investigate the roles of executive 
directors in contributing to the performance of the board and the entire organisation.  
6.6 Research Question Five 
 This section will address the fifth research question by identifying any empirical 
evidence of difference that indicates divergence in the influence of CEO professional 
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development and CEO work context on organisation performance between Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong.  
6.6.1 Significant Relationship: The United States Case 
Hypothesis three predicts that the selection of a CEO with international work 
experience is positively associated with organisation performance. This study found a 
positive relationship between a CEO with international work experience and organisation 
performance, thus providing support for hypothesis three for the United States. Nevertheless, 
the empirical evidence shows that a CEO with international work experience does not predict 
organisation performance for Australia or Hong Kong. It should also be noted from the 
multiple regression results that there is an area of difference in the negative relationship 
between a CEO with international work experience and organisation performance in 
Australia, although that relationship is not statistically significant. 
6.6.1.1 CEO International Work Experience and Organisation Performance 
The finding of this study with regard to the positive effect of a CEO with international 
work experience for the United States is aligned with the finding of the Carpenter, Sanders 
and Gregersen (2001) study of 245 United States multinational companies. They found a 
positive correlation between CEO international assignment experience and ROA. Similarly, 
in their hierarchical multiple regression results from their United States study, Daily, Certo 
and Dalton (2000) found a positive relationship between a CEO with international work 
experience and ROA.  
The NYSE and NASDAQ listed companies are normally headquartered in the United 
States, but many of these companies have subsidiaries in various international locations, thus 
creating additional international management and regulatory-compliance challenges. 
Sambharya (1996) and Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) mentioned the rare presence 
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of executives and CEOs with international assignment experience among United States 
companies. However, globalisation has accelerated. This has resulted in intense global 
competition and increasing demand in the United States for executives who possess such 
experience. This study found that in 2010, slightly over 60 per cent of the 200 CEOs of the 
leading United States stock exchange listed companies had international work experience. In 
comparison, Carpenter, Sanders and Gregersen (2001) found that in 1993 approximately 20 
per cent of the sampled CEOs from multinational S&P 500 companies had international 
assignment experience. The increase in the percentage of CEOs with international work 
experience may imply that United States stock exchange listed companies have, through time, 
become more aware of the importance of equipping high-potential managers with 
international work assignments. 
Companies with global business operations bring together individuals from different 
traditions, cultures and educational systems, and people who operate in regions with different 
regulatory and political systems and different industrial growth rates (Dhir & Gòkè-Paríolá 
2002). Black, Gregersen and Mendenhall (1992) explain how global assignments can serve to 
enhance the flow and discussion of information among subsidiaries, and between the parent 
company and subsidiary companies. Global assignments can enhance a CEO’s ability in 
providing their organisation with better control and management of global business 
operations, and this type of assignment is valuable for a CEO’s professional development and 
the succession arrangements (Black, Gregersen & Mendenhall 1992). Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1992) and Sanders and Carpenter (1998) argue that CEOs in multinational corporations are 
often presented with the most difficult decision-making situations. International work-related 
experience provides CEOs with the ability to overcome complex challenges from managing 
within the global environment (Sanders & Carpenter 1998). CEOs with international work 
experience are more likely to gain more knowledge, different viewpoints, and greater 
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comprehension of global markets than the CEOs without such experience (Chen & Stucker 
1997; Athanassiou & Nigh 1999). They are more sensitive and adaptable to cross-cultural 
issues (Roth 1995), and will have the necessary skills to assess, comprehend and form good 
relationships with host nationals (Black, Mendenhall & Oddou 1991). These benefits to 
organisation performance of having a CEO with international work experience were 
evidenced in the United States context. 
Nevertheless, the trend of a significant positive effect of a CEO with international 
work experience was not evidenced in Australia or Hong Kong. A possible reason for this 
may be related to the different level of firms’ international interdependence between the 
Australian, United States and Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies. The Roth (1995) 
study of United States medium-sized companies found that the influence of CEO 
international experience is positive when the international-interdependence level of the 
company is high. He found that the value of having a CEO with international work 
experience is amplified in a context where a wide integration between locations in different 
countries is vital to the global strategy of the company and its subsidiaries. It is possible that 
the CEO’s ability to manage the integration between company subsidiaries which are located 
in different countries is more important to the overall strategy and performance of the United 
States stock exchange listed companies than it is in Australia and Hong Kong. The Hong 
Kong corporate governance setting upholds the importance of family businesses, networks 
and entrepreneurship. Therefore, it is unsurprising to discover that the performance of the 
Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies will benefit more from the selection of an 
insider CEO, or from a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, than from the 
selection of a CEO with international work experience. Future research in this area should 
perhaps consider the use of moderating variables—such as the international-interdependence 
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level of the company—to discover under what conditions a CEO with international work 
experience will matter to firm performance in Australia and Hong Kong. 
6.6.2 Other Areas of Difference in Results 
There is empirical evidence of other areas of difference which indicate divergence in 
prediction by certain CEO professional development and CEO work context variables of the 
dependent variable, organisation performance, between Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong.  
First, this study found an area of difference in prediction by the cross-sectional insider 
CEO variable of that dependent variable between Australia and the United States; and 
between Australia and Hong Kong. The relationship between an insider CEO and 
organisation performance is positive, but is not statistically significant in Australia; this 
Australian finding is in contrast with the significant United States and Hong Kong findings.  
Second, although the relationship between a CEO with an MBA degree and 
organisation performance is not statistically significant across the three countries, it should be 
noted that while the relationship is positive in Australia, it is negative in the United States and 
Hong Kong.  
Third, although the relationship between CEO tenure and organisation performance is 
not statistically significant across the three countries, it should be noted that this relationship 
is positive in the United States and Hong Kong. By contrast, the present study found this 
relationship to be negative in Australia, and although this relationship is weak it provides a 
little support to agency theory.  
Fourth, the relationship between CEO share ownership percentage and organisation 
performance is significant in a positive direction in both Australia and Hong Kong. This 
relationship is negative in the United States, thus suggesting limited support to agency theory. 
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However, solid conclusions could not be drawn from this finding from the United States, as 
the relationship was found to be weak and statistically insignificant. 
6.6.3 Theoretical Implications 
The discovery of areas of difference in the results between countries provides a 
contribution to upper echelon theory by implying that researchers applying this theory should 
be cautioned against generalising the findings of a study conducted in one national context to 
other national contexts; a similar notion has been echoed by Zona, Zattoni and Minichilli 
(2013). The relationship between certain professional development and work context aspects 
of the CEO and organisation performance did vary between national contexts.  
Hambrick (2007) explains that if a community has an exclusive, fixed pathway for 
developing senior executives then there would be no variation in the CEO professional 
development or CEO work context variables to investigate. The research here evidences a 
very high percentage of insider CEOs in each of the leading 200 stock exchange listed 
companies in the United States and in Hong Kong. This implies that the United States and 
Hong Kong societies have an inclination to the professional development of future CEOs 
from inside the company. This popular CEO professional development pathway supports the 
firm’s organic growth and leads to better organisation performance in the United States and 
Hong Kong contexts. The preference for selecting a new CEO from inside the company is 
slightly different in Australia, where 35 per cent of the large Australian stock exchange listed 
companies had selected an outsider CEO. However, the present study discovered that for 
Australia, insider or outsider status of the CEO is not a significant CEO professional 
development predictor of the dependent variable organisation performance. This finding 
contributes to a better understanding of upper echelon theory. This is through its testing to see 
whether the assumptions embedded in upper echelon theory with regard to this particular 
  
233
CEO professional development variable for predicting organisation performance are 
applicable to Australia. 
The findings of this present benchmark study provide a contribution of convergence 
theory. The probability of a cross-cultural convergence in relation to the CEO effect between 
countries, which was inquired into in the ‘future research’ section of Crossland and Hambrick 
(2007), has been partly evidenced here. There are still certain areas of difference with regard 
to the CEO professional development and work context effects between the three countries, 
as evidenced in the results of the present study. While the finding in this thesis has opened up 
important discussion on the convergence debate, future research that explores cross-national 
convergence in the effect of CEO professional development and work context—and that 
ideally includes additional countries—is recommended to enhance understanding of the 
occurrence of global convergence. Such a study could perhaps enable a more complete 
investigation of areas of similarity or difference in the influence of the professional 
development and work context of the CEO in different legal jurisdictions. It could perhaps 
provide valuable insights that would help to assess the external validity of convergence 
theory and other implied theories—for example upper echelon theory—when such theories 
are applied in different cultural contexts. The trends of convergence and divergence explored 
in this thesis are cross-sectional and not time-dependent. Future research should look at 
adopting a longitudinal research design to incorporate more time points and to ascertain 
further the trends identified in this benchmark study. 
6.7 Other Useful Findings 
The empirical data from the leading stock exchange listed companies in Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong also provide useful insights into understanding the control 
variables, the moderating variable and the dependent variable. In terms of the industrial 
control variables, the dominant industry and the second-most dominant industry in Australia 
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were the materials (excluding mining and metals) industry and the mining and metals 
industry, respectively; the health care industry was the least-dominant industry. In the United 
States, the dominant industry and the second-most dominant industry were the consumer 
industry and the IT and telecommunication industry, respectively; the mining and metals 
industry was the least-dominant industry. In Hong Kong, the dominant industry and the 
second-most dominant industry were the consumer industry and the financial industry, 
respectively; the health-care industry was the least-dominant industry. On average, the United 
States stock exchange listed companies had been listed on their (respective) stock exchange 
for the longest time, the Australian companies were next, followed by the Hong Kong 
companies. On average, in 2010, the United States stock exchange listed companies were the 
largest in terms of sales, followed by the Hong Kong companies, and then the Australian 
companies. The average Australian, United States and Hong Kong company boards consisted 
of seven, 11 and 11 people, respectively. 
In terms of the moderating variable, the descriptive statistic shows, on average, that 
the percentage of the non-executive directors on the Australian, United States and Hong 
Kong company boards was 80, 88 and 58 per cent, respectively. This means that, in general, 
Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies included more executive directors on the board 
than did companies in the other two countries. There was greater balance between the number 
of the non-executive directors and the number of the executive directors on the board in the 
Hong Kong companies. This implies that they followed the recommendations of the 
Corporate Governance Code in terms of designing a balanced composition between the non-
executive directors and the executive directors (HKEx 2013b). In terms of the dependent 
variable, the average ROA between 2011 and 2012 was highest for the United States stock 
exchange listed companies, followed by Hong Kong and Australian companies, 
consecutively. This finding may mean that in those years, on average, the United States 
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companies were performing slightly better than their Hong Kong and Australian counterparts 
in terms of ROA.  
The bivariate correlation statistic provides valuable insights into understanding 
corporate characteristics in the three countries. In Australia, larger companies (in terms of 
sales) have larger boards and a greater percentage of non-executive directors on the board, 
but a smaller CEO share ownership percentage. In the United States, larger companies have 
larger boards and a greater percentage of non-executive directors on the board. They are also 
more likely to combine the roles of CEO and chairperson and to select a CEO with a 
throughput-oriented functional background. Similar to Australia, Hong Kong’s larger 
companies have larger boards and a greater percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board, but a smaller CEO share ownership percentage. Additionally, they are more inclined to 
select a CEO with a greater number of university degrees.  
Further, in Australia, companies that have been listed longer on the stock exchange 
are larger (in terms of sales), but have a smaller percentage CEO share ownership. They are 
more likely to select an outsider CEO, and a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background. In the United States, companies that have been listed longer on the stock 
exchange are bigger, and have larger boards and a greater percentage of non-executive 
directors on them. In Hong Kong, companies that have been listed longer on the stock 
exchange have larger boards and longer CEO tenure, but a smaller percentage of CEO shares. 
They are more likely to select a CEO with international work experience and a CEO with a 
greater number of university degrees. 
The additional findings provide useful insights to academics and practitioners by 
describing the general characteristics of the stock exchange listed companies in each legal 
jurisdiction. They provide a contribution to convergence theory by highlighting areas of 
difference and similarity in these characteristics. 
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It should also be noted that the selected control variables in this study do not correlate 
with (nor are significantly related to) the dependent variable organisation performance in the 
Australian data. On the contrary, some of the selected control variables do correlate with (or 
are significantly related to) the dependent variable in the United States data and to some 
extent in the Hong Kong data. This finding from Australia is surprising and opens up the 
interesting question of why the selected control variables, which theoretically should be 
related to firm performance, are not significantly related to organisation performance in 
Australia. An explanation for this issue may relate to the specific subjects—i.e., the selected 
Australian sample—especially when compared with the results from the United States sample 
and Hong Kong sample. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out and discussed the research findings in this benchmark study. 
The chapter has addressed the research questions used to achieve the research objectives of 
the study. It has discussed the theoretical implications of the research findings. The findings 
contribute to the development of convergence theory by identifying areas of difference in 
certain cross-sectional CEO professional development and in CEO work context data. 
Notable areas of difference include the high number of cases of CEO duality seen in the 
United States context compared with the Australian and Hong Kong contexts, and the 
continuing importance of CEO share ownership in Hong Kong. The non-executive director 
ratio in Hong Kong is, in general, lower than that in the Australian and the United States 
contexts. This may mean that in Hong Kong, there could be a continuing divergence of 
certain corporate governance practices—in relation to CEO share ownership and board 
structure—away from the British corporate governance system. Future research that 
incorporates more time points—an option here is the use of panel data—might provide a 
better understanding of this divergence trend. 
  
237
The findings enhance understanding of upper echelon theory by pointing out which 
CEO professional development backgrounds and CEO work context issues matter most to 
organisation performance in each legal jurisdiction. This study contributes to both upper 
echelon theory and convergence theory by identifying an area of convergence in the positive 
relationship between a CEO with an output-oriented functional background and organisation 
performance across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. This study found some non-
significant findings showing moments where the integration of upper echelon theory and 
corporate governance theories—such as agency theory and stewardship theory—are limited 
in their ability to predict the influence of certain CEO professional development and CEO 
work context variables. Examples are the CEO tenure variable in all three countries. The 
discussion of the findings provides a basis for future research. The next chapter will complete 
the thesis. It will discuss the strengths, practical implications and certain limitations of the 
study. These offer guidance on the content of a substantial future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter discussed the significant findings, the non-significant findings, 
and the theoretical implications of the study’s research outcomes. This concluding chapter 
summarises and completes the study. The strengths of the study and the practical implications 
of its research findings will be discussed. This chapter will also explain certain limitations of 
this benchmark study, inform possible future research and provide several concluding 
remarks.  
7.2 Strengths of the Study 
The strengths of the study are as follows. First, this research is a quantitative study 
utilising secondary data from publicly available archival data. It thus offers objective 
unbiased results and empirical evidence from the largest stock exchange listed companies, by 
market capitalisation, in the legal jurisdictions of Australia, the United States and Hong 
Kong. The use of three countries, a large sample size and appropriate statistical techniques 
increases the internal and external validity of this research and the wide applicability of its 
results (Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle 2012). Second, this study opens up opportunities for 
publications in Australia and internationally. There are opportunities to publish the results in 
relation to the influence of the professional development and work context of CEOs in 
Australia, the United States, or in Hong Kong, separately, to contribute to the development of 
corporate governance theories and practices in each respective business community. There 
are opportunities to publish articles that further develop the theories, hypotheses, and results 
for any pair of the countries in this study. This may advance the global corporate governance 
research agenda by identifying areas of similarity and difference between countries in the 
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effect of CEOs’ professional development and work context. Since Australia, the United 
States, and Hong Kong have been deliberately selected as countries that represent the Anglo, 
American, and Asian corporate governance settings, respectively, there is an opportunity to 
publish the results contained in this research on the three countries and thus contribute to the 
debate on convergence in corporate governance.  
Third, this study has built databases which could be extended in several possible ways 
to accommodate future research interests. The data could be expanded to include other 
variables of interest, for example ROE and sales growth. There is an opportunity to download 
companies’ annual reports for the end of the fiscal year subsequent to 2012, and to extract the 
relevant financial data to explore the effect of the CEOs’ professional development and work 
context on average ROA over a longer period. The number of companies in each of the 
selected countries could be increased in the cases where a larger sample size is desired. It is 
possible to extend the data by collecting cross-sectional CEO professional development and 
CEO work context data and company financial performance data in legal jurisdictions other 
than Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. An exploration into the effect of the CEOs’ 
professional development and work context on organisation performance in other legal 
jurisdictions may allow for an interesting comparison of how that effect would differ from the 
effect of the CEOs’ professional development and work context discovered in the present 
study. Extension of this study will provide a better understanding of the extent to which upper 
echelon theory, convergence theory and corporate governance theories may be generalised 
and applied in explaining the influence of the professional development and work context of 
the CEOs in each particular legal jurisdiction. 
Fourth, this study makes an important contribution to the research and practice of 
corporate governance. This research creates a synthesis of the corporate governance literature 
and identifies the importance of applying upper echelon theory, agency theory, stewardship 
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theory, managerial hegemony theory, resource dependence theory and convergence theory to 
expand the understanding of a range of choices in corporate governance practice in and 
across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). The 
conceptual framework and the hypotheses developed here have provided a focused 
exploration into the link between the professional development and work context of the CEO 
and organisation performance. The findings from this study will benefit policy makers and 
practitioners in Australia, the United States and Hong Kong in understanding whether or not 
the professional development and work context of the CEO has a crucial impact on 
organisation performance.  
7.3 Practical Implications 
 The research outcomes from this thesis provide relevant and useful insights to a wide 
range of stakeholders inside and outside the organisation. Inside the organisation, the 
chairperson, board members and TMT members, chief (C)-level executives and managers 
will benefit from gaining a clearer understanding of how the application of the when, who, 
where, and how agency, stewardship, managerial hegemony, resource dependence, and upper 
echelon theories could influence CEO appointment decisions. These will have implications 
for organisation performance. Outside the organisation, international bodies—including the 
OECD, the ICGN, the World Bank, the IMF—and national bodies—including the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council, the NYSE, the NASDAQ and the Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited—all have an interest in the study’s findings. Further, in the 
interests of making firms and boards of directors work better, the management consulting 
profession, the banking industry, the accounting profession, the legal profession, policy 
makers and public servants all have an interest in the matters discussed here (Hambrick, 
Werder & Zajac 2008; Clarke 2014a).     
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 In agreement with Zajac (1990), it should be underlined that this study explored 
central propensities, not particular single cases; therefore, the empirical results of the present 
study should not be regarded as signifying that certain CEO professional backgrounds or 
work issues are inferior to others. For example the empirical findings for the United States 
and Hong Kong should not be regarded as implying that an outsider CEO is inferior when 
compared to an insider CEO (Zajac 1990). However, in general, stock exchange listed 
companies in the United States and Hong Kong may encounter advantageous situations when 
they consider an insider CEO, because his or her interests are more likely to be aligned with 
the interests of other key stakeholders and the company board (Chung & Luo 2013; Miller et 
al. 2014).  
7.3.1 CEO Professional Development and Organisation Performance 
The findings with regard to the positive influence of certain CEO professional 
development backgrounds will benefit board members of stock exchange listed companies in 
Australia, the United States and Hong Kong in understanding the type of CEO needed to 
drive organisation performance in a positive way (Cho & Hambrick 2006). The findings will 
assist the Human Resources department in readjusting the profiles, perspective, experience 
and skills of senior managers within a context of changing industry needs (Cho & Hambrick 
2006).  
Hypothesis one—which predicts that selection of an insider CEO is positively 
associated with organisation performance—was supported for the United States and Hong 
Kong. The hiring process for a CEO is crucial to enable the board of directors and the main 
stakeholders to review the desired strategic orientation of the company (Cao, Maruping & 
Takeuchi 2006). However, the process is normally a challenging task for directors and for the 
incumbent CEO too who is likely to influence the process of succession to the highest degree 
permitted by the board (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). This happens because 
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directors have little experience in recruiting individuals for an executive position above chief 
financial officer, chief operating officer or vice chairman (Charan 2005). The findings of this 
study will assist practitioners—especially board members or retiring CEOs in the United 
States and Hong Kong stock exchange listed companies—in succession planning and in the 
selection of the most suitable CEO for the firm through their consideration of the origin of the 
CEO candidates. The findings also bring implications for the training and development of 
senior managers, highlighting the importance of organic growth (that is, growth from inside 
the company) in the United States and Hong Kong contexts. Companies should 
professionally develop several capable inside executives who are suitably skilled and 
qualified to undertake the CEO role. The findings inform practitioners that the origin of the 
CEO is not associated with organisation performance in the Australian context.  
Hypothesis two—which predicts that the selection of a CEO who has a functional 
background in an output-oriented area is positively associated with organisation 
performance—was supported for Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The findings 
indicate that the type of functional background of the CEO candidate should be considered as 
one of the key selection criteria in succession planning for hiring the CEO. The findings 
assist practitioners in developing appropriate professional development programs and 
relevant training for the senior managers. Companies should assign a diverse set of 
challenges for managers recognised as possessing high potential to promote more prospective 
leaders from within the company (McCauley 2014). These challenges may include a shift of 
an employee to a line position, or a move to initiating a new business division (McCauley 
2014). Another practical implication of these research findings is that companies should 
focus more closely on strengthening their sales, marketing, engineering and product R&D 
departments. Wirtz, Tuzovic and Kuppelwieser (2014) studied the role of marketing 
departments in the contemporary business environment. They found that a well-developed 
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marketing division could have a positive impact on an organisation’s performance. 
Companies may benefit from equipping senior managers who have not previously been 
exposed to an output-related functional area with some experience and knowledge in such an 
area. McCauley (2014) emphasises the importance of lateral moves—exposing high-potential 
managers to other business units, new departments, new markets or new roles—to the 
professional development of managers, so that they will ultimately understand how to lead 
the entire firm effectively when promoted to a CEO position. The findings may bring 
implications for the job-rotation arrangement of the management-trainee programs in a way 
that the rotation should expose graduates to experience in an output-related functional 
department. Large organisations should embrace a culture that stimulates product innovation 
and promotes intrapreneurship by offering opportunities for high-potential managers to 
launch new business sectors (McCauley 2014). CEOs should recognise the customers’ needs 
and maintain good communication with the staff members who closely interact with 
customers, such as the frontline sales employees and their immediate managers (Saunders & 
Banta 2014). 
Hypothesis three—which predicts that the selection of a CEO with international work 
experience is positively associated with organisation performance—was supported for the 
United States. Large United States stock exchange listed companies with a strong worldwide 
presence are advised to promote the concept of international work assignments to their 
executives as an important mechanism for admission to ‘the upper echelon and not into 
obscurity’ (Sambharya 1996, p. 744). An organisation desiring to utilise a large but struggling 
portfolio of global operations is recommended to opt for a globally experienced CEO, and to 
allow that CEO considerable discretion in hiring other senior managers with similar global 
work experience (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001). Organisations should consider 
sending their senior managers on an international work assignment as a valuable component 
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of their professional development (Slater & Dixon-Fowler 2009). This will help to reduce the 
paucity of international work experience in the senior management group in United States 
companies. This paucity has arisen because of companies being incapable of persuading 
overseas executives to move to the United States company headquarters, or being unwilling 
to recall executives from overseas assignments (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001).  
Hypothesis four—which predicts that the presence of a CEO with an MBA degree 
would have a positive influence on organisation performance—was not supported for 
Australia, the United States, and Hong Kong. Some large organisations have offered 
reimbursement of tuition expenses as a part of their employee-benefits package (Landes 
2012). An MBA is among the most popular master’s degrees by coursework that senior 
executives will choose to undertake to boost their business acumen (Lewis, Walls & Dowell 
2014). However, the finding of this study suggests the possibility that an MBA education has 
been overstated as a determinant of the success of leadership and management practice 
(Lindorff & Jonson 2013). This finding does not imply that an MBA education is ineffective 
in all sectors, since this type of education has supplied graduates with intellectual capital, 
social capital, prestige and an international mindset which are especially required for lower-
level management and career advancement (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). The finding does 
suggest that the knowledge acquired from the MBA education may not any longer be suited 
to leadership at the CEO level (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). Therefore, practitioners should 
consider alternative options, such as sending senior managers to in-house company training, a 
professional-development program, or an advanced management program offered by leading 
business schools (Lindorff & Jonson 2013). The finding has practical implications for 
business schools to review and update their MBA core curricula continuously in order to 
provide senior executives with the most relevant, current and practical learning experiences 
possible.  
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Hypothesis five—which predicts that there is a positive relationship between the 
number of university degrees that a CEO possesses and an organisation’s performance—was 
not supported for Australia, the United States, or Hong Kong. This finding has useful 
implications for practitioners who are inquiring into whether CEO education matters. While 
their university degrees may have been influential in determining early success in an 
individual’s career, the finding suggests that CEO educational level may be less relevant to 
the later years of that individual’s career, particularly when the individual has reached the 
CEO level (Tonello 2011).  
7.3.2 CEO Work Context, the Non-executive Director Ratio and Organisation 
Performance 
The findings from this study on publicly listed companies offer potentially useful new 
insights in relation to optimum levels of CEO tenure and the non-executive director ratio for 
achieving a high level of financial performance in the legal jurisdictions of Australia, the 
United States and Hong Kong. These findings will assist the development of future practice 
and policy in the Anglo, American and Asian corporate settings. In the United States, 
practitioners should give more attention to the professional development of the CEO than to 
the work context of the CEO. For the United States, this study found no significant 
correlation between an organisation’s performance and CEO duality, CEO tenure, and CEO 
share ownership.  
Hypothesis six—which predicts that CEO duality is negatively associated with 
organisation performance—was not supported for the United States where the practice of 
CEO and chairperson duality was more prevalent, or for Hong Kong where the practice of 
CEO and chairperson separation was more prevalent. This study found that the practice of 
CEO duality was very uncommon in Australia, indicating that the majority of the leading 
ASX companies had followed the ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations with regard 
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to separating the CEO and chairperson positions. The research finding here will benefit 
practitioners from countries such as the United States that are going from a strong practice of 
CEO duality to more frequent practice of separation; the finding indicates that, in general, the 
decision either to combine or separate CEO and chairperson positions does not have a crucial 
impact on an organisation’s performance. This is supported by the Krause, Semadeni and 
Cannella (2014) observation that the decision by the board to separate or combine the CEO 
and chairperson roles may go beyond the issue of board independence, and go more into the 
need for gaining greater legitimacy in the business and financial community. The shift from 
duality to separation in the United States may be driven more by institutional pressures 
(Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014).  
 Hypothesis seven—which predicts that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and organisation performance—was not supported for Australia, the United States, or 
Hong Kong. This finding has implications for CEOs as they consider how to maximise their 
contribution to the overall performance of the organisation (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991). 
This finding indicates to practitioners that having a long-tenured CEO does not predict either 
better or poorer organisation performance. Hypothesis eight—which predicts that there is a 
positive relationship between CEO share ownership percentage and organisation 
performance—was supported for Australia and Hong Kong. This finding has implications for 
the board and the principals of the corporation in considering the remuneration of the CEO.  
Hypothesis nine—which predicts that there is a negative association between the non-
executive director ratio and organisation performance—was supported for Australia and 
Hong Kong. Aligned with Kiel and Nicholson (2003a), across Australia, the United States, 
and Hong Kong, practitioners can learn that there is benefit to be obtained from a bigger 
board size relative to the firm size, suggesting that a small number of directors on the board 
could have a negative effect on the efficiency of the board in making decisions. It is not only 
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board size which is important but, rather, the successful consolidation of the knowledge base 
and skills of the board with the corporation’s demands at any given time (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003a). The results from Australia and Hong Kong provide support to the Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003a) arguments. They lead to recommendations to include a majority of non-executive 
directors on the board, but they do not reinforce boards that only consist of non-executive 
directors. The results did support some of the assumptions of stewardship theory, as there was 
a positive link between executive directors on the board and the return on assets (Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003a). While the boards have to be attentive to agency problems—and there is a 
higher chance that this will happen when there are non-executive directors on the board— 
practitioners can learn from this research that executive directors do bring valuable 
knowledge and company-specific skills to the board, thus contributing to numerous board 
roles (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a). 
Hypothesis ten—which predicts that high CEO tenure and a low non-executive 
director ratio jointly predict better organisation performance—was supported only for 
Australia. This finding will provide valued insights to practitioners in the Australian context 
that in the right situations, a long-tenured CEO is really the key steward of the corporation, 
helping it to achieve better performance. One of the situations is the inclusion of executive 
directors on the board. The executive directors work alongside the CEO daily. Therefore, 
they will offer valuable expertise and skills, particularly during board meetings. They can 
help the CEO to articulate operational problems and directly offer useful recommendations to 
other board members.  
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This research has certain limitations, which give guidance on a future research 
agenda. This study uses cross-sectional data and provides a benchmark for the exploration of 
convergence in the influence of CEO professional development and work context. However, 
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it is limited in a way that it does not explore whether such influence changes over time. 
Replication of the study through the use of longitudinal data or time series data should be 
considered for future research. This may offer deeper insights into the convergence process, 
since the process takes time (Khanna, Kogan & Palepu 2006; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2009).  
This study used two-year average ROA as the measure of the dependent variable: 
organisation performance. This measure, which is commonly used in corporate governance 
research (Kiel & Nicholson 2003a; Quigley & Hambrick 2012; Dalton & Aguinis 2013), only 
captures the organisation performance effects of the CEOs’ professional development and 
work context in two years; and it does not inform subsequent performance. It is likely that the 
performance effects of the CEOs’ professional development and work context vary in the 
later years of the CEOs’ tenure (Shen & Cannella 2002b). Future research can extend this 
present study by exploring the effect of the CEOs’ professional development and work 
context on ROA beyond the year 2012. The organisation performance measure in this present 
study is limited to ROA. Future research may explore the influence of the professional 
development and work context of the CEO on other objective accounting and (or) financial 
performance measures (for example ROE, return on sales, Tobin’s q) (see Richard et al. 2009 
for an extensive review) and other dependent variables of interest (for example strategic 
performance, corporate social performance and environmental performance). 
The research is solely a quantitative study. The development of qualitative interviews 
with the CEOs or a qualitative case study could perhaps provide additional insights into the 
effect of CEO professional development and work context, and may also give a deeper 
explanation of the interaction between the CEO and the board. This could be a focus for 
future research. 
This research limits the scope of the study specifically to individual CEOs. This is to 
provide a comprehensive study of their professional development and work context; 
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nonetheless, the study of the behaviour of other groups of actors such as TMTs, executive 
committees and managers at all levels could be a useful addition to strategic management 
research (Pettigrew 1992). The exploration of the link between TMT characteristics and 
organisation performance—particularly in the Australian and Hong Kong legal jurisdictions 
where there is currently a limited understanding of this linkage—may yield interesting results 
and contribute to a more complete understanding of upper echelon theory and corporate 
governance theories. Further, Liedtka (1998) and O’Shannassy (2003) argue that all 
individuals in the organisation can think strategically, not just the CEO. An interesting area of 
study may perhaps be to investigate the existence of other strategic thinkers—such as chief 
strategy officers—and their contributions in a modern strategy-making process, as they work 
alongside the managerial elites to improve organisation performance. In countries where the 
CEO duality practice is rare (for example Australia), there is an opportunity for future 
research to complement this present study by exploring the influence of the professional 
development and work context of the chairperson in large stock exchange listed companies 
that do not practise CEO duality. Such a study is likely to improve our limited understanding 
of the benefit of the chairperson to organisational outcomes. 
 This study focuses on a number of archival measures, and so it relies on the quality of 
the data disclosed in company annual reports and other publicly available sources. In general, 
the annual reports of the leading stock exchange listed companies in Australia, the United 
States and Hong Kong have provided reliable, transparent and sufficient information with 
regard to CEO professional development backgrounds and work context issues. The 
extensiveness of the information in these reports could vary between companies. For this 
reason, in cases where the information from the annual reports was considered inadequate, 
the present study additionally utilised other reliable publicly available archival data and 
published CEO biographies. With regard to CEO tenure, a few companies had reported the 
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initial year of the CEO appointment, rather than the initial date of the CEO appointment. This 
might have a slight impact on the CEO tenure calculation and analysis, but the use of this 
measure is consistent with previous leading studies (for example Bigley & Wiersema 2002; 
Henderson, Miller & Hambrick 2006; Walters, Kroll & Wright 2007). This present study 
relies on the accuracy of the financial data disclosed in company annual reports and financial 
reports. These have been audited by external professional accounting firms. The validity of 
the findings of this study could be limited in the event that there were some amendments to 
certain financial performance data which might be reported in the later annual or financial 
reports.  
 The influence of the professional development and work context of the CEO could be 
the subject of survey research to obtain perceptual insights on matters such as perceived 
organisation performance (Westphal & Fredrickson 2001). Here, the exploration of the 
influence of the professional development and work context of the CEO in this respect was 
limited to the availability of archival data across the Australian, United States and Hong 
Kong publicly listed companies. Survey questionnaires could extend this study to examine 
the influence of some of the CEO professional development and work context variables that 
may be difficult to obtain from archival data on subjective organisation performance. For 
example with regard to CEO international work experience, a survey could inquire about how 
long a CEO had undertaken international work assignments, and whether the CEO had found 
such experience influential for their managerial decisions. 
This study has provided comprehensive insights into the relationships between the 
professional development and work context of the CEO and organisation performance in the 
contexts of Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. The practice of the independent 
variables discussed in this study—including CEO insider/outsider status, CEO functional 
background, CEO international work experience, CEO education, CEO duality, CEO tenure, 
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and CEO share ownership—and their effect on the dependent variable organisation 
performance could vary between countries. A replication of this study to include other 
national contexts may provide interesting results and the opportunity for meta-analysis. A 
cross-country comparative study conducted in more countries could perhaps improve our 
understanding of the extent of the possible generalisation and consistency of upper echelon 
theory, agency theory, stewardship theory, managerial hegemony theory, resource 
dependence theory and convergence theory. 
 The focus of this research is large stock exchange listed companies. The results of this 
study will not necessarily generalise to other organisational forms such as partnerships, sole 
proprietorships, private firms, entrepreneurial start-up firms and small-to-medium enterprises 
(SMEs). These could be the focus of a further study. The findings of such a study may be 
compared to the findings from the large stock exchange listed firms in this present study. The 
outcomes of this study are limited to a specific time period that is between 2010 and 2012 
and to firms inside the top 200, and therefore should not be generalised to different time 
periods or companies outside the top 200.   
 The use of the non-executive director ratio as a moderating variable is proper for this 
study. However, some scholars (for example de Villiers, Naiker & van Staden 2011) have 
proposed to explore the influence of board process (for example strategy development), 
rather than board characteristics such as the non-executive director ratio. This may well be a 
possibility for future research.   
7.5 Future Research 
 Geletkanycz and Tepper (2012) explain that theoretical implications should help 
develop the future direction of a study. The research here opens up an exciting avenue for 
potential future research. First, the present research provides evidence that the professional 
development and work context of the CEO does have a crucial impact on organisation 
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performance, dependent on the national context. In addition to testing the main effects of the 
professional development and work context of the CEO on organisation performance, future 
research may be able to integrate insights from this study on CEO professional development, 
CEO work context and organisation performance. For instance with regard to CEO 
professional development, this study points out in the Hong Kong context the value to the 
organisation of an insider CEO. With regard to the CEO work context, this study points out 
the value to the Hong Kong publicly listed companies of a high percentage of CEO share 
ownership. Future research could take the next step and connect the percentage of CEO share 
ownership with an insider CEO as having a joint effect on organisation performance.  
 In the Australian context, the study discussed the value to the organisation of long 
CEO tenure where that CEO is a good steward of organisational resources (Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen 2001). The study has highlighted the value to the Australian stock 
exchange listed companies of selecting a CEO with an output-oriented functional 
background. It is rational for future research to take the next step and connect the length of 
CEO tenure with a CEO having an output-dominated functional background as having a joint 
effect on organisation performance. Incorporating the non-executive director ratio into this 
joint effect could allow an opportunity for future research to test for three-way interactions 
(Dawson & Richter 2006). In the Australian context, the study has found the value to the 
organisation of long CEO tenure which is joint with a lower non-executive director ratio. It is 
reasonable for future research to take the next step and connect length of CEO tenure and the 
non-executive director ratio with a CEO having an output-oriented functional background, as 
having a joint effect on organisation performance. This interconnection between the three 
variables may provide a useful contribution to the development of stewardship theory, 
resource dependence theory, agency theory and upper echelon theory. 
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 Second, the findings here indicate that between countries there were similarities and 
differences in relation to the influence of the professional development and work context of 
the CEO. For instance, the CEO share ownership percentage was found to have a more 
important impact on organisation performance in the Australian and Hong Kong business 
contexts than in the United States context. Based on the results of this study, it is therefore 
recommended that there be a study of the effect of the professional development and work 
context of the CEO on organisation performance in other national contexts. In particular, an 
exploration of this research area in the Japanese context may contribute additional valued 
insights to the global debate on convergence. This is because the Japanese corporate 
governance model is characterised by maximisation of stakeholders’ values and is in utmost 
contrast with the Anglo-American model that maximises shareholders’ interests (Yoshimori 
1995). If archival data for the CEO professional development and work context variables and 
the organisation performance variable could be obtained for Japanese publicly listed 
companies, then it would be interesting to compare the results of such a study to the results of 
the present study. In testing the convergence hypothesis, future research should consider 
more emerging stock markets, for example Russia. In their study of the Russian Trading 
System Stock Exchange listed firms, Yukhanaev, Nguyen, Galvin and Demirbas (2014) 
found that these firms seem to adopt many of the principles of the Cadbury Report with 
regard to board composition. However in reality they discovered many of the non-executive 
directors are figureheads only, are often treated as merely consultative resources and have 
little power. The board is often regarded as a technical instrument to realise objectives and 
policies ‘skewed towards satisfaction of the dominant proprietors’ and to make decisions in a 
way that benefits certain political groups (Yukhanaev et al. 2014, p. 256).  
 Third, this present study found an area of cross-country similarity in the significant, 
positive relationship between a CEO with an output-oriented functional background and 
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organisation performance across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. Future research 
could explore the relationship between CEO functional background and organisation 
performance in different settings—for example in other national contexts or in other 
organisational forms, such as SMEs—to see if such a relationship is statistically significant. 
Such a study may provide a better understanding of how the CEO functional background can 
become reflected in the organisational outcomes and, consequently, it may advance the 
development of upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason 1984).  
 Fourth, the empirical findings in relation to the negative effect of the non-executive 
director ratio on organisation performance in Australia and in Hong Kong signifies that future 
research should focus more attention on the role of inside, executive directors in enhancing 
organisation performance. Future research could look into the issues of how many executive 
directors should be included on a company board, the ideal average tenure of executive 
directors, and the specialisation or functional backgrounds of executive directors, and how 
these factors would affect firm performance. Such an exploration through the use of 
qualitative interviews or quantitative statistical analysis may provide fresh valuable insights, 
especially for countries such as Australia and the United States, which are implementing the 
prevalent practice of having a majority of non-executive directors on the board. Particularly, 
it may provide a useful insight into the issues of separation of control and ownership which 
have been the main focus of agency theory—whether these issues might need to be revisited, 
or whether a more balanced composition between non-executive directors and executive 
directors on the board would benefit firm performance. An exploration into these issues will 
provide a clearer understanding of when agency theory applies and when stewardship theory 
applies. 
 This research solely focuses on the non-executive director ratio as the moderating 
variable; however, this study has recognised differences in institutional and competitive 
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environments between Australia, the United States and Hong Kong. This opens up an 
opportunity for further study that explores the effect of the institutional and competitive 
environments in moderating the influence of the professional development and work context 
of the CEO. Such a study should contribute to a better understanding of convergence theory 
and institutional theory. Different constructs such as institutional support and competitive 
uncertainty may be used as potential moderating variables (Qian, Cao & Takeuchi 2013). 
7.6 Conclusion 
 The practice of corporate governance is of great interest to a variety of stakeholders 
ranging from the OECD, investors, practising company directors, C-level executives, senior 
managers and politicians (Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 2008; Clarke 2014a). High-profile 
corporate collapses in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s have led to some important changes in 
corporate governance practices—especially board processes and procedures—as professional 
directors, governments, the legal community, the investment community and the accounting 
community sought to rectify shortcomings in legal jurisdiction and the business environment 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2007; Kroll, Walters & Wright 2008; Clarke 2014a). This thesis 
has undertaken a multi-theoretic perspective on upper echelon theory, convergence theory 
and several corporate governance theories to develop numerous challenging hypotheses, 
which lead to some interesting findings.  
Solutions that this thesis offers on CEO professional development and work context 
matters for consideration by practitioners to improve organisation performance, and which 
are supported by theoretical arguments, include preference for selection of: 
• a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, encouraging CEO share 
ownership, a lower non-executive director ratio, or high CEO tenure and a lower 
non-executive director ratio in a moderation relationship (that is, acting jointly) in 
Australia; 
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• an insider CEO, a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, or a CEO 
with international work experience in the United States; 
• an insider CEO, a CEO with an output-oriented functional background, 
encouraging CEO share ownership, or a lower non-executive director ratio in Hong 
Kong. 
This research identified an area of similarity in the cross-sectional CEO output-
oriented functional background data across Australia, the United States and Hong Kong, and 
in prediction by the use of a cross-sectional CEO output-oriented functional background 
variable of the dependent variable, organisation performance, to support a convergence 
argument. However, this research identified a few areas of difference in certain cross-
sectional CEO professional development and CEO work context data. This is particularly 
identified in the relatively large number of cases of CEO duality still seen in the United States 
context, and in the relatively higher percentage of CEO share ownership in the Hong Kong 
context. With regard to convergence, the claim for total convergence in corporate governance 
across different countries is not fully supported in this research, at least for the time period 
covered in the study, although this research evidences a number of pockets of convergence in 
certain CEO professional development and (or) work context issues. It has been argued that 
the process of convergence and the change in institutions could happen in slow motion 
(Aguilera & Jackson 2003). This cross-sectional research provides a benchmark for future 
research, which may allow longitudinal aspects in this research area to be investigated and 
thus contribute to a better understanding of the convergence process. 
 The influence of the professional development and work context of the CEO could 
vary from one country to another; therefore, scholars in this research area should be cautious 
in interpreting the extent to which they can generalise their findings, especially if only one 
national context is considered. In conclusion, the study conducted here has provided a 
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reliable, acceptable and valid piece of evidence that contributes to the current global 
corporate governance research agenda and opens up an avenue of future research 
opportunities. 
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